THE DALLAS COWBOYS and the NFL

By DONALD CHIPMAN,
RANDOLPH CAMPBELL, and
ROBERT CALVERT

Foreword by
TEX SCHRAMM



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FOREWORD

When the authors of *The Dallas Cowboys and the NFL* first came to me to discuss the possibilities of writing the book, my immediate response was, "Is there a demand for such a book? Would it fill a void in information about professional football?" It did not take me long to conclude that there was indeed a need for a book of this kind. There is no denying the massive impact, social and economic, that professional football has had on the American public, particularly in the past decade. The rapid rise in the popularity of the game has been paralleled by the growth in sophistication of football fans. Many have insatiable appetites for information about their team and its players, both on and off the field, and their interest extends to the operation of the club itself. *The Dallas Cowboys and the NFL*, based on a thorough study of the club organization, provides facts and figures about the team and its operation.

This book is not a collection of x's and o's or first downs and touchdowns. It is primarily the story of another kind of competition, the competition off the field which helps to ensure that there is competition in the stadiums on Sunday afternoons. It focuses on such subjects as the common player draft, the division of television revenue, the option clause in player contracts, and the division of live gate revenue at home and on the road. Without regulations in these matters, the competition which has captured the fans in the 1960's could be lost. In addition, there

is a comprehensive look at computerized scouting, which the Dallas Cowboys have helped to pioneer.

In the financial area, the book traces the lean years of sharing the Dallas dollar with the Dallas Texans through the expensive war between the leagues until the Cowboys finally achieved a black-ink ledger. The key role played by television money is illustrated, and the fact is brought out that even today, with the Cowboys holding one of the most successful franchises in the National Football League, the return is surprisingly short in relation to investment.

Over and above these topics, the book deals with the social and cultural impact of professional football on the American scene and the reasons for its popularity.

The Dallas Cowboys and the NFL is a different kind of book about professional football. One of its strengths is that it was written by historians, professionals whose work required total accuracy and authenticity. Their diligence and professional curiosity have made it a unique publication.

TEX SCHRAMM
President and General Manager
The Dallas Cowboys

Dallas, Texas
May, 1970

PREFACE

Professional football's spectacular rise in popularity in the last ten years requires little by way of illustration. While regular-season attendance at National Football League games did not reach three million until 1958, preseason game attendance alone in the NFL and the American Football League in 1969 surpassed that mark. Clearly, in the hearts of many Americans football had replaced baseball as the national pastime. When the Columbia Broadcasting System ran a television special entitled "Big Game America" in September, 1969, there was no need to explain that the subject was professional football.

The popularity of the sport in the 1960's has created an interest that extends far beyond the Sunday afternoon action that takes place on the field. There is more to the "game" than the players, the coaches, and the on-field tactics. The successes of George Plimpton's *Paper Lion*, Jerry Kramer's *Instant Replay*, and Eliot Asinof's *Seven Days to Sunday* testify to the interest in the "inside" activities of pro teams. Histories of the NFL and AFL as well as encyclopedias of professional football have been published. Television has dealt with the game in both dramatic and documentary programs. Hollywood has produced a movie version of *Paper Lion* and a film called *Number One* about an aging quarterback facing the end of his career. In print and on film, however, the focus has been on players and action on the field. Hollis Alpert of *Saturday Review*, in his com-

ments on *Number One*, remarked that "a fascinating opportunity was missed to take us inside the huge sport-business-financial complex, to show us the wheeling, dealing, and sheer professionalism of the sport, as well as the staging of this often brutal spectacle."

The opportunity to deal with football off the field is the basis for this book. In the fall of 1968, we began to mature plans to study the planning, organization, development, and operation of a professional football team. Our approach was easily determined. A history of the Dallas Cowboy organization, we believed, would provide the necessary perspective on professional football in the 1960's and at the same time would allow us to deal with all the important aspects of professional football off the field.

In the ten years since they began play in 1960, the Dallas Cowboys have become one of the most successful modern expansion teams in the NFL. Overcoming tremendous odds—including the failure of an earlier NFL franchise in Dallas in 1952, competition with the AFL's Dallas Texans and a winless first season—the Cowboys built a team that came within thirteen seconds of the NFL championship in 1967. They have developed into one of professional football's "glamor" teams; a team that has considerable appeal nationally. It seems no accident that Cowboy games were chosen by CBS for three of its special national telecasts in 1969—the Monday night game in October, the Thanksgiving Day game, and the Saturday game in December. This history of the Dallas Cowboys' first ten years seeks to explain the leadership, business and financial organization, and managerial operations that have made the team a success in the NFL.

Because of the role of the Cowboys in the rivalry between the National and American Football leagues, this book is more than a business history of one team. Lamar Hunt, a wealthy young

Dallasite, founded the AFL in 1960 with his own Dallas Texans as one franchise. The Cowboys began operations that same year, making Dallas a focal point in the struggle between the leagues. The "battle for Dallas" between the Cowboys and the Texans is important in the history of major league football and demonstrates the special nature of competition in the business of professional sports. Competition within a league is controlled to preserve the financial and playing equality of the member teams, and therefore the league. Without such controls, one or two franchises might come to dominate the league so completely that the interest of most fans would be destroyed. Competition between the NFL and AFL, however, was total and uncontrolled for six years. In Dallas the clash between the Cowboys and the Texans could have had only two results; one team had to leave the city or lose its identity through a merger with the other.

While professional football is a major sport-business, it is also a major social phenomenon of our age. "Sunday afternoon madness" affects millions of Americans from September through December. Why is pro football the most popular sport of our time? In attempting to answer this question, we gathered information from people both outside and inside the game. We speculate on what a pro team means to a community, in short, on the social impact of a professional sports organization and its players on a major American city.

The study is not footnoted, but it contains a chapter by chapter statement of sources and a bibliography. It is based on solid research, which includes interviews with Clint Murchison, Jr., principal owner of the Cowboys; Lamar Hunt, founder of the AFL and owner of the Kansas City Chiefs; Tex Schramm, president and general manager of the Cowboys; head coach Tom Landry; and many other key management, coaching, and player personnel. We have had access to the Cowboys' financial

records as well as extensive information on their computerized scouting system. A number of Dallas business and civic leaders answered questionnaires concerning the social and commercial impact of the Cowboys in the community. Extensive use has been made of newspapers and a wide range of periodical literature as well as published sources on the history of professional football. The annual press-radio-television guidebooks of the Cowboys and other NFL teams have also been useful sources of information.

We wish to thank everyone in the Dallas Cowboys Football Club for their helpful co-operation in our project. Without their kind assistance, it would not have been possible. Lamar Hunt, Angus Wynne, Sr., Robert Cullum, and many other members of the Dallas community who are not associated directly with the Cowboys deserve special mention for their help. Our friend Larry Bowman of the North Texas State University history faculty read the entire manuscript and saved us from many embarrassing mistakes, and we wish also to thank Doris Chipman, our capable typist and indexer.

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PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL: THE "NATIONAL PASTIME"

"The Best Football Game Ever Played," as Tex Maule of *Sports Illustrated* called it, ended when fullback Alan Ameche plunged across the goal line of the New York Giants to break a 17–17 tie in the first sudden-death overtime and give the Baltimore Colts the 1958 National Football League championship. That greatest of all playoff games was fought out on December 28, 1958, before 65,185 enthusiastic fans at Yankee Stadium. A national television audience of nearly fifty million people meant, however, that the impact of the game extended far beyond New York City. As Maule explained it: "The classics of the pre-television era have been perpetuated only in the minds of the spectators on hand and by the newspaper accounts; this for the first time, was a truly epic game which inflamed the imagination of a national audience." Perhaps this game, then, as much as any single contest could, signaled the arrival of professional football as the national spectator sport. It was also the harbinger of an expanded interest in professional football that brought forth fourteen new teams in the 1960's.

The popularity of National Football League competition had been building steadily through the 1950's. Attendance reached the two million mark in 1952 and passed three million in the 1958 season, which ended so dramatically in Yankee Stadium. The continued rise of the game thereafter became almost spectacular. Within five years, attendance approached four and

one-half million; within ten years it was close to seven million. The new American Football League, in operation after 1960, gradually built fan support above two and one-half million by 1968.

Professional baseball, with its longer season and more games, continued to draw larger total attendance than professional football, but many observers pointed out that baseball's reign as the "national pastime" was coming to an end. In 1964 the Cleveland Browns of the NFL drew 712,614 for nine contests, including an exhibition doubleheader and the championship game. The Cleveland Indians that year drew 653,293 fans for eighty-one home games. Baltimore's World Champion Orioles played a league game in 1966 before 23,000, while the Colts attracted 31,000 paying customers to a team scrimmage. The first exhibition game of 1969 between the Dallas Cowboys and the Los Angeles Rams drew 87,381 people to the Los Angeles Coliseum. Many baseball teams needed five to eight regular-season games to attract an equal number of fans.

Professional football transcended its regional appeal, as Maule indicated, through increasingly lucrative contracts with its ideal partner in prosperity—television. The Columbia Broadcasting System, in league-package contracts, paid $9,300,000 for the 1962 and 1963 seasons, $28,200,000 for 1964 and 1965, and $37,600,000 for the next two years. In 1964 the American Football League negotiated a contract with the National Broadcasting Company which paid a total of $36,-000,000 over a five-year period.

After the two leagues negotiated a merger in 1966 and began that year to play the Super Bowl, the world championship game guaranteed $15,000 to each player on the winning team. Television rights to that game cost in excess of $2,000,000, making it the most expensive single sports show in the history of television. Perhaps the ultimate proof of professional football's

development into the major televised sport came in the spring of 1969. At that time the American Broadcasting Company signed an $8,500,000 contract for thirteen games to be telecast on Monday nights during the 1970 season when the two leagues will have merged as the NFL. What other sport could sell thirteen Monday night contests for approximately $660,000 each—a year and a half before the games are to be played?

The origins of modern professional football are largely obscured by a haze of unknown players and unrecorded contests that date back to the late nineteenth century. The first professional competition took place in the western Pennsylvania–Ohio area under circumstances of complete disorganization. Possibly it all began in Latrobe, Pennsylvania, in the late summer of 1895, when sixteen-year-old John Brallier accepted ten dollars to quarterback the local team against a neighboring town. There were no leagues or set schedules in that era. Team owners contacted each other for games on an individual basis. Players jumped from one team to another as they saw fit.

The first significant efforts to bring order into the sport came in September, 1920, at Hay's Hupmobile Auto Agency in Canton, Ohio. George Halas, then in the process of creating the Decatur Staleys, suggested to Ralph Hay, owner of the Canton Bulldogs, that a league be formed to fix rules, regulate the handling of players, and create a set schedule. While sitting around on auto fenders and running boards, a number of team managers created the American Professional Football Association with Jim Thorpe (obviously chosen for his reputation as the first professional star rather than for his stabilizing administrative ability) as its first president. It was announced that team franchises would cost one hundred dollars, an ambitious figure since there was probably not a total of one hundred dollars in cash in the room at the time. In the best American tradition, the National Football League, as the organization was renamed

in 1922, had humble beginnings. Those origins would not be overcome easily.

Of the eleven original franchises in the league in 1920, only two, the Decatur Staleys (Chicago Bears after 1921) and the Chicago Cardinals (St. Louis Cardinals after 1960), are still in operation. Unlike the Green Bay Packers, who joined the league in 1921 and became a monument to superior organization and community pride, most small-city teams, such as the Canton Bulldogs, the Dayton Triangles, the Muncie Tigers, and the Hammond Pros, were not destined to survive. League membership fluctuated wildly through the 1920's and into the next decade as one franchise after another operated briefly and then went broke. The World Champion Bears of 1932 played fifteen games with teams representing Stapleton, New York, and Portsmouth, Ohio, as well as with the Packers, the Cardinals, the New York Giants, and the Boston Redskins. Exhibition game foes included the Cleveland Panthers and the St. Louis Gunners. The Bears lost eighteen thousand dollars on the way to a championship that year.

Professional football did, however, have its moments of glory in those early years. In 1925 the Bears, with Red Grange, toured the country, drawing capacity crowds in every city, including an estimated seventy-seven thousand in the Polo Grounds for a game with the Giants. The rules were altered to provide a more open, high-scoring game. In 1933 the NFL was divided into Eastern and Western conferences, creating an annual playoff game that grew steadily in popularity. The quality of competition was gradually improved after 1936 by the common college-player draft in which the teams chose talent in the inverse order of their standings after the end of the previous season.

Still the sport failed to fire the imagination of fans in the years before World War II as it was later to do. Much of the general public apparently looked upon professional football as a game

of unrefined violence marked by clawing, kicking, and biting. As Red Hickey, former head coach of the San Francisco Forty-Niners, put it, the professional game had the "image of just a lot of dumb people hitting each other." Only a few "superstars" like Red Grange glamorized pro football, while baseball had its Babe Ruth, Walter Johnson, Dizzy Dean, and Lou Gehrig among dozens of other outstanding stars. NFL attendance edged past the one-million mark in the late thirties, but baseball clearly was not threatened in its position as the national sport.

By 1941 the NFL had become relatively stable, with teams in Chicago (Bears and Cardinals), Green Bay, Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Washington, New York, and Brooklyn. Attendance, sparked by such exciting innovations as the Bears' T formation, which crushed the Redskins 73 to 0 in the 1940 championship game, reached a new high of 1,108,615. The league raised the price of a franchise from the 1933 level of ten thousand dollars to fifty thousand dollars in 1940 and in 1941 named its first commissioner, Elmer Layden of Notre Dame's famed Four Horsemen.

Indications that the NFL was growing up came when it caught the attention of sportsmen of the Southwest and the Pacific Coast, areas where major-league football was not available. Overtures for new franchises to operate in Texas and California, however, were coldly received by the commissioner's office. The basic rule of the NFL had been contraction rather than expansion. Approximately four franchises had failed for every one that was still operating in 1941. Of the ten in operation, only four had ever shown a profit. The successful owners were quite naturally reluctant to spread a barely healthy product too thin. World War II put a temporary end to all efforts for expansion. The game deteriorated badly. Attendance fell below the one-million mark and did not reach 1941 levels again until 1945. NFL teams regularly finished in the red. Nevertheless, the

end of World War II brought the creation of a new professional league and a new kind of "war"—one fought primarily with checkbooks.

By 1944, Arch Ward of the *Chicago Tribune*, founder of the College All-Star Game and a born promoter, became convinced that the time was ripe to create a second major league in football to duplicate the successful arrangement in baseball. A number of wealthy men agreed with Ward on the game's potential. Anthony J. Morabito, a lumberman from San Francisco, had sought an NFL franchise in 1941 only to be advised to stay in the lumber business. Arthur (Mickey) McBride, a Cleveland newspaperman and taxi magnate who saw his first pro game in 1940, had failed in repeated efforts to purchase the Cleveland Rams. Morabito, McBride, and four other prospective club-owners met secretly with Ward in St. Louis in 1944. The result was the All-America Football Conference, which began play in 1946.

A-AFC operations began with eight franchises located in Buffalo, Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami (which moved to Baltimore in 1947), San Francisco, Brooklyn, and New York. (The New York team was originally the Yankees of the NFL, but it jumped to the A-AFC in 1945.) The new conference sought an agreement with the NFL, but the established league refused to recognize or co-operate with the upstart pros. Throughout four seasons, 1946–49, the battle continued, marked by rising costs and dwindling attendance in the A-AFC. The sports economy of the country was not yet able to support two professional leagues. A merger agreement effected in 1950 killed the A-AFC with the exception of the Cleveland, San Francisco, and Baltimore franchises, which were incorporated into the NFL.

In some ways, the war of the two leagues was good for pro football: it stimulated interest among sports fans; competition

for players resulted in unheard-of bonuses, higher salaries, and more fringe benefits, all of which attracted larger numbers of better athletes; players from the folded A-AFC franchises were selected in an open draft that also improved the quality of most NFL teams; and the Cleveland and San Francisco franchises became two of the strongest in the league. Finally, there was the lesson of the need to maintain the competitive level of all the teams in a league. Cleveland had dominated the A-AFC so completely that the Browns were that league's only champions. They destroyed competition to the point of killing fan interest. Obviously, a successful league required better balance among its teams.

The 1950 merger made the NFL a thirteen-team, truly national organization. San Francisco joined the Los Angeles Rams, who had moved from Cleveland in 1946, to bring first-class professional competition to the Pacific Coast. By and large, the league prospered, although regular-season attendance still had not passed two million and not every franchise enjoyed success. The Baltimore Colts were a failure on the field, where their record was one win for eleven losses, and at the home gate, where they averaged less than sixteen thousand per game. As a result, the Baltimore franchise folded in January, 1951. Contraction rather than expansion was still the rule.

Of the twelve teams remaining in the NFL in 1951, the New York Yankees seemed destined to follow the Colts into oblivion. Owner Ted Collins had lost an estimated one and one-half million dollars in eight seasons, and the club's 1951 record was one win, nine losses, and two ties. Collins went to the league meeting in January, 1952, to sell his franchise, and the result was an attempt to expand into Texas, an untapped area with apparently unlimited potential.

Collins' franchise was bought by a twenty-one-man syndicate of Dallas industrialists and oilmen headed by Giles E. Miller,

president of Texas Textile Mills. The purchase price of three hundred thousand dollars for the team that then became the Dallas Texans caused some observers to feel that it was no accident that Miller also served as president of the wacky Dallas Bonehead Club. However, Miller, a football enthusiast who had attempted to make the varsity at the University of Texas, was totally optimistic about his venture into professional sports. Dallas was the football-mad capital of a football-mad state. Southern Methodist University in Dallas had done extremely well at the gate in the era of Doak Walker and Kyle Rote, necessitating expansion of the Cotton Bowl. Two of the early Texan home games were to be played in that stadium during the Texas State Fair, which had drawn 2,230,000 people during its two-week run in 1951.

Those were indeed reasons for optimism, but the owners of the Texans were plainly carried away by their own dreams. Before the season began, they discussed the possibility that the seventy-six-thousand-seat Cotton Bowl would not accommodate the crowds attracted by pro football. Such sublime confidence moved Karl Hubenthal of the Los Angeles *Examiner* to a sort of poetry:

> Oh, give me a home
> Where the millionaires roam
> And three-hundred-grand is just hay.
> Where seldom is allowed
> a discouraging crowd,
> And the Cotton Bowl is jammed every day.

The Texans might well have directed their energies to attracting fans into the Cotton Bowl and worried later about where to put them. They opened training camp in Kerrville, Texas, and received little attention from the Dallas press; a 34–7 victory over Brooks Army Medical Center in the first exhibi-

tion game was overshadowed on the sports page of the *Dallas Morning News* by a Texas League baseball game. More attention centered on the Texans as the season neared, but there was no concerted effort to compensate through publicity for the obvious weakness of the team's personnel.

Nevertheless, the debut of pro football in Texas on September 28, 1952, appeared to be a natural attraction for fans. Not only was football popular in the state, but the first game was with the New York Giants, a fine team and former crosstown rival of the Yankees now turned Texans. Governor Allan Shivers said, "This is a new era in sports in Texas." Attendance, however, was 17,499 (including ushers, according to one account). The Texans scored first when Tom Landry of the Giants fumbled a punt at his own twenty-two yard line, but the New Yorkers emerged victorious, 24 to 6.

It was hardly an auspicious debut for the Texans. From there their fortunes declined rapidly. The team lost consistently and home attendance dropped to the point that one wit suggested saving time by introducing the fans instead of the players before games. Halfway through the season, the Dallas syndicate gave up and returned the franchise to the league. A thoroughly demoralized outfit, the Texans played out the remainder of their schedule as a road team under the direction of the league. Incredibly, they won their only game of the season over the tough Chicago Bears in Akron, Ohio, before three thousand fans on Thanksgiving Day. Perhaps the Bears were made self-conscious by the lack of crowd noise, something the Texans had become accustomed to.

The first attempt at expansion into Texas ended then in a near disgrace for the NFL. Plainly, it would take time and large financial losses to build a successful franchise in Dallas, and its fans would have to be won to the team as well as to the game in general. The NFL literally gave the Texans to Baltimore, where

Carroll Rosenbloom and his associates built a highly popular club which won the national championship in 1958 and 1959. Had the owners of the Texans properly understood the obstacles to success in the NFL, and had they expected to lose money for at least four or five years, the Dallas Texans might well have played a key role in the rise of pro football to the level of national spectator sport.

Professional football reached its "take-off" point in popularity around 1952 and has risen almost without interruption since then. In December, 1960, *Life* commented: "For eight years National Football League attendance has risen until it has almost reached the saturation point. . . ." Attendance dipped slightly that year to 3,128,296, but by 1967 it reached 6,162,-287, and no one was talking of saturation. The golden age of professional football had arrived.

One might well ask why this thirty-year-old sport so dramatically captured the imagination of the 1950's and 1960's. Part of the answer obviously lies in the improvement of the game itself. Players became larger, faster, and quicker. The switch to free substitution allowed greater specialization, and the game steadily became more sophisticated. Relatively good competitive balance in the NFL meant that most teams had a real chance to win on any given Sunday. Action-packed, high-scoring games were often not decided until the last minutes of play. Professional football had developed into a combination of speed, finesse, and violent body contact that was greatly attractive to millions of sports fans.

There is much more, however, to the special appeal of the pro game in the fifties and sixties than mere improvement in the quality of play. The game offers a type of athletic competition that is especially fitted to the pace and life style of post–World War II America and has also developed a symbiotic relationship with its ideal partner—television. The "magic box" of the com-

munications media has become a "golden box-office" for NFL franchise owners. Both its style and its television appeal are elements in pro football's rapid growth and financial success.

The United States of today places great value on institutions of mass education that give football first place in their athletic programs. High schools in most parts of the country, increasingly affluent and able to afford the game, have generally given it primary emphasis over basketball and baseball. Football is *the* college game in a society marked by rapid increases in college enrollment. Retention of interest in the game after graduation is natural, and professional football, while it appeals to virtually all classes and levels of society, is pre-eminently an educated man's game.

Elaborate strategies and precise co-ordination of specialized skills make even the huddle intellectually stimulating to many fans. The involved spectator at a professional game must be nearly as mentally alert as the successful coach or player. As *Esquire* said in 1961, "Watching a pro game, if one knows what to look for, can be an exquisite experience." In this sense, the intelligence and finesse of professional competition serves to reflect a part of our society's goals, and this, too, is an important facet of the game's appeal.

More obviously, speed and action in pro football appeal to spectators who live in an age characterized by a blur of action. Fast automobiles, faster airplanes, instant communications, millisecond and faster computer calculations, and, ultimately, the incredible speed of space exploration characterize modern America. A professional football team spends time in the huddle planning, but the snap of the ball means action involving split-second timing for virtually every man on the field.

By comparison, baseball, as Roone Arledge of ABC Sports has pointed out, "is a game of sporadic action interspersed with long lulls." It seems designed for a more leisurely age in

America's past. The central figure in baseball, the pitcher, is concerned primarily with inhibiting action. Action in baseball can be instantaneous, but not on every pitch, and it may be over before it can be properly appreciated. A routine ground ball or a home run is often determined the moment the bat is swung, and the remainder of the play is predictable, if not anticlimactic.

In football the quarterback is the initiator of the action; he accomplishes nothing until he puts his entire team into motion. A long touchdown run or pass is exciting from beginning to end. Even when a back is stopped at the line of scrimmage for no gain, most of the players on both teams are involved in a clash of wills and physical conflict. An average football game usually generates exciting action for four quarters, and pro fans demand it. It is not pleasant to imagine their reaction if it took five or ten minutes to warm up a relief quarterback!

Professional football players have been called "Sunday's Gladiators," who participate in "The American War Game." These terms highlight the obvious presence of violence and personal danger on the field. There are two distinct but related levels of thought that emphasize these elements in explaining the appeal of pro football.

Although the theory may appeal only to the highly imaginative, there is an intriguing if not eerie parallel between pro football and the development of Cold War foreign policy. With that policy, the United States broke with its isolationist traditions and developed a state of perpetual war readiness marked by ultimate reliance on nuclear retaliation. In the 1950's most of the pro teams moved from a ground-oriented game toward greater dependence on a more wide-open passing game. As Thomas Morgan wrote in *Esquire*, "What could be more appropriate for our time than the Sabbath roar: 'throw the bomb'." The Cold War moves from conflict to conflict without victory; America's war game on Sunday concludes with total victory every year.

Perhaps part of its appeal is the result of its symbolism and the fact that it does offer an unmistakable and tension-relieving conclusion.

At a different and less imaginative level, the appeal of the violence and personal danger in football becomes more concrete. The United States is indisputably a violent nation, characterized by a brutal war in Vietnam, an ever-rising crime rate, destructive riots and student disorders, and a daily fare of "televiolence" which is defended as one of the "facts of life." Certainly professional football draws much of its popularity from its role as a mirror of our psychic state as a violent people. A crushing tackle or shattering block is the most exciting and satisfying part of the game to millions of spectators, and few players or coaches will quarrel with the idea that violence is a key element in their game's appeal. Ralph Neely, the All-Pro offensive tackle of the Dallas Cowboys, cheerfully agrees that people "love to see somebody get the hell knocked out of them. They get a big kick out of it. The guy that is knocking the hell out of the other guy gets a big kick out of it, too." Yet there have been no complaints about this aspect of pro football comparable to those directed at other forms of television programing. Vince Lombardi has provided a concise explanation of this circumstance. "Football is violence. There is nothing wrong with violence as long as it is controlled."

Professional football does offer a refined and controlled conflict of man against man that offers a mental as well as a physical challenge to the participants. It appeals to spectators and may, at the same time, have a purgative effect on the viewer. John Niland of the Cowboys expresses this idea when he argues that "knocking another human being down is probably the biggest thing some people would like to do when their boss gets on their back. I feel that basically this is why they watch television—to watch us knock other guys down." At least there are few com-

plaints that the violence of football stimulates similar action among its fans. Perhaps it does even ease destructive impulses, although there is no guarantee that the fan whose team has just been humiliated fifty to nothing will feel relieved of all aggressive tendencies.

Television executives might attempt, in much the same way, to plead the cathartic effects of television violence, but there is a vast difference between the action in football and that in a television show. Television violence is more extreme in what is depicted, while at the same time it is obviously make-believe: the hero emerges unmarked from a murderous brawl; a .30-caliber rifle bullet in the shoulder produces only a "flesh wound" and the comment, "I'm all right, Marshal"; and bloodless mannikins are slaughtered by the dozen. It isn't real. Football is less extreme, but there can be no question of the reality of the action. Eric Sevareid of CBS News has suggested that if television showed only the life and death results of the violence it depicts, the trauma might purify the country. A football player like Dan Reeves or Gale Sayers lost for a season or perhaps with his career ended due to injuries testifies eloquently to the all-too-real results of even controlled violence.

We do not attempt here or elsewhere to defend the violence of professional football, but no American of these times need apologize for recognizing the public appeal of controlled physical conflict. Indeed, professional football may be one of the most socially acceptable forms of violence in the United States today.

It appears to be no accident that automobile racing has joined pro football as a fast-rising spectator sport of the last twenty years. Both sports offer spectacular competition that combines education, specialized skills, speed, timing, and continual action. The analogy is imperfect, but they also offer the elements of personal danger and violence to varying degrees. Both football and racing match the pace and life style of the post–World War II era.

Football, however, has the additional and overwhelmingly important advantage of being an ideal television sport. Radio is an adequate communications medium for baseball. The action can be and has been broadcast from tape, the scoring is generally concentrated in two or three innings, and play takes place in a carefully prescribed area, usually the infield and the basepaths. The strategy is often less immediately obvious than in football, and most of the players at any given time are not involved in the action or, in the case of televised baseball, are off screen. A view of the dugout, even in a close contest, hardly adds to the spectator's appreciation of the game. Baseball is a great sport, but not a great television sport.

Football, in contrast, has great affinity with the television medium, which allows fans to follow the unpredictable action on the field while receiving the full force of the exciting and appealing strategy and tactics of the game. Action begins with the quarterback and flows naturally from him so that there is no need to cut to events on other parts of the field as in baseball. The viewer at home, at times even more than the paying spectator, can appreciate the tension of coaches and players on the bench, "feel" the physical contact of the players on the field, and be stimulated between plays by the strategic intricacies of the game. As many as ten million fans may watch pro football in person during a season, but the television audience for a single game may exceed fifty million.

Television gave pro football the nationwide exposure that made it the national spectator sport of the 1960's, and at the same time, pro football was the quality sports attraction that gave television an exciting commodity on Sunday afternoons. The groundwork for this successful partnership is built on a mutually advantageous financial relationship. The first NFL

playoff game was telecast in 1951. In 1958, the game sold for $200,000. The price rose to $615,000 in 1961 and then soared to $1,800,000 in 1964 and $2,000,000 in 1969. Television income from regular season contests and special games often makes the difference between profit and loss for a franchise. The networks have benefited too, as the price of a one-minute commercial during a playoff game has risen to a figure in excess of $75,000. Clearly, football and television have been good for each other.

The sudden-death playoff game of 1958 had all the ingredients that have made the sport popular—intricate strategy, spectacular action, suspense, and violent physical contact. Television gave a truly appealing sport national exposure. The 1958 season broke most records for attendance and receipts; the NFL in 1959 piled another great season on top of the previous one. There was a brief setback in attendance in 1960, probably due to the new American Football League, but since then the game has steadily advanced in every way.

A sport that began as a Sunday afternoon affair, because the college football games occupied Saturdays, became an object of near worship for many Americans in the 1960's. The dedication of professional football's Hall of Fame shrine in 1963 prompted "Pen-ultimate," a columnist in *Christian Century*, a magazine devoted to religious trends, to observe that "professional football seems to be eclipsing baseball as our nation's folk religion." He explained further:

> Pro football is an earthy, grinding, crunching game that suits the American temper. It has universalistic pretensions; every metropolis wants a team. It has missionary zeal; television spreads its saving word. With the annual extension of pre and post season activities, it will soon have a full church year. It lacks nothing in the way of votaries or sacrificial sufferers: just watch a football crowd on a December day. It has tragic heroes like Big Daddy Lipscomb, sages like Y. A. Tittle, betrayers like Paul Hornung, patriarchs like George Halas, and priests like Byron "Whizzer" White, who presided over the Canton shrine's dedication. . . . All the earmarks of high religion are here.

"Pen-ultimate" concluded that he really should decry the brutality and religiosity of pro football—but not this Sunday.

Booming prosperity and national popularity of the sport dictated a cautious move from contraction to expansion by the NFL. Every major city wanted to be a part of what would certainly be the sport of the sixties. In Dallas, where the Texans of 1952 had been such a dismal failure, two millionaire sportsmen, Clint Murchison, Jr., and Lamar Hunt, eagerly sought to return major-league football to Texas and make it a success. Bert Bell, the able commissioner of the NFL, encouraged their interest, but suggested that they attempt to purchase an existing franchise and move it to Dallas.

Murchison and Hunt were temporarily frustrated in their individual quests for a franchise for Dallas by 1958, but the logic of the situation was on their side. Commissioner Bell and George Halas of the Chicago Bears had begun to talk of expansion by granting new franchises. The National Football League had not granted a totally new franchise since 1937, but the ghosts of over forty deceased teams no longer haunted the game. Dallas was to get its franchise.

DALLAS GETS ITS TEAM(S): COWBOYS VS. TEXANS

Professional football, indeed too much of it, returned to Dallas in 1960. Two major-league franchises, the Cowboys of the NFL and the Texans of the infant American Football League, began a fight for supremacy in a city that was the second smallest in the pro ranks and had failed in 1952 to support even one team. The results were unfortunate for both teams, for the Dallas community, and to some extent for the whole game of professional football. Both franchises suffered heavy financial losses, the community became divided and refused to rally behind either team, and the Cowboys and Texans were central to a bitter controversy between the NFL and AFL that was detrimental to both leagues.

The man primarily responsible for returning NFL competition to Dallas was thirty-five-year-old Clint Murchison, Jr., an aggressive businessman with an engineering degree from Duke University and a master's degree in mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Murchison and his older brother John inherited wealth and a solid education in finance from their multimillionaire father, Clint Murchison, Sr., who reportedly once said, "Money is like manure. Spread it." The philosophy may seem homespun, but at the time of his death in 1969, the senior Murchison had amassed a family fortune estimated at five hundred to eight hundred million dollars. After the Murchison brothers joined forces in Dallas in 1950, John

specialized in finance, insurance, and publishing, while Clint, Jr., concentrated on real estate and construction. Together, they made a formidable combination that owned or directed enterprises worth more than one billion dollars by 1960.

Clint, Jr., thoroughly infected by the football "bug" at an early age, needed no convincing about the potential of pro football in Texas. He had bought twenty season tickets to support the Dallas Texans of 1952. Finding the immediate failure of the team incredible, he had offered at mid-season to buy the franchise. But the syndicate of owners felt hard pressed and refused to honor his request for time to study their books.

After the Texans folded, Murchison became determined to bring professional football back to Dallas. He completed the financial arrangements for purchasing the San Francisco franchise in 1954, but personal difficulties involving one of the parties in the transaction caused the deal to fall through. In 1956 and 1957 Murchison negotiated unsuccessfully with the late George P. Marshall of the Washington Redskins for the acquisition of that franchise. It seems that Marshall insisted on going with the franchise in a management position. Murchison also negotiated with the owners of the Chicago Cardinals, the Wolfner family, but did not make an offer because he became convinced that they did not seriously mean to sell.

By the late 1950's Clint, Jr., was not alone in his desire to bring pro football back to Dallas. Lamar Hunt, son of one of the world's richest men, H. L. Hunt, was another Dallasite with the sports "bug" in his blood. As a young man under college age in 1952, he had been surprised by the fact that the owners of the Texans expected to make money from the beginning and had failed to stick with their team through one rough year. Hunt, while making an enthusiastic if somewhat unsuccessful attempt to play college football at Southern Methodist University in the mid-fifties, developed an interest in how the professional game

would fare if returned to Dallas. In 1957 and 1958 he approached Commissioner Bell concerning a franchise for the city. Bell advised him to negotiate with the Chicago Cardinals. Hunt, like Murchison, found that because the Wolfner family wanted to continue its struggle with the Bears they talked with prospective buyers primarily in the hope of acquiring new support for the franchise in Chicago or in the hope of driving up the price of the Cardinals.

The unsuccessful efforts of both Murchison and Hunt to acquire an existing team for Dallas coincided with building pressure to expand the NFL by adding completely new franchises. During the early 1950's, most owners had been hesitant to expand because three or four existing teams were usually weak on the field and/or at the gate. By the late 1950's, however, a majority of league members felt that the NFL should expand to sixteen teams during the 1960's. Only two owners, the Wolfners and George P. Marshall, opposed expansion into new cities.

The Cardinal owners had long competed with George Halas for supremacy in Chicago. Halas was determined to keep the Bears where they were, but he wanted the Cardinals out. The Wolfners, on the other hand, in the late 1950's repeatedly talked of selling but never did. If, however, the NFL expanded into new cities, the high marketability of the Cardinals would be cut because there would be fewer places for them to go. George Marshall, who reigned as one of the game's true patriarchs, had been pro football's great innovator in the 1930's and 1940's. It seems that he feared that NFL expansion would mean new teams in the South where the television market for the Redskins was especially lucrative. The intransigence of Marshall and the Wolfners toward expansion could not be broken.

There were good reasons for expansion. NFL teams were approaching a reasonable equality in playing strength, so ex-

pansion would not threaten competition in the league. The healthier financial condition of the game, due to its growing popularity and television revenue, encouraged the idea that it would prosper in cities like Dallas, Houston, Atlanta, Miami, and Buffalo. Some owners simply believed that the game should be available to more spectators. Negatively, there was the fear that a new league, like the All-America Football Conference, would appear to compete with the NFL. There was also some feeling that expansion would aid in passage of the "Sports Bill," a piece of legislation intended to exempt professional sports from most features of the antitrust laws.

Testifying before a congressional committee hearing on the Sports Bill in July, 1957, Commissioner Bert Bell predicted expansion by 1960. In January, 1958, he appointed an expansion committee of the NFL headed by George Halas, an ardent supporter of an enlarged league. There was strong opposition from Marshall and, to a lesser extent, from the Wolfners, an opposition that could kill expansion, for the by-laws of the NFL at that time required unanimous approval for new franchises. Bell and Halas decided against pushing the matter of expansion at the annual meeting in January, 1959. Accordingly, no recommendations were made by Halas and his committee.

Most of the owners who favored the addition of new franchises felt that Dallas and Houston, in a state where football was so popular, should be the first two cities admitted. This meant that Clint Murchison, because of his long-term interest in a franchise for Dallas, headed the list of potential new team owners. Halas first encouraged Murchison in 1958 to expect expansion in 1960, but after the January, 1959, meeting, Murchison was advised that the league would not move into Dallas until 1961. Halas suggested a meeting later in 1959 to discuss the formalities of applying for a franchise at the 1960 annual meeting. At the same time in early 1959, Art Rooney of

the Steelers visited Houston to discuss the operation of a new franchise there in 1961. A telephone press conference between Rooney and Halas made public, with Commissioner Bell's approval, the intention of the NFL to return to Texas.

In the meantime, Lamar Hunt, who was still attempting to purchase the Cardinals, had an exciting idea while flying home from one of his unsuccessful trips to Chicago. The Wolfners had pointed out that many wealthy sportsmen around the nation were interested in the Cardinal franchise. Why not, thought Hunt, create a new league that would offer pro football to many of these interested sportsmen and major cities? At that point Lamar Hunt began to plan secretly to organize a new professional league.

Hunt continued to discuss the possibilities for a new NFL franchise in Dallas with Bell and Halas, but he found their answers unsatisfactory. To this day, Hunt maintains that he was told that no expansion would take place. That statement conflicts with the evidence offered by Murchison and NFL leaders. Hunt, like Murchison, was offered an opportunity to make a presentation at the 1960 annual meeting with the understanding that there was to be no expansion until 1961. It seems certain that Murchison, the older of the two, with a longer record of efforts to obtain a team, would have won any clear-cut competition for an NFL franchise. The two men had met only once, however, and apparently knew little of each other's activities in relation to pro football, so Murchison's head start probably had little effect on Hunt, who, in any case, proceeded quietly in June and July, 1959, to develop the framework of the American Football League.

Hunt revealed his intentions to the NFL on July 17, 1959, by sending Davey O'Brien, a business associate of the Hunts and a former NFL star, to visit Commissioner Bell. O'Brien arranged a meeting between Hunt and Bell on July 29. At this meeting,

Hunt proposed that Bell serve as commissioner of both leagues and that the two leagues co-operate in a common player draft as well as the arrangement of television blackouts during home games. Bell refused all offers but did give friendly advice on how to run a professional football league. He did not mention the possibility of NFL expansion which would compete with the proposed AFL.

Public announcement of the formation of the new American Football League came in early August at Houston. Organization meetings began on August 14. The total composition of the league was far from complete at that time, but it was clear that franchises would operate in Dallas and Houston. Those plans, of course, conflicted with Clint Murchison's hopes for an NFL franchise in Dallas in 1961, and they undercut the plans of George Halas' expansion committee. Murchison asked the NFL for a press statement on its plans for meeting Hunt's threat to establish an AFL franchise in Dallas. He was also afraid that Hunt would gain sole use of the Cotton Bowl for his team, leaving the future NFL club without a stadium. After consulting four other NFL teams, Halas and Rooney, on August 29, issued a press release to the effect that in January, 1960, the expansion committee would recommend new franchises for Dallas and Houston which would begin play in 1961.

At this point the possibility of disastrous competition between two Dallas teams came into the open. Murchison conferred with Hunt in an effort to reach mutual agreement, not just on Dallas, but on a settlement that would satisfy other potential AFL owners as well. He offered to share the Dallas NFL franchise with Hunt, but no understanding could be reached. Murchison then decided to request that the date of expansion be moved up to 1960 in order to begin the competition on an equal footing with Hunt's AFL team.

Commissioner Bert Bell died on October 11, 1959, while

attending a game at Franklin Field in Philadelphia. At his funeral the owners discussed expansion and Murchison's request for a franchise in 1960. Only the Redskins voted in the negative on the proposal that the NFL expand with two new teams for the following season. On October 19, Halas issued a statement to the press which promised a franchise for Dallas in 1960 and a team for Houston if a suitable stadium could be found. Two more franchises were to be granted in 1961 or 1962. Ten of the twelve NFL teams, a sufficient number to change the league's by-laws in order to grant the franchises and make good on the promise, approved the press release.

Murchison, now able to meet Hunt on at least equal terms, repeated at a second conference on October 25 his proposal that the problem be settled by granting NFL franchises to Dallas, Houston, Minneapolis, and Miami. He offered to step completely out of the picture and allow Hunt full ownership of the Dallas franchise. As Murchison later remembered it, he said, "Lamar, if you really want this so badly, I'll withdraw from the Dallas franchise and you can have it." Hunt, however, was too deeply committed to his new league, which was planning to play in New York, Los Angeles, and several other cities as well as those covered by Murchison's proposal, to accept any compromise. He could not, as he says, tell the prospective AFL owners, "Well gee, fellows, it was a good idea, but I would rather go another route now." There were further meetings between representatives of the NFL and the AFL in the last months of 1959, but no agreements were reached.

Hunt publicly called the NFL's move into Dallas "sabotage" and announced that his plans had not changed "in the least." They suffered a further setback, however, in December, 1959, when the Minneapolis–St. Paul group decided to withdraw from the proposed new league, to ask for a refund of their

twenty-five-thousand-dollar deposit on an AFL franchise, and then to petition for an NFL franchise in 1961. By that time Hunt was devoting most of his efforts to convincing the NFL owners not to expand into Dallas and to collecting information in support of antitrust action against the NFL aimed at keeping it out of Dallas, the birthplace and titular headquarters of the AFL.

Murchison, after being rebuffed by Hunt in the fall of 1959, went ahead with plans to obtain his franchise and build the Dallas Rangers, as his team was first called. In his efforts he had the enthusiastic cooperation of George Halas, who had his own reasons for bringing Dallas into the league. Halas, whose dedication to the NFL is an article of faith, helped sway hesitant team owners in favor of expansion to meet the challenge from the rival AFL in Texas. He also must have sensed a golden opportunity for himself and the Bears. The Wolfners would have to move the Cardinals soon or face the possibility that choice cities would be claimed by either the AFL or the expanding NFL. It appears to have been not entirely coincidental that the 1960 season found the Cardinals playing in St. Louis.

One of Murchison's first responsibilities in building his team was to find a tough and resourceful executive leader. The task ahead for the Rangers was so demanding that it required a man with unlimited energy and long experience in pro football. Accordingly, Murchison asked George Halas to recommend someone for the key position of general manager. Halas pointed to Texas E. Schramm, then assistant director of sports for CBS in New York, who had had ten years of experience—including several as general manager—with the Los Angeles Rams organization. Schramm took the position in October, 1959—contingent, of course, upon Murchison's receiving a franchise the following January. CBS, which also has an eye for talent, told Schramm he could have his old job back if the franchise for Dallas fell

through. Schramm, employing his experience and contacts with professional football, immediately went to work to put together a team.

From the beginning there were severe handicaps. Because Murchison had not received his franchise, the Rangers did not participate in the December, 1959, draft and missed their full share of the best college talent. No other NFL expansion club has been so handicapped. Schramm had to improvise from the very first. He paid the Rams $5,000 for all their scouting files on players not drafted, and he enlisted the aid of friends around the country to sign free agents for the Rangers. The budding Dallas organization had no NFL contracts, and Austin Gunsel, who served as interim commissioner after Bell's death, refused to give any to a club without a franchise. Undeterred, Schramm acquired a set of contracts and had them duplicated. The first Dallas players signed counterfeit contracts with a rider stipulating that the agreement was not binding unless Murchison received a franchise.

The twenty-six free agents already signed by Schramm became an important asset in Murchison's fight for a franchise at the annual meeting of the NFL in January, 1960. The owners, meeting in Miami Beach, were deadlocked for nearly a week over the election of a new commissioner before compromising on Pete Rozelle, the young general manager of the Los Angeles Rams. George Halas cannily avoided involvement in the dispute over the commissioner in order to maintain and build support for expansion. Predictably, opposition came primarily from George P. Marshall of the Washington Redskins, who argued that expansion would weaken existing NFL franchises. There was no mention of what it might do to his southern television market. Marshall publicly stated that "the only reason for expansion I have heard from other owners is that we would destroy the new league." Lamar Hunt listened intently.

In combating this opposition, Halas and those who favored expansion pointed to the free agents who had been signed to play for Dallas and reminded the owners of the previous moral commitment to expand in 1960. The by-laws were then altered to allow expansion if approved by ten of the twelve owners. Murchison had enough votes to get his franchise, but he still made a special effort to placate Marshall. He went to Marshall's hotel room to gain approval from one of the game's grand old men. To his surprise, Murchison found that the Washington owner had a personal grudge against the Rangers. One of Murchison's business associates, Benny Briskin, owned part interest in the Redskins' marching song, "Hail to the Redskins." Marshall finally offered to vote for immediate expansion if Murchison would have all rights to the song transferred to him and agree to pay for all potential losses suffered by the Redskins arising from legal action over the admission of Dallas in 1960. An expansion franchise was then granted on January 28 to Murchison, his brother, and Bedford Wynne, their business associate and a member of the prominent Wynne family of Dallas. They paid $50,000 for the franchise and $550,000 for players to be drawn from existing teams. The NFL could begin competition in Dallas at the same time the AFL began operations there.

In the meantime, the American Football League held its first annual meeting in Dallas. It completed organization for the first year by admitting Oakland as the eighth franchise. Although it avoided such tactics as raiding the NFL for players, the apparent peace and good relations between the two leagues definitely ended at that point. Hunt and the AFL's Commissioner Joe Foss, World War II hero and successful South Dakota politician, threatened antitrust action. Speaking primarily of the Dallas situation, Foss told a Senate antimonopoly subcommittee, "We are victims of a monopoly and we may need

help." In reply, Rozelle pointed out that the AFL was moving into New York, Los Angeles, and the San Francisco area to compete with the NFL. How did that differ, he asked, from his league's move into Dallas?

Hunt countered with the argument that the size of the market area involved made the difference between free competition and attempted monopoly. Since the population of Dallas was under seven hundred thousand in 1960, it would be the smallest city, other than Green Bay, with an NFL franchise. It was clear to all, Hunt argued, that only one professional team could operate successfully in Dallas. The birthplace of the AFL would become the scene of a crucial battle between the leagues.

Murchison renamed his team the Cowboys in March, 1960. Although he still preferred his original choice, Rangers, Schramm convinced him that the name created too much confusion in the press with the Dallas Rangers baseball team of the Texas League. Lamar Hunt, paying no attention to jinxes, since the Dallas Texans of 1952 had been an NFL failure, named his team the Texans. In the best western tradition, the town would not be big enough for both Cowboys and Texans.

Competition between the two teams was fought out everywhere except on the football field for the next three years. The Cowboys and the Texans went to court at the same time they began competing for Dallas fans in the Cotton Bowl. In the spring of 1960, the AFL drew up an antitrust suit. It was formally filed in the Federal District Court of Maryland in October of the same year. The suit asked for injunctive relief from NFL competition in Dallas or any other city to which it might expand and sought triple damages totaling $10,080,000 from members of the older league. The Washington Redskins, presumably because of their opposition to expansion, were exempted from any part of the suit. The NFL was accused of monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize the

metropolitan areas that could support professional teams, the capable players in the country, and the sale of television rights. Both leagues prepared for a lengthy court battle.

The primary purpose of the AFL suit was to drive the Cowboys out of Dallas, but both franchises recognized that the financial success of the rival teams would determine the one that stayed in that city. Clint Murchison, Jr., was hardly a stranger to multimillion-dollar business competition when he organized the Cowboys. His major concern was what could be expected by way of financial returns to determine the success or failure of the venture, and that question involved the entire economy of the professional football business.

The two main sources of income for football clubs were gate receipts and television rights. Radio contracts and game programs containing advertising were minor sources of revenue. Under the terms of their contract with the Cotton Bowl, the Cowboys did not receive any proceeds from the sale of souvenirs or the operation of concessions. There was no income at that time from NFL properties such as films and product endorsements.

While income depended primarily on attendance and television, operating expenses were more varied. Large expenditures went for players' salaries and bonuses as well as for salaries for coaches and management. The training camp, team equipment and supplies, transportation during the season, insurance, and physicians' and hospital bills also became important expenses. The Cowboys paid high rent for the Cotton Bowl and picked up the tab for expensive halftime shows, and all games were filmed at considerable cost for cameramen, equipment, and film. Off the field, Murchison's organization had to maintain business offices, pay telephone and telegraph bills—which alone ran to more than $25,000 for the first year—support promotional campaigns, and build a strong scouting system. Support

for the commissioner's office fell on all league members. There were also the federal admissions tax on game tickets, a Texas state franchise tax on the Cowboys' charter, and the usual payroll taxes.

The economy of running a professional team did not encourage Murchison to expect a quick return on his NFL business venture. The Cowboys were not, however, organized to provide tax relief for a few wealthy investors. Some owners operate their clubs as "subchapter S" private corporations, a setup which allows them to funnel profits or losses into their personal income tax returns and avoid corporation income taxes. The Cowboys were and still are a private corporation which has never been required to divulge publicly profits or losses, but Murchison and associates have not operated the team as a "subchapter S" corporation. Since 1960, the Cowboys have remained subject to standard corporation income tax laws. Losses can be carried forward for five years against profits, but that is a standard feature of the corporation tax laws of the country.

Questions of corporate taxation raised the interesting problem of how to depreciate the Cowboys football club for tax purposes. Capital investment in 1960 was primarily $550,000 in football players. The owners had no other important real assets except the charter, which was expected to maintain its value over the years. The Cowboy organization decided to write off the original investment in players at 10 per cent ($55,000) annually over a ten-year period ending in 1969. In a way it was a good arrangement for the Cowboys. The average active career of a player in the NFL is four and one-half years, but the Cowboys could not logically expect measurable profits within such a brief period. Depreciation over ten years meant that some tax relief would remain while the Cowboy corporation really needed it. Murchison expected to lose money for only the first two years, but, as he put it, "Tex Schramm was less sanguine." The leaders

of the Cowboys perhaps took some cold comfort in the knowledge that Lamar Hunt faced the same financial considerations.

The leadership also found encouragement in the fact that the National Football League had long recognized the need to maintain competitive balance among its teams. To allow any one team to dominate the league (as the Browns had ruled the A-AFC, for example) would destroy fan interest. Club owners therefore had developed a number of controlling devices to maintain relative equality in the strength of teams. They always split the live gate between home and visiting teams in order to round out inequities in the sizes of stadiums and attendance, they designed the draft to provide the best talent for the weakest club, their option clause made it extremely difficult for a veteran to leave one club and join another, and they had an authoritative commissioner, whose special responsibility it was to protect the integrity of the game and maintain the viability of professional competition.

Income from ticket sales to NFL games is still split on the basis of 60 per cent for the home team and 40 per cent or a $30,000 minimum for the visiting team. The importance of this provision can be demonstrated by a hypothetical home and home series between the Cowboys and the New York Giants. Assume that the game in Dallas clears approximately $65,000 while the one in Yankee Stadium nets $200,000. The Giants would then receive $30,000 in Dallas and $120,000 in New York; the Cowboys, $35,000 at home and $80,000 in New York. The Giants would pick up only 57 per cent of the combined gates although their home gate was 200 per cent more than the gate in Dallas.

The college-player draft is designed to build up the weaker teams. Each club picks in the order of its game loss record of the previous season and may choose the outstanding collegiate athlete in the nation or draft on the basis of the team's weakest

position. The Cowboys will always pick the best all-round athlete, but other clubs have their own philosophy. In any event, it is never possible for a team with the most money to buy up more than its share of the most talented players. The record of the Buffalo Bills in 1968 was horrendous, but it earned them the right to draft O. J. Simpson and the immediate opportunity to develop an exciting offense. Needless to say, drafting a superstar helps not only the team but also the gate receipts. There is still the problem of signing college stars, as evidenced by several important holdouts in 1969, but, as Richmond Flowers of the Dallas Cowboys, a second-round draft choice and holdout in 1969, discovered, the club has "all the hole cards." A player either signs with the team that drafted him or faces the very real prospect of missing a year of competition and much more money than he could make anywhere else.

The option clause in NFL player contracts limits the right of a player to move from one team to another. It requires any player wishing to leave a team to play one year without a contract at a salary 10 per cent below the previous year before he becomes a free agent. Retirement from professional football does not void the option clause. If a retired player returns to football, the team he last played with has the same option on his services as though he had never left the game. This clause obviously discourages players who might try to better their situation by jumping from one team to another, and it discourages any owner from attempting to lure away his opponents' key personnel. In any event, the consent of the commissioner, currently Pete Rozelle, is also required. Had the Cowboys picked up Bill Brown of the Minnesota Vikings, who was a free agent after the 1968 season, Rozelle could have ordered the Cowboys to give up one of their stars, such as Bob Hayes or Bob Lilly. The commissioner is truly an autocrat whose power is felt by everyone from Paul Hornung and Alex Karras to "Broadway" Joe Namath. But anyone who

understands professional football recognizes that Rozelle has consistently operated in the best interests of the game.

Television, while it has been a perfect mate for pro football, has from the first required specialized controls in the interest of maintaining competitive balance in the NFL. The Los Angeles Rams telecast all their home games during the 1950 season. They found the results more disastrous for their live gate than competition with the A-AFC's Los Angeles Dons had been in 1949. The Rams were protected by a guaranteed cash gate to be paid by the television sponsors if attendance dropped below a set figure. When sponsors had to pay the Rams $307,000 at the end of the 1950 season, the NFL learned that home games could not be telecast locally. Bert Bell and the owners then agreed on a blackout rule which prohibited television transmission of a game within seventy-five miles of a stadium where a pro contest was being played. The blackout rule was not intended as a direct control on competition among NFL teams, but the United States Department of Justice brought suit against the league, charging that the rule operated as a restraint of interstate trade in violation of the antitrust laws. Bell decided to fight for guarantees against destruction by television, and although the legal action which followed cost the NFL $200,000, the results were worth it. In November, 1953, Judge Alan Grim of the Federal District Court for Eastern Pennsylvania, who was no friend of professional sports, upheld the blackout. The television debacle in Los Angeles in 1950 was highly instrumental in Judge Grim's decision.

Further controls were necessary, however, to make television work for the NFL as a whole rather than for individual teams. During the 1950's each club negotiated a network contract on its own, a situation which created a great disparity of income among league members. For example, in 1961 the champion Green Bay Packers received $120,000 for radio-television

rights while the Eastern Conference's last-place club, the Washington Redskins, earned $250,000. The New York Giants, the Pittsburgh Steelers, the Cleveland Browns, and the Baltimore Colts also signed increasingly lucrative contracts, while the television revenues of other teams lagged. By 1960, Commissioner Rozelle and some club owners had become convinced that a league-package contract was the answer to the problem of financial disparity created by television. Rozelle set out to convince all the league members that a television contract should be negotiated by the NFL as a whole and the proceeds divided equally among all members.

The Cowboys, as an expansion team in the NFL, could benefit eventually from all these controls aimed at maintaining relative financial and competitive equality among league members. Nevertheless, Murchison and his associates brought professional football back to Dallas in 1960 under less than auspicious circumstances. The Cowboys were doomed to have financial difficulties until they built a team that could win in their league. Competition with the new American Football League's Dallas Texans added the element of an immediate life-or-death struggle for the loyalties of a divided city to the longer-run struggle for competitive success in the NFL. Clearly, the Dallas Cowboys needed a superior organization if they were to succeed.

THE COWBOY ORGANIZATION, 1960

Ownership of the Dallas Cowboys' franchise was broadened in June, 1960, by the addition of W. R. "Fritz" Hawn and Toddie Lee Wynne, Jr., as stockholders. Five men, a number that would not change in the next eight years, now held shares in the private corporation. Both Hawn and Wynne were established Dallas businessmen who had been associated with the Murchison brothers and Bedford Wynne in earlier ventures. Bedford Wynne was the chief spokesman for the group as preparations for the 1960 season began, but it has never been a mistake to refer to the team as "Clint's Cowboys." Clint Murchison, Jr., having acquired the NFL franchise for Dallas, was the principal owner and president of the Dallas Cowboys Football Club, and responsibility for building the Cowboy organization thus rested primarily with him.

The duties and responsibilities of an owner or president in professional football vary greatly from franchise to franchise. Art Modell, owner of the Cleveland Browns, is intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of his club but has a president who serves under him. Murchison, on the other hand, became the seldom-seen or heard-from owner and president. He admits that his philosophy of management is to find the most able person for a job and to give him free rein. Constantly looking over the shoulders of top executives is, in Murchison's opinion, neither possible, in view of his enormous investment

enterprises, nor consistent with his concept of executive responsibility. He realized that the success or failure of the Cowboys depended heavily on having the right men in control of the organization from the first.

Murchison took a major step in the right direction by hiring Texas E. Schramm to fill the key executive position of general manager. Ironically, this thirty-nine-year-old man with the perfect given name for a Cowboy was a native Californian, though his father, also named Texas, was a native of the Lone Star State. Schramm's father, the twelfth child of a huge family, was born in San Antonio, and perhaps, as Schramm suggests, his father's parents simply ran out of given names. Texas Schramm, Sr., moved from Texas to the Los Angeles area, where he became a successful stockbroker. His son, Texas Schramm, Jr., grew up in San Gabriel, California, but attended high school at Alhambra. In high school Schramm became interested in sports and sportswriting and pursued those interests at the University of Texas, where he enrolled as a freshman in the late 1930's. At the university Schramm played freshman football and worked on the student newspaper. Pearl Harbor and service in the Army Air Force during World War II interrupted his college career, but in 1945 he returned to university studies in Austin and resumed newspaper work, this time on the *Austin American Statesman*. Upon graduation from the University of Texas in 1947, Schramm learned through his father that Dan Reeves, of the Los Angeles Rams, needed a publicity director. Schramm's journalistic qualifications satisfied Reeves, and Schramm got the job. Thus began for Tex Schramm an association with professional football that has since kept him intimately involved with the sport.

Schramm worked ten years for the Los Angeles Rams, and his knowledge of pro football broadened far beyond his responsibilities as publicity director. The Rams rose from mediocrity in the mid-1940's to the top of the Western Conference in 1949, captured the NFL championship in 1951, and remained at or near the top of their conference for the next four years. Of particular interest to Schramm was the development of the Rams's scouting system, at that time the best in the league at finding and signing college talent. He became general manager of the Rams in 1955 and held that post for two years. His years with the Rams provided an ideal education in how to build a winning team, an education he sorely needed in trying to transform an expansion team into a league contender.

After joining CBS as assistant director of sports in 1957, Schramm handled television contracts with most of the NFL teams for the network and thereby kept his ties with professional football intact. Until the fall of 1959, however, he had never met Clint Murchison, and he came to Murchison's attention through George Halas. Halas undoubtedly felt it was a sin that a man with Schramm's zeal for pro football had become so far removed from it. After interviews with Schramm in New York and Dallas, Murchison offered him the position of general manager. Schramm accepted and became the operational head of the Cowboys with the demanding task of putting together the management, coaches, and players in building a football club that could compete successfully in the NFL. While in New York, Schramm had come to know many of the top sports personalities in the United States, and his contacts and associations were an important asset in Murchison's efforts to persuade the NFL to expand one year earlier than originally intended to meet the challenge of Lamar Hunt's Texans.

Tex Schramm's standards for Cowboy personnel from 1960 to the present, as he explains them, would serve as a yardstick for any organization seeking excellence in any field of endeavor. He places such a premium on native intelligence that all prospective employees, including players, must take a battery of tests

measuring intelligence as well as personality and character traits. Members of the Cowboy organization are expected to have the judgment necessary to avoid costly errors that are magnified in the public eye, but they must also have the confidence necessary to make decisions and stick to them. Schramm looks for people with imagination, too—the imagination that will keep his organization ahead of its competition. And he seeks people with pride, people who care about their work and are "really hurt when they lose or are embarrassed publicly." Intelligence, judgment, confidence, imagination, and pride—Schramm naturally looks for these qualities in personnel with experience in football, but the Cowboys, under his leadership, have found several key personnel from other occupations.

Tex Schramm personally recruited every member of the original Cowboy organization, with the exception of the man next in importance to himself, head coach Tom Landry. Murchison suggested that his new general manager look into the possibility of hiring Landry away from his job as a defensive coach with the New York Giants. The only other coach considered was Sid Gillman of the Rams. Schramm was familiar with Landry's reputation among people in football and within the Giant organization, and he also hired Sid Gillman as head coach of the Rams in 1955 and had seen him win the Western Conference title in his first year. Since that time, Gillman had run into problems and was soon to move on to the San Diego Chargers of the AFL. Of the two men, Landry was more of a "natural" for the job. He was a native of Mission, Texas, and, like Schramm, had attended the university in Austin, where he played college football. More importantly, he was the premier assistant coach in the league, with proven ability as an intelligent and innovative football theorist and teacher. That Schramm has been happy with Landry's choice as head coach of the

Cowboys is well expressed in his own words: "I would love to take one hundred per cent credit for Landry, but I can't."

Landry had entered pro football with the New York Yankees of the All-America Football Conference in 1949. With the merger of the leagues a year later, he moved to the Giants and began a ten-year career with them. He played defensive back for six years, the last two in the capacity of player-coach. From 1956 to 1960 he was a full-time defensive coach and established the Giants as the best defensive team in the league. In 1960 *Life* called the Giants' defense a "Triumph of Mind" and credited its success to Landry, "one of football's original thinkers." As a defensive coach, Landry developed a new philosophy based on the 4–3 alignment, which he innovated, and the complicated concept of a co-ordinated defense designed to stop every play at the line of scrimmage. Players who are required to learn the Landry system at first admit it seems overly complicated but later agree that it is fairly simple once confidence in it is developed. When Landry left the Giants in 1960, he was considered irreplaceable, and the Giants' defense was self-directed by the players he had taught. He was also widely recognized as one of the game's leading intellectuals, a perfectionist who left no room for guesswork.

Frank Gifford, who had known Landry as a player and coach in the 1950's, commented that he "approached the game with a zeal that none of us could match." Landry's preoccupation with pro football during the season has become legendary. He has been known to drive off from a press luncheon leaving behind his wife, who had accompanied him, and not to speak to secretaries at Cowboy headquarters for several months. At the end of the season he "rediscovers" the secretaries, asks them how they are, and comments that he hasn't seen them in ages. To some observers in Dallas, Landry reminds them of the computer

in sports—the coach who is totally immersed in his efforts to bring machinelike perfection to football. And yet in the off season, no one in the Cowboy organization gives more generously of his time and energies than Tom Landry. He teaches Sunday school in Dallas and makes countless speeches before youth and civic groups.

Landry is the epitome of the Christian athlete; each year as he opens training camp for Cowboy rookies he speaks of the merits of Christian conduct and fellowship, but he also tells the rookies that they will be judged first as football players, not as Christian gentlemen. His training camp is marked by the absence of profanity, something quite rare in pro circles. All Cowboy veterans must be able to demonstrate a certain quality of character or they are eventually released or traded. A number of former Cowboys are now playing for other NFL teams because they failed to measure up to Landry's standards of conduct.

Landry had few illusions when he signed to coach the Cowboys in December, 1959. He realized that an expansion team would surely lose consistently in its early years and could become a graveyard for head coaches. With Murchison as president and Schramm as general manager, he could be certain of one thing—coaching the players would be left entirely to him. There would be no second-guessing or meddling with his development of the team or direction of it on the field. Neither Murchison nor Schramm was disposed to interfere, but Landry insisted on coaching autonomy as a condition of his employment. Murchison has joked about the day he stopped by the practice field to say hello and was immediately accused by Landry of interfering with the team!

In building the Cowboys, Landry obviously depended on the general manager to provide the best players available. Schramm fulfilled this responsibility by hiring Gil Brandt as his player scouting director in the fall of 1959. Brandt, a native of

Milwaukee with a degree in physical education from the University of Wisconsin, took an unusual path into professional scouting. He did not play football beyond high school and had no experience in coaching. When Tex Schramm hired him, he was making his living as a baby photographer in three Milwaukee hospitals, taking pictures of newborn infants and selling them to the mothers.

Scouting and rating football players was Brandt's hobby. He attended as many practices and games as possible, wrote to colleges for brochures and game movies, studied and rated pro prospects, and held his own mock draft in which he attempted to predict in what round college athletes would be drafted. After graduation from college, Brandt worked as a part-time scout for the Los Angeles Rams from 1955 to 1957. His entry into pro football came through his friend and Milwaukee neighbor, Elroy Hirsch, an All-Pro offensive end with the Rams in the early 1950's. As a part-time scout for the Rams, Brandt became acquainted with Schramm, but scouting remained a hobby only.

Schramm had realized in late 1959 that the Cowboys would have to play their first season without participating in the college draft. He thought of Brandt and called to ask his help in signing free agents. Brandt's career as a baby photographer ended immediately. He signed the players that Schramm wanted so quickly that he astonished the Cowboy general manager. Schramm gave him another assignment and he has been with the Cowboys ever since.

Gil Brandt, Tex Schramm, and Tom Landry are the key men in the Cowboy organization, and they are people who love what they are doing. It is a pleasure to see them in action, for rarely does one find in any profession the dedication that these men bring to their work. Anyone who has felt trapped by his job cannot help but envy and admire them. In Brandt's case, he gravitated toward scouting without realizing that his future

would be in that area. He spent hundreds of man-hours working at something that promised no immediate financial reward. Schramm cites Brandt as a person without extensive experience in professional football, but one who had the intelligence, determination, pride, and judgment to become the best personnel director and to set up the most intricate scouting system in the league. As Bob St. John of the *Dallas Morning News* put it, Brandt became a "father confessor, a counselor, psychiatrist, advisor, James Bond and IBM machine."

Brandt arrived in Dallas before Schramm, found some empty space in the insurance office of a friend, and kept at the signing of free agents. He joined two other mainstays in the Cowboy organization who are still with the club today. Eilene Gish first worked at drawing up corporate papers prior to the granting of the Cowboys' franchise and has served as Tex Schramm's executive secretary since he came to Dallas in the spring of 1960. Her familiarity with the operation of the Cowboy front office makes her an invaluable aide. Jack Eskridge has been the first and only equipment manager for the Cowboys. Eskridge, like Brandt, came into football in an unorthodox manner. He played varsity basketball shortly after World War II at the University of Kansas, and he still holds the school record for most points scored in a half (thirty), no mean accomplishment in a university that has produced Clyde Lovellette and Wilt Chamberlain. Unhappy with his job in Dallas, Eskridge jumped at the opportunity to get back into athletics in 1960. In the spring of 1960, Schramm found men for the positions of business manager, ticket manager, trainer, and three assistant coaches. The Cowboys were then ready to put together a team for the 1960 season.

There were no good precedents for the creation of an expansion team at that time, and the league, in advancing the date of its move into Dallas to compete with the AFL, did not have time

for careful planning. The Cowboys paid a heavy price for their hasty creation, a mistake not repeated by the NFL. Minnesota, Atlanta, and New Orleans all managed to win in their first year. Dallas did not. By missing the 1960 draft, the Cowboys were denied a chance at picking twenty top college players for their new team. Nevertheless, they did manage to acquire two graduating collegians who were to play prominent roles for the next nine years. Don Meredith was completing a record-breaking career at Southern Methodist University. He was the sports hero of Dallas and a necessity, the Cowboys thought, in building a team to compete with the Texans. Murchison signed Meredith to a contract guaranteeing his personal services for the Cowboys. Don Perkins, an outstanding running back at the University of New Mexico, signed a similar contract largely through the efforts of Senator Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, a close friend of Murchison's. Both contracts promised release with payment if Dallas did not get its franchise.

The league was informed of these contracts before the draft in December, 1959, to avoid having Meredith and Perkins claimed by other clubs. Both men were drafted, however—Meredith by the Bears in the third round and Perkins in the ninth round by the Colts. Halas explained that he was afraid someone else might draft Meredith and cause trouble over the contract. Apparently someone in the Baltimore organization was not informed of Perkins' status. No doubt he thought it was the coup of the year to find Don Perkins still available in the ninth round. The Cowboys obtained both men, but only by returning third- and ninth-round choices to the Bears and Colts respectively in 1962.

In a sense, then, the Cowboys drafted two players in 1960. Other rookies from the college ranks had to be signed as free agents. A comparison of this situation with that of the New Orleans Saints, who began play in 1967, demonstrates the

special disadvantage of the Cowboys. In the draft before their first season, the Saints were given thirty-seven choices, including two in the first round, two in the second round, and three in the third round.

Rookies, of course, were not expected to provide the nucleus of the Cowboy team—rather, its strength would depend on veteran players worth $550,000 which the existing franchises made available to stock the Cowboys. Each of the twelve NFL members carried thirty-six players. They were allowed to protect twenty-five top players and offer the remaining eleven to the Cowboys. Dallas could choose three from each team and thereby acquire thirty-six veterans. Established teams quite naturally put their oldest, injured or injury-prone, and weakest players into the pool for the Cowboys. Since there had been no recent expansion team to draw off such players, Dallas found itself in March, 1960, having to pick from the worst pool in the history of the NFL. To make matters worse, the Cowboys had only twenty-four hours to study the available players and make their selections. Again by comparison, the Atlanta Falcons in 1966 had an entire year to study the personnel of existing teams, consider the players who would probably be available, and make their evaluations of those players.

Schramm, Landry, and Brandt attempted to choose players by athletic ability, but they also had to be careful to fill all positions on the team. This further limited their opportunity to acquire quality players. At the time selections were made, sports writers in Dallas tried hard to convince the public that the Cowboys had been able to choose the nucleus of a good team. Several NFL coaches screamed about having to give up three experienced men. The suggestion was made that the league was building a "Frankenstein's Monster" in Dallas.

In truth, the Cowboys had acquired only a very few players who would last more than two or three years. Many were in

questionable physical condition. During the first season, thirteen players went to hospitals for surgery or for repair of broken bones. The first-year Cowboys deserved honorary purple hearts. By 1967 only two of the original thirty-six were still active with the Cowboys—Jerry Tubbs, a linebacker from San Francisco, and Frank Clarke, an offensive end from Cleveland. Tubbs is the only member of the original Cowboy roster who remains with the team today, having become a full-time coach in 1968. According to him, he had intended to retire from professional football in 1960. He stood an excellent chance of acquiring a Coca Cola distributorship in Little Rock, Arkansas, and if the position was offered to him, he intended to accept it. Tubbs made his intentions known to head coach Red Hickey of the Forty-Niners, but he never mentioned to Hickey that he might play for the Cowboys. At that point he had no desire to remain in football and certainly no desire to go to an expansion team. As he explains it, he had always played on winning teams; at high school in Breckenridge, Texas, at the University of Oklahoma, and at San Francisco. He knew that playing for the Cowboys in their early years would be "hell to pay." Because of Tubbs's feelings about retirement, Hickey placed him on the list of players available to the Cowboys, assuming that he would never sign a contract with them. As it turned out, the job in Little Rock fell through and Tubbs resumed his football career in Dallas. He admits that his decision not to quit the game has worked out well for him and that he was happier playing in Texas than in California.

Three of Dallas' choices, including Charles Ane, a center from Detroit, and Ed Modzelekski, a fullback from Cleveland, did retire rather than play for an expansion team. In Ane's case, since his retirement left the Cowboys without a center, Schramm was desperate. He spent hundreds of dollars in long-distance telephone calls to Ane's home in Hawaii, one conversation last-

ing for more than two hours; but it was all in vain, as Ane refused to sign with the Cowboys.

At this point the Cowboys had few ways to acquire more players. They could negotiate trades at the expense of future draft choices or wait for other teams to begin cutting down their rosters during the pre-season. Schramm and Brandt still insist that the history of trades in the NFL clearly indicates that the strong clubs get stronger and the weak, weaker. Brandt maintains that all pro teams today have come to the realization that you "cannot buy a football team or trade for a football team. Nobody is going to trade you an all-pro player for a bag of beans." As late as 1969, Tex Schramm reiterated at the Cowboy training camp in Thousand Oaks, California, that he has never believed in trading away future draft choices in an effort to become an immediate success. Age will disintegrate a club that attempts to do this.

In 1960, however, the pressures to compete dictated some sacrifices of the future for immediate needs. The Cowboys lacked an experienced quarterback and acquired Eddie LeBaron from the Washington Redskins. LeBaron, at 5 feet, 7 inches in height, was an established seven-year veteran in the NFL and had led the league in passing in 1958. He was available only because he had retired from the Redskins to devote full time to his law practice in Texas and was willing to play only in that state. Even under those circumstances, the Cowboys gave Washington their first- and sixth-round choices in the 1961 draft for LeBaron's services. Dallas also traded away its fifth- and tenth-round choices in 1961 and its fourth-, fifth-, and seventh-round picks in 1962.

In their desperate efforts to acquire player talent, the Cowboys became involved in the first of two celebrated court cases fought out with AFL franchises. The first suit involved Jimmy Harris, an outstanding collegiate quarterback at the University

of Oklahoma who had entered pro football in 1957 as a defensive back for the Philadelphia Eagles. The Eagles traded Harris to the Los Angeles Rams in 1958, but in 1959 Harris declined an increase in salary from the Rams and returned to the University of Oklahoma, where he finished study for a degree in geology. After graduation, Harris moved to Dallas in 1960 and accepted a position with an oil-drilling company. At this point he was approached by the Texans, offered an excellent salary to play for them, and eagerly signed a new contract. He insisted that his retirement from football had been involuntary because "they [the Rams] simply refused to pay enough money to make it worthwhile."

To Harris the opportunity to play football in Dallas and also work for the drilling company combined the best of two possible worlds. He assumed that his retirement from the NFL had released him from the league's option clause. Pete Rozelle disagreed. Several former players in the NFL with situations roughly comparable to Harris' had signed AFL contracts, but Harris was thought to be a quality player while the others were not. Also at stake was the option clause, long established as a means of ensuring competitive balance among NFL teams. On July 22, 1960, the Dallas Cowboys, in return for a fifth-round draft choice, acquired the Rams's rights to Harris; but he went ahead with his plans to play for the Texans. The Cowboys then filed suit against Harris and the Texans, asking for an injunction to prevent his joining the AFL club. Lamar Hunt complained, "It's obvious that the National Football League is acting as a group to hurt our League in Dallas." Tex Schramm denied the allegation, saying, "This is not a harassment. . . . We feel that Harris is a fine football player and a valuable piece of property and that he belongs to the National Football League."

The resulting litigation in the Harris case was long, involved, and bitterly contested. A series of temporary injunctions in the

Texas State District Court in Dallas sidelined Harris for all except the last three games of the Texans' 1960 season. In May, 1961, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Dallas ruled that Harris had never been released from his contract with the Rams, and that the Cowboys, in trading for the Rams's rights to Harris, owned his services. If Harris was going to play football, he had to play for the Cowboys until he released himself from the option clause. On July 14, 1961, Harris reported to the Cowboys' training camp in Minnesota, but he failed to become a regular. Whatever the Cowboys' motives in seeking Harris, the law was clearly on their side, and the case bolstered the stipulations of the option clause.

Despite problems in acquiring quality players, the Cowboys opened their first preseason training camp at Forest Grove, Oregon, in July, 1960. It was a unique camp in that there was no squad of returning veterans to claim starting positions. Every man could feel that he was part of something new with a good shot at starting. But the enthusiasm of the club was tempered by Tom Landry's sober warning that it would take three to five years to build a contending team.

The College All-Star Game of August, 1960, was enough to gray and thin the hair of Schramm and Landry. The AFL refused to send its rookies to the All-Star camp, bringing more pressure than usual on the NFL teams. Dallas had to send Meredith, Perkins, and three of their free agents—Jim Mooty of Arkansas, Paul Rochester of Michigan State, and Fred Doelling of Pennsylvania. Not only did these players miss critical time in camp, but Perkins and Mooty sustained costly injuries. In Perkins' case, he never played a down in the Cowboys' first season. Dallas, of course, had no real choice in sending five of its players. NFL rules require that a player summoned to the All-Star contest must either go or sit out an equal amount of time at training camp.



Cowboy Headquarters, Expressway Tower, Dallas

Clint Murchison, Jr., Chairman of the Board

Tex Schramm, President and General Manager



Toddie Lee Wynne, Jr., Stockholder



John Murchison, Stockholder



Fritz Hawn, Stockholder



Bedford Wynne, Stockholder (1960–66)



Al Ward, Assistant General Manager



Tom Hardin, Business Manager

Curt Mosher, Director of Public Relations

Eilene Gish, Executive Secretary to the President

Tom Landry, Head Coach

Gil Brandt, Player Personnel Director

Bob Griffin, Assistant to Gil Brandt



Bucko Kilroy, Player Scout



Red Hickey, Player Scout



Dick Mansperger, Player Scout



Don Cochren, Trainer

Larry Gardner, Trainer

Jack Eskridge, Equipment Manager

Kay Lang, Ticket Manager

1969 Coaching staff. Landry and assistants (l. to r.) Jim Myers, Ray Renfro, Jerry Tubbs, Ernie Stautner, Raymond Berry, Ermal Allen, and Bobby Franklin



Reception room, Cowboy Headquarters



Gil Brandt's office (with a portion of the scouting data for one year on the shelves)

Tom Landry confers with two of his assistants

Lamar Hunt, founder of the AFL and owner of the Dallas Texans–Kansas City Chiefs



Hank Stram, Head Coach, Dallas Texans–Kansas City Chiefs



L. G. ("Long Gone") Dupre alone with the Redskins in the Cotton Bowl

Eddie LeBaron, Cowboy Quarterback, 1960–62



Don Meredith, Cowboy Quarterback, 1960–68, hands off to Don Perkins, Cowboys' first All-Pro

As the pre-season advanced, Dallas gave careful attention to players placed on waivers by other clubs prior to outright release. The Cowboys had received the right to pick first from such players, but again they were unlucky. Just before the NFL teams were to make their last two cuts, from forty-three to thirty-eight and to the regular-season roster of thirty-six players, the league decided to allow each team to carry thirty-eight players in 1960. That move was to prepare them better for stocking the Minnesota franchise in 1961, but it would also have cost Dallas its choice of the last, and therefore the best, twenty-four players to be cut.

Tex Schramm protested so bitterly that the league decided to skip the thirty-eight-limit cut and go directly from forty-three to thirty-six. Each team was to list seven men, and the Cowboys had the option of choosing one. The team would then keep two of the remaining players on their roster. Under this arrangement, the Cowboys could not know whether a player ranked forty-third or thirty-seventh in the thinking of his own team. Nevertheless, they gained some help, including Mike Connelly, a center who was active through the 1968 season.

The only other concession allowed the Cowboys by the league was the right to carry forty-two men on their roster. Only thirty-eight could be dressed for any game, and Landry had to inform the opposing coach which four players would not play. In retrospect there appears to have been little reason for optimism in Dallas in September, 1960, but the local sports writers again made an effort to convince the fans that the Cowboys would be a good team. *Sports Illustrated* backed up this opinion in its annual scouting report: "But with their air attack, their good short gaining ground game and their good defense, it will be a great surprise if the Cowboys finish last."

Perhaps *Sports Illustrated* was a little red-faced as well as surprised as the season progressed. The Cowboys, playing once

as a swing team against each NFL club, lost their first ten games, surprised the New York Giants in a 31–31 tie, but returned to normal by dropping their last game of the season. Under the impact of an 0–11–1 season and competition with the Texans, attendance fell from thirty thousand for the first home game to ten thousand for the last one. Attendance figures in this era are estimates only, perhaps generous ones, since the Cotton Bowl at that time had no turnstiles. When asked later if the Cowboys took a relaxed attitude in the early years as they built toward a winner, Tex Schramm replied, "No, I wouldn't say that 0–11–1 would relax you a hell of a lot."

The Cowboys' performance on the field was not reassuring, but as Landry had indicated, they did not expect to be an immediate winner against established NFL teams. The challenge to build a contender could be met in time, but in the meantime, they also had to meet the challenge of the AFL's Texans for the support of Dallas. The Cowboys thus faced competition on two fronts; within the NFL and against the AFL. The two areas of challenge were related in that success in the controlled competition against other NFL teams would be essential to success in the uncontrolled and total financial competition with the Texans.

THE BUSINESS OF TOTAL COMPETITION, 1960–62

Professional football today is a big-league business operation as well as a major-league sport. One primary objective of NFL club owners, as of men engaged in any business venture, is to maximize profits. Even the Green Bay Packers, a community-owned corporation with stock that pays no dividends, are interested in producing profits; the Packer management can draw from these profits to buy superstars like Donny Anderson and Jim Grabowski in the same year. Other franchises also seek profits to strengthen their teams or provide a return on their investments.

As in most business operations, the best road to success in pro football is to produce a better product than one's competitors. An NFL team that consistently wins will, as a rule, make more money than a steady loser. But there is a striking dissimilarity between pro football and most big businesses. The typical business corporation strives, in theory at least, totally to outstrip its competition and take an ever-increasing share of the market. It is no great exaggeration to say that an ordinary corporation operates as if its purpose, within the law, is to destroy competition.

The pro football businessman, however, must be careful to maintain the quality of competition within his league. The interest and support of the fans, his source of income, will be weakened if any single team becomes too strong. This is equally

true of other professional sports. Some observers contend that domination by the New York Yankees in the 1950's was one cause of the decline of baseball as the national sport. Uncontrolled competition could bring the NFL to the situation envisioned by Tex Schramm: "You eventually determine who has the best football team, but you don't have anybody to play."

Because of the special business nature of professional sports, NFL franchise holders engage in all-out competition only on the football field. The club owners, as previously explained, accept a number of off-the-field controls to maintain the viability of balanced competition on the gridiron. Each recognizes that the financial success of a franchise is dependent on maintaining the strength of the opposition. Controls include the division of live-gate proceeds, the operation of the draft, the option clause in player contracts, and the league-package television contract. Only the last of these was not an established practice at the time the Cowboys entered the NFL, but it was to become a key part of the league's plans for maintaining relative equality among its members.

With the formation of the AFL in 1959, pro football also developed competition in the more typical business sense. When Hunt's plans were announced, George P. Marshall of the Redskins said, "We welcome them." "Yeah," commented a reporter, "the way Atlanta welcomed Sherman!" From the viewpoint of most NFL owners, the AFL presented a threat to be handled very much like that of the All-America Football Conference in the late 1940's. There would be uncontrolled competition in every business aspect of the game, including the acquisition of new players, the sale of television rights, and efforts to attract live-gate fan support. The ultimate purpose was first to destroy the AFL and then perhaps to pick up a few of its strongest franchises. For six years, professional football would have unrestricted warfare between the rival leagues.

Dallas, because of the circumstances that brought both the Cowboys and the Texans to the city at the same time, became the focal point of this all-out struggle. In addition to its symbolic importance as the home of the AFL, Dallas was the smallest city in which the two leagues met head on. The AFL sought to strengthen its hand by initiating the ten-million-dollar antitrust suit, which was primarily designed to block the NFL's hurried move into Texas in 1960. But the decisive factor in the Cowboy-Texan contest was the extent of their early financial losses and their prospects for operating a profitable franchise in Dallas. Both the Cowboys and the Texans concentrated on building their organizations to compete within their respective leagues, and neither thought primarily in terms of driving the other out of Dallas, but it soon became apparent that financial success for one team was all that the city could maintain.

Lamar Hunt got off to a good start in the Cowboy-Texan competition by quickly reaching an agreement with the Cotton Bowl management on a home schedule for 1960. The AFL season was to begin two weeks before the NFL opened play, but the Texans' first two games were with Los Angeles and Oakland in California. They were then to return home to the Cotton Bowl for the next three Sundays. Hunt relished the idea that his Texans could be 3–0 at home and fixed in the hearts of Dallas fans before the Cowboys had an opportunity to appear in the Cotton Bowl. The Texans also were to play at home on the last three Sundays of the season, leaving the Cowboys with the possible problem of having to squeeze all their home games into the middle of their NFL schedule. In response, the Cowboys considered playing on Saturday night, but the collegiate Southwest Conference threatened to move the Cotton Bowl out of Dallas if the Texas State Fair Commission allowed professional games to conflict with college football. A compromise eventually allowed the Cowboys to play their first two games at home on

Saturday and Friday nights respectively, but the whole affair did little to endear them to Dallas fans. The Texans still had the Sunday dates, and they took great pleasure in pointing out that the Cowboys were apparently willing to injure high school and college football as well as to monopolize the professional game.

Competition for playing facilities was only a minor part of the developing fight before the 1960 season. A more important struggle was building for fan support. Cowboy season tickets went on sale in April at $27.60 for six games; Texan tickets, at slightly less cost per contest for their seven-game home season, began selling at the same time. Tex Schramm suggested in June that the people of Dallas, rather than the impending antitrust suit, would decide the Cowboy-Texan contest. Hunt replied, "Our ticket sales indicate Dallas people know which is the Dallas team and which is the Halas team."

The Cowboy leadership insisted from the beginning that its club was part of a quality product, the National Football League, and that its only job was to become competitive within that league. They expected to benefit from the reputations and drawing power of teams like the Colts and Giants with their established stars. The Texans countered this situation by placing special emphasis on promotional campaigns to attract Dallas fans. In late July, before the preseason games, they held a "Meet the Texans" night at P. C. Cobb Stadium which attracted an estimated eighteen thousand Dallasites. The promotional gimmicks of the AFL club developed eventually into a point of controversy and cost the Texans some of the public sympathy they had gained as the underdogs.

As the preseason games began, it became evident that the Texans would enjoy a better regular season than the Cowboys. They won six straight exhibition contests while the Cowboys dropped five of six. There was, however, no fair test of how well

the two teams would draw fan support in Dallas. Each played only one exhibition game in the Cotton Bowl, and both offered free admission in a variety of ways. The question of whether the Cowboys, with a weak team in a strong league, or the Texans, with a strong team in a weak league, would be more attractive to Dallasites remained unanswered.

The Cowboys' only preseason appearance in the Cotton Bowl resulted in a 14–10 loss to the Baltimore Colts in the Salesmanship Club's annual charity game in mid-August. The crowd in the Cotton Bowl could not be accurately counted, but attendance was estimated at forty-one thousand fans. By no means were these all paying customers, for the Cowboys instituted a family plan which allowed any person buying a $2.75 general admission ticket to get five children under twelve years of age into the game free. In early September, the Texans drew an estimated fifty-one thousand for a contest with the Houston Oilers, their intrastate rival, but Lamar Hunt admitted that many of that number were not paying fans. Nevertheless, both organizations pointed to these preseason crowds to prove that Dallas could support their teams.

The Cowboys opened their regular season in the Cotton Bowl on Saturday night, September 24, against the Pittsburgh Steelers; the Texans played their first home game the following afternoon. Competition for professional football fans could hardly be more intense in a city the size of Dallas. The Cowboys drew a crowd of thirty thousand with no free admission offers other than five end-zone seats to children under twelve for each $2.75 ticket sold. That first game promised a spectacular halftime show highlighted by the personal appearance of Roy Rogers, who was then involved in the promotion of the NFL, but it turned into a fiasco as the fans ungraciously hurled ice and cups at the movie hero. Apparently they acted out of simple

malice, not out of partisan opposition to Rogers as a Cowboy promoter. The Cowboys' initiation into the NFL was an exciting 35–28 loss to the Steelers.

The Texans drew an estimated forty-two thousand the next day against the Los Angeles Chargers, but their promotional gimmicks raised eyebrows among many observers and drew the wrath of the Cowboy organization. Hunt's team formed a "Huddle Club" for Dallas youngsters, offering them a Texan T-shirt and admission to seven home games for only one dollar. Tickets were discounted all over the city through grocery stores, department stores, airline offices, and other commercial establishments. The purchase of ten dollars' worth of groceries in some stores would bring a free ticket to the Texan game. Thirty-six attractive girls drove around Dallas peddling Texan tickets. Free tickets were released in helium-filled balloons and enclosed in packages of corn chips. A member of the Texan organization explained, "We've got a new product to sell and the way to sell it is by exposure." A Cowboy official snapped, "Exposure can kill people."

On Friday night of the following weekend the Cowboys played the Eagles, and the Texans again played on Sunday. The Texans promptly announced that any student attending a high school game that Friday night could get into the Cotton Bowl without charge on Sunday. Tex Schramm commented, "About the only thing left for them to do is open the gates and forget about tickets. Our concern is to get people out to see ours, and we think when the product is worth buying, it should be paid for."

Reduced by high school games and Texan promotions, attendance at the Cowboy-Eagle game slumped to 18,500. Two days later, the Texans drew 37,500 for their game with the New York Titans. Hunt had now added a new tonic for the Texans by declaring that every Dallas County "barber" who

showed up in a white jacket would be admitted free. His rationale for this promotion gimmick was the claim that the barbers controlled the largest captive audience in Dallas. Despite their best efforts as the 1960 season progressed, the Texans and Cowboys played to huge banks of empty seats in the 76,000-capacity Cotton Bowl. Their brave estimates of attendance led one *Houston Post* writer to remark, "I wish the fellow who estimates the Dallas pro football crowds handled my bank account."

The Cowboys, staggering through the 0–11–1 season, were consistently outdrawn at home by the Texans, who finished with an 8–6 record, but *Sports Illustrated* argued that the Cowboys had the better prospects for financial success in Dallas. Their crowds, while smaller than the Texans', had a higher percentage of paying fans; and their tickets, at $4.60 per reserved seat and $2.75 for general admission, were more expensive than Texan tickets, which sold for $4.00 and $2.00. Giveaway programs by the AFL team seemed to downgrade its football and began to erode the sympathy it had enjoyed as the "underdog" fighting the "monopolist." The won-lost record of the two clubs was no fair indication of their relative strength. All members of the new AFL were, in effect, expansion teams in 1960, while the Cowboys competed in the NFL, with its long-established franchises. Road games were far more lucrative for the Cowboys than for the Texans. The AFL had only a $20,000 guarantee for the visiting team, and the Texans never received more than the minimum on the road. On the other hand, the Cowboys profited from large crowds in New York, Detroit, Chicago, and Green Bay.

Television was the other key factor in determining the financial footing of the Dallas pro teams in 1960. Leadership in both leagues generally agreed that the ideal television arrangement was a league-package contract under which all teams shared equally in the revenue. But the United States Department of

Justice warned the NFL in the spring of 1960 that such a contract would violate antitrust laws. The NFL hesitated and allowed individual teams to negotiate with the networks; the AFL went ahead and signed a package plan with the American Broadcasting Company. Its five-year contract paid approximately $185,000 to each team in 1960 and promised increases as the network raised the price of advertising time. Commissioner Joe Foss of the AFL indicated that television income was expected to make the crucial difference in the survival of his league.

The National Football League could certainly have negotiated a more profitable package contract for its members, but made no attempt to do so in 1960. The Cowboys therefore had to make a television agreement on their own and lost part of the potential benefits of NFL membership in their competition with the Texans. They received $150,000 from CBS for television rights in their first year; a package contract would have nearly doubled that figure.

Paradoxically, the two teams were both helped and injured by television, a problem which had plagued the Bears and Cardinals in Chicago. After their first two night games at home, the Cowboys played four times in the Cotton Bowl on Sunday afternoons. Those games were in direct competition with the Texans on television. Similarly, when the Cowboys were on the road, their televised games cut into the Texans' live gate in Dallas. This situation was undoubtedly the single most harmful factor to the two teams in their three years of uncontrolled competition. It was further evidence that a city the size of Dallas could not support two franchises.

Television, of course, was not solely to blame for the poor performance of the Cowboys and Texans at the gate. Another problem was the Dallas community's lack of education as professional football fans. Dallasites also became so badly divided

over the two teams that they failed to identify with or support either of them, although there were naturally a great number of people who were intensely loyal to one side or the other. Tex Schramm's secretary, Eilene Gish, had to hide whenever a certain Texan fan who was dating her roommate came to their apartment. But most Dallasites took the position described by Schramm: "We're not going to support either side because we don't want to get caught in the middle." Lamar Hunt tells of businessmen who refused to buy season tickets for fear of injuring some business relationship.

The Cowboy organization recognized that it could hardly expect enthusiastic support until it produced a winning team. Professional football had not yet reached the point at which, as in the case of Atlanta and New Orleans later in the 1960's, fans would fill the stadium even though their team would almost certainly lose. The Cowboys in their early years made no effort to attract fans by on-the-field gimmicks or attempts to develop a spectacular offense. Tom Landry's only concern was to build a winning team; if he seemed to emphasize offense in the early years, it was because he had to make maximum use of available material. As Landry explains it, "Public relations is great, but there is no public relations like winning. If you are losing, no public relations is going to offset it."

The financial balance sheet of the Cowboys at the completion of the 1960 season showed the impact of a losing year and their competition with the Texans. They had received $391,704.04 from tickets sales, $150,000 from television, $35,000 from radio rights and $3,098 from the sale of programs. Income from these major sources amounted to $579,802.04. Major items of expense were $712,000 for management, coach, and player salaries, player bonuses, and the costs of the scouting system; $120,985 for team travel; $100,342 in office expenses, including $26,447 for telephone and telegraph services; $28,-

718 for training camp; and $27,419 for team equipment and supplies. Additional minor expenses in many areas pushed total costs well above $1,000,000. The result was a loss of slightly more than $700,000 for the year.

At present, no comparable balance sheet on the Texans is available. Lamar Hunt says, "We never release any financial information, good or bad." Estimates of the total losses of the AFL clubs in 1960 range from three million to seven and one-half million dollars. The most common estimate of Hunt's losses was one million dollars, a figure that is, in our opinion, approximately correct. It brought about a comment often quoted in the Dallas press and among sports fans in the Southwest. When a newspaper reporter asked H. L. Hunt for his reaction to his son's losing a million dollars in one year, the reply was, "The boy only has 123 years to go."

The story may be apocryphal, but the point made was genuine. The Cowboys and the Texans were both prepared and able to take large losses in the process of establishing themselves in Dallas. During the season, rumors that the Cowboys would give up and move to Minneapolis or Miami spread, but Bedford Wynne assured Dallasites, "We'll be here when the whistle blows next year." In December, Curtis Sanford, the real estate man and sports promoter who founded the Cotton Bowl Game, made a tongue-in-cheek proposal for another way to end the competition—a postseason showdown game with the loser to leave town. Some newspapers and many fans took the suggestion seriously, and Lamar Hunt, enjoying the humor of a situation in which he could safely challenge the established league, remarked that it didn't "sound like a bad idea at all." It was up to the Cowboys to put an end to the idea of a winner-take-all battle in the Cotton Bowl. "It's utterly preposterous," said Bedford Wynne. "It's simply impossible."

The idea of inter-league play for less dramatic stakes re-

mained popular with the AFL team. In January, 1961, Lamar Hunt suggested an exhibition game during the next preseason, and some Dallasites took up this suggestion with the argument that the public demanded a Cowboy-Texan game. "Dear hearts," wrote Blackie Sherrod of the *Dallas Times-Herald*, "the way the 'public' turned out for both Texan and Cowboy games this year, it could ill afford to demand anything, even mustard for the hotdogs." Final rejection of the Texans' challenge, of course, was again up to the Cowboys. Tex Schramm commented, "We need stronger competition than that to get ready for the National Football League season."

The only hand-to-hand combat between the Cowboys and Texans in 1961 came that spring at Ferris Plaza in Dallas during National Dairy Week. Cotton Davidson, the Texan quarterback, and Cowboy linebacker Jerry Tubbs met in a much-publicized milking contest. Tubbs, bowing in defeat, preferred to think of the contest as part of the 0–11–1 season just completed. "Well," he remarked, "that's 12 for 13."

In preparing for the 1961 season, the Cowboy organization took steps to strengthen its player personnel. The college draft in December, 1960, the first in which the Cowboys participated, appeared to offer great opportunities. Two of the outstanding college players in the country, Bob Lilly of Texas Christian University and E. J. Holub of Texas Tech University, were native Texans who wanted to play with the Cowboys. Lamar Hunt's Texans were naturally interested in Lilly and Holub also and picked both of them in the AFL draft held before the NFL meeting. This appeared, at first, to be a break for the Cowboys, since few NFL teams would choose Lilly or Holub and try to compete with Lamar Hunt's checkbook. Murchison had no such qualms, and as Tex Schramm has remarked, "Lamar Hunt was the biggest asset we had."

The Cowboys, due to their winless record, were to pick second

in the draft behind Minnesota, the newest expansion team, but their first round choice had been traded to Washington the year before for Eddie LeBaron. Schramm went to the NFL draft meeting thinking that he would choose Lilly, with whom the Cowboys had reached an agreement, in the second round and hope to find Holub available in the third round. At the meeting he found the Los Angeles Rams willing to tangle with Hunt over Holub. Believing it impossible to get such a highly touted player in the third round, Schramm urged Holub the night before the NFL draft to sign with the Rams, but the Texas Tech star signed with the Dallas Texans at 5:00 the following morning, a development unknown to Schramm at the time.

When the NFL draft began, the Cleveland Browns discovered at the last minute that their number-one choice had already signed with an AFL team, and they offered to trade Dallas their first-round pick for the Cowboys' first choice in 1962. Schramm accepted and was able to pick Lilly late in the first round and find Holub available as an early second-round choice. After calling Holub, who assured him that he had not signed with anyone, Schramm made the obvious choice. The Cowboy general manager returned to Dallas in a state of ecstasy, believing that he had made the greatest selection of the century in pro football. He had gone to the meeting with no first-round choice and had come home with the two best defensive ballplayers in the country. A week later he discovered that Holub belonged to the Texans, where he was destined to become an all-star linebacker by 1962. From the Holub case and the loss of their third-round and fourteenth-round choices as well, the Cowboys learned in 1961 that their competition for players with the Texans, and indeed with all AFL clubs, required greater care and vigilance.

After the 1960 season, the Cowboys again signed a large number of free agents, four of whom made the squad. Three—

fullback Amos Marsh, defensive halfback Warren Livingston, and defensive tackle Ken Frost—received NFL All-Rookie honors in 1961. The Cowboys also made trades in the off-season that brought six new faces to their 1961 team. Among them was Chuck Howley of the Bears, who became an All-Pro linebacker by 1963. The Cowboy organization knew it was obtaining better players, and it was confident that Tom Landry would win with them. In the spring of 1961, Clint Murchison predicted eight to ten victories for his previously winless club.

Another good reason for Cowboy optimism that year was a much-improved schedule. With Minnesota in the league, the Eastern and Western conferences could be balanced at seven teams each. The Cowboys were assigned to the weaker Eastern Conference and played a home-and-home series with each team. Their fourteen-game schedule was completed by two games with the only team younger than they, the Vikings. With Lamar Hunt's approval, the State Fair Commission balanced Cotton Bowl dates fairly between the Texans and the Cowboys so they could anticipate regular appearances throughout the season. Murchison predicted that the Cowboys–Cleveland Browns game on December 3 would draw fifty-five thousand fans and determine the championship of the Eastern Conference.

Financially, the Cowboys were given new encouragement in the spring of 1961 when the NFL finally negotiated a league-package television contract with the Columbia Broadcasting System. The two-year agreement called for annual payments of approximately three hundred thousand dollars per team. It included rights to all regular-season games and conference playoffs, but excluded preseason and championship games. All teams on the road would have their games telecast back into their home city. Commissioner Pete Rozelle explained that the contract had been negotiated to avoid domination of the television market by a few teams. "We cannot maintain a plan which

denies a team, especially a weaker team, its fair share of television income." The Cowboys, who were to double their television income under the contract, nodded in approval.

The NFL contract of 1961, like the AFL contract of 1960, was signed in the face of warnings by the Department of Justice that such action would violate antitrust laws. The infant league's agreement with ABC was not challenged, but the NFL-CBS package was immediately made the subject of legal action by the government. In July the same Judge Grim who had earlier upheld the blackout rule invalidated the NFL's contract. Judge Grim concluded that the member clubs had eliminated competition among themselves in the sale of television rights to their games and had thereby violated antitrust laws.

Commissioner Rozelle and the NFL leaders were disappointed by the so-called grim decision. Many considered equalization of television revenue as the key difference between profit and loss. Tex Schramm, whose Cowboys now faced another year with only $150,000 in television income, bemoaned the prospect that the major networks might sign contracts with the most powerful teams and carry them each week as a network show. Under these circumstances the Cowboys might not be able to broadcast their road games into the Dallas area. The AFL leaders contended that their contract was legal, but they were obviously "whistling past the graveyard."

The NFL requested a suspension of Judge Grim's ruling until December 31, 1961, to allow the first year of the contract to be honored. Rozelle explained again the need to control competition and pointed out that the contract was the only way to protect the fans' rights to follow their own home team on the road, but Grim rejected this request. The NFL reverted to the policy of individually negotiated contracts for the 1961 season. Congress would soon act to legalize the league-package contract,

but not in time to aid the struggling Dallas Cowboys in that season.

The Cowboys opened their second training camp in July at St. Olaf's College in Northfield, Minnesota. This time the mood was "tempered optimism." With a better schedule and more quality players, they intended never to be the weakest team in professional football again. Preseason games brought Cowboy victories over the Vikings and Baltimore Colts, but their only appearance in the Cotton Bowl was a disappointing 30–7 loss to the Packers before only thirty thousand spectators. Again, there was little room for optimism about support from Dallas fans.

The regular season for the Cowboys began with a spectacular last-second victory over the Steelers in the Cotton Bowl, and the team owned a respectable 4–3 record at the halfway point. Only five NFL teams had better records. After a stunning 17–16 upset of the Giants for victory number four, the *Morning News* declared, "Dallas has a team, not just a franchise." But the victory bubble soon burst. When the Cowboys came home to play the Cardinals the next Sunday, only 20,500 fans showed up. The Cowboys stumbled through the remaining seven games with one tie and six losses and concluded the season with a 4–9–1 record.

In spite of the Cowboys' collapse in the second half of the season, no NFL expansion team has ever had a better record in its second year. Attendance was disappointing, but the average for seven games did rise from 21,417 in 1960 to 24,571 in 1961, an increase of 14.3 per cent. With one more game the second year and better attendance on the road as well as at home, gate revenue rose almost $100,000 to $480,271. Operating expenses naturally rose, too, especially the salaries of management, coaches, and players; players' bonuses; and the costs of the scouting system (a $66,000 increase). The Cowboys' balance

sheet for 1961 showed another loss of approximately $700,000. The figure was only slightly less than the loss for 1960, a fact that was still not likely to bring shouts of joy from Clint Murchison, Jr., and his associates. At least the Texans, with a 6–8 record, also continued to lose heavily. In February, 1962, one of Murchison's companies bought the Texans' practice field, which was located off Dallas' North Central Expressway. Perhaps that was an omen for the future, especially since Cowboy headquarters are now on the eleventh floor of the Expressway Tower office building on that site.

The Cowboys' financial outlook for the 1962 season brightened dramatically in January when the NFL signed a new, and this time clearly legal, league-package television contract. After Judge Grim had overturned the CBS contract in 1961, the NFL leadership had not appealed to a higher court. Instead, it had turned to Congress, where Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York and the House Judiciary Committee had been concerned since 1957 with the "Sports Bill"—proposed legislation designed to exempt professional sports from antitrust laws. Action in Washington appeared to offer pro football the strongest hope for relief from the effects of Judge Grim's decision.

Bills to exempt league-package television contracts from antitrust laws were introduced in August, 1961, by Estes Kefauver of Tennessee in the Senate and by Emmanuel Celler in the House. Celler's bill received prompt attention in the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. After public hearings and so many amendments that it became in fact a new bill, Celler's proposal reached the floor of the House on September 18, 1961. Kefauver's bill became superfluous as Celler's neared passage.

Celler's bill proposed to amend the antitrust laws to allow members of professional football, hockey, basketball, and baseball leagues to enter into joint agreements to sell television rights

to their games. It also recognized the blackout rule, protected intercollegiate football games from professional competition, and stressed that it was not an exemption of professional sports from any other liability that might come under antitrust laws. Representative Celler explained that Judge Grim's decision denied some teams adequate television income and the opportunity to telecast road games back into their home areas. And he concluded that, "should these weaker teams be allowed to founder, there is danger that the structure of the entire league would become impaired and its continued existence imperiled." Congress itself was now being asked to recognize the special need for controlled business competition in professional football.

Discussion of the bill in the House was brief and entirely friendly. Representative John Byrnes of Wisconsin pointed out that Judge Grim's decision was really contrary to the spirit of the antitrust laws in that "it would make the strong clubs stronger and the weak clubs weaker." In a lighter vein, Representative H. R. Gross of Iowa wanted to know if the bill might help the Redskins win a few games. The answer to Gross was not strongly affirmative, but the bill passed easily. Three days later, on September 21, the Senate briefly considered and passed the House bill. The NFL, now with governmental approval of its special business requirements, proceeded to negotiate a league-package contract for 1962 and 1963 with CBS. Total income for two years was $9,300,000 or more than $300,000 annually for each NFL team.

The contract with CBS meant that the television revenue of the Dallas Cowboys in 1962 would be double that of the previous year. Murchison's team would finally enjoy all the benefits of controlled competition in the NFL—if it would be allowed to operate in Dallas in 1962. The antitrust suit filed by the AFL in 1960, which sought $10,080,000 in damages and injunctive relief from NFL competition in Dallas, finally came to trial in

February, 1962. If the decision went against the NFL, there would be no Dallas Cowboys in 1962. If, on the other hand, the AFL's case was dismissed, the Texans might have to look for greener pastures.

The AFL suit rested on the contention that the NFL had monopolized, attempted to monopolize, and conspired to monopolize the metropolitan areas in which pro teams could successfully operate, the signing of available players, and the sale of television and radio rights. As the trial began, Commissioner Rozelle stated, "We deny all the material allegations of the complaint." Testimony continued into April. A war of words, with the AFL doing most of the talking, went on in the press as well. When it was all over, the transcript of recorded testimony ran to 2,857 pages. Both sides expressed relief that the matter was at last in the hands of District Judge Roszel Thomsen.

Lamar Hunt optimistically repeated his lawyers' belief that the AFL had better than a fifty-fifty chance. "We feel," he said, "we proved conspiracy on the part of the NFL. Can you think of any business reason for the NFL to expand?" Judge Thomsen, however, did not see it that way. In a thirty-seven-page summation and decision, he found that the NFL had in no way monopolized or intended to monopolize professional football competition in the relevant market area for that product—the United States. He ruled that monopoly power on the part of the NFL would be "the power to prevent the formation or successful operation of a new league." The AFL could not win a monopoly suit simply because the NFL had the power to exclude it from some cities unless exclusion from those cities prevented completely the formation or operation of the new league. There could be no successful charge by the AFL of attempted monopoly or conspiracy to monopolize unless the NFL, in acting to exclude the AFL from some cities, was acting to exclude it from all.

Judge Thomsen, using Lamar Hunt's testimony as a basis, concluded that there were thirty-one metropolitan areas in the United States with populations of over seven hundred thousand and therefore capable of supporting a professional team. There had been no shortage of applicants for franchises in the AFL, and three of them operated in NFL cities. The NFL had never contemplated expanding beyond sixteen teams because of the fear of weakening existing clubs. Therefore, the NFL, even with expansion into Dallas and Minnesota, left many cities in which the AFL could establish and operate franchises. In short, it did not have a monopoly on the market area of professional football. The AFL plainly had no case in the second and third areas of its charge—monopolization of players and television markets. Its clubs had signed six of the twelve first-round choices of NFL teams in the 1960 draft. Judge Thomsen concluded, "The NFL has no power to prevent the AFL from signing an adequate number of qualified players." The AFL had a league-package television contract with ABC. Plainly there was no monopoly power in that area.

Having ruled that there was no monopoly power involved, Judge Thomsen turned to the AFL's charge that the move into Dallas and Minnesota in 1960–61 was an attempt or conspiracy to monopolize the game. He pointed to the matured plans of the NFL for expansion in 1961 and concluded that the advanced granting of the Dallas franchise in 1960 was motivated by legitimate "business reasons." Some NFL leaders may have felt that Murchison's franchise would discourage the Texans or the whole AFL idea, said Judge Thomsen, but "this was not a predominant or principal motive in granting the franchise or advancing the date." Final judgment favored the NFL with the stipulation that none of the AFL plaintiffs was entitled to relief.

Commissioner Pete Rozelle called the decision a "complete vindication of the NFL." Clint Murchison, Jr., said, "The ver-

dict is the only one I expected. . . . Rather than argue about it in the press, we argued it in the courts." The AFL leadership was philosophical in defeat and talked of settling down to the business of playing football. Peaceful coexistence was unlikely, since there would be competition for players, television income, general public support, and, in some cases, for fan support in the same stadium. Dallas obviously remained the scene of the most critical head-on competition between the leagues, but, as Judge Thomsen pointed out, "interest in and attendance at both NFL and AFL games in Dallas has been disappointing, and may indicate that the city is not as good a location for a professional football team as was generally believed." The judge left the distinct impression that the winner of the Texan-Cowboy competition would likely inherit a poor prize.

The Cowboys lost all five preseason games in 1962 and opened the regular season before only 15,730 fans in the Cotton Bowl. They were, however, a better team than in the previous two years. Tom Landry moved from coaching the defense to take direct charge of the offense in 1962. As a result, Cowboy scoring balanced a weak defense so effectively early in the season that the record stood at 4–3–1 when the New York Giants came to town in early November. Attendance based on ticket-stub figures and counts from the newly installed turnstiles was 45,668, the largest home crowd in Cowboy history. The team appeared on the verge of a major breakthrough in winning the support of Dallas, but they proceeded to lose to the Giants, 41–10. For the first time, the Cowboys could pay more than the thirty-thousand-dollar guarantee to the visiting team, but observers noted that Tex Schramm was not smiling when he signed the check. The following Sunday the Cowboys drew only 12,692 for a game with the Bears. The crowd may have been cut by the appeal of an important Texan-Bronco game on television as well as by the miserable showing of the Cowboys against the

Giants. In any case, the Cowboys lost again and concluded the season with a 5–8–1 record.

Home attendance for the Cowboys' season, often cut by bad weather as well as disappointing losses, averaged 21,781 per game. The total was 152,446, a decline of 11.4 per cent from the 1961 level. At least there was a continued increase in attendance at road games, where the average was approximately 40,000. With increased income on the road and a 100 per cent increase in television revenue, the Cowboys overcame their poor home showing and rising costs to the point that losses totaled approximately six hundred thousand dollars, an improvement of one hundred thousand dollars from the 1961 deficit. This was small consolation to Clint Murchison, who had not expected to be in the position of merely reducing losses after three years.

The 1962 Dallas Texans finished with an 11–3 record and defeated Houston 20–17 in a double-overtime, sudden-death playoff for the AFL championship. In spite of this success, their home attendance averaged only 22,201 a game. The Texans, as the championship club, stood seventh of the eight AFL teams in attracting fans at home and obviously had a heavy financial loss.

As the season ended, the sports community of Dallas, no longer concerned with the question of which team had the right to be in town, interested itself in the practical matter of which one would stay. There was little amusement in either club at a suggestion by John Breen of the Houston Oiler organization that the two teams play each other "and the winner gets to leave Dallas." Murchison and Hunt both appeared to remain committed to becoming successful in Dallas, but interviews in December, 1962, indicated an important difference in their views of the future for the Cowboys and the Texans. Hunt was willing to talk of moving to another city if such a step was the only way to succeed in the professional football business. Murchison, when asked if two teams would continue to exist in Dallas, re-

plied, "As long as the Texans are here, there will be two teams." His objective remained "to stay here and make money, which we will do."

The Cowboy-Texan confrontation in Dallas came to an end in May, 1963. Lamar Hunt announced that his franchise was moving to Kansas City for the next season. He would receive free use of a stadium for two years and a guaranteed sale of twenty-five thousand season tickets. Undoubtedly, the decision to move was made essentially on the basis of financial considerations. As Lamar Hunt now explains it, poor attendance meant that

> we were not helping the League which was important, and we were not helping ourselves. I felt that a better home could be made elsewhere, and really what I wanted to build was a successful business venture of a football team. I had hoped it would be in Dallas, but realistically it looked like both teams would go on forever losing a ton, so we decided to move.

Leaders of both the Texans and the Cowboys maintain that the result of the AFL's antitrust suit had nothing to do with Hunt's decision, but it is hard to imagine that a decision favoring the new league would not have altered the financial considerations that convinced Hunt to move.

In any case, Dallas became a one-league city; the community could unite in support of the Cowboys and brighten its considerably tarnished image as a major-league franchise. Clint Murchison and Tex Schramm were elated by the prospect. Not only were they free of the financial competition of the Texans, but they were free of all the minor irritations of being one of two teams in the same town. They no longer had to worry about constant comparisons with the Texans, challenges from the underdogs who had little to lose, competition for newspaper coverage, and all the other bothersome aspects of a crosstown rivalry. The Cowboy leadership denies any particular concern

with promotional campaigns to compete with the Texans, and undoubtedly they did expend less money and energy in that area than the Texans did, but their promotional expenses in 1963 were less than one-half those of 1962.

At the end of these years of total competition with the Texans, the Cowboys had lost approximately two million dollars. Yet they had lost considerably less than Hunt's team and were more willing to accept those losses in order to win the battle for Dallas. Victory in the direct confrontation with the AFL obviously meant improvement in the business situation of the Cowboys, but it did not totally end the problems of uncontrolled competition. The Texans might have gone to Kansas City, but the AFL remained very much alive as a rival professional league. The competition, especially that for players, still held the potential for ruin.

In its efforts to become competitive in the NFL, Murchison's team was already showing the results of strong financial backing, excellent organization, and the league's controls on competition. The Cowboys advanced from seventh or last place in the Western Conference in 1960 to sixth place in the Eastern Conference in 1961 and fifth place in 1962. They obviously had a long way to go, but their 4–9–1 second-year and 5–8–1 third-year records remain the equal of those achieved by any NFL expansion team in the decade, and the Cowboys concentrated more completely than ever on building a financial and competitive winner in the NFL.

BUILDING A WINNER, 1960–66

Professional football in Dallas came of age on the first Sunday of the 1966 season as the Cowboys, playing before 60,010 fans in the Cotton Bowl, crushed the New York Giants 52–7. Quarterback Don Meredith played a near-perfect game, completing fourteen of twenty-four passes for 358 yards and five touchdowns. Three of Meredith's passes went to Dan Reeves, an unheralded running back from South Carolina, and two to Bob Hayes, the 1964 Olympic 100-meter gold medalist often billed as "the world's fastest human." Hayes contributed the most exciting play of the game when, with a one-step lead on defensive back Clarence Childs, he took a short pass and used his 100-yard sprint speed of 9.1 seconds to outrun Childs, merely a 9.3-second sprinter, for a 74-yard touchdown.

So spectacular was the Dallas offense that the fans even cheered the few long passes that fell incomplete. One amazed sportswriter commented that even Baltimore fans didn't do that, and to Gary Cartwright of the *Dallas Morning News* the whole afternoon added up to "Dallas in Wonderland." Tex Schramm's comment, "I think that does it," summarized the feeling of the Cowboy organization that it had at last built a winner and had captured the imagination of the city.

Clint Murchison's franchise obviously had come a long way since the first game of the 1960 season, but the road to success in 1966 was six years long for the Cowboys—six years of more

defeats than victories as they struggled to become competitive in the NFL. To overcome the early handicaps and field a consistently winning team, Murchison's organization had to be both efficient and innovative. Administrative competence alone could not guide an expansion club to the top of the NFL. The task demanded a superior performance from men willing to accept challenge. These demands for leadership fell principally upon three men—Tex Schramm, Gil Brandt, and Tom Landry.

The three enjoyed essential independence in their areas of responsibility from the beginning. Schramm gave executive direction to the club with full support and no interference from the owners, and he, in turn, ensured Brandt's autonomy in scouting as well as Landry's right to run the football team as he saw fit. Yet these individuals were also interdependent parts of a smoothly operating organization. They worked together in the critical areas of finding and signing necessary players and in the development of a coaching staff with the philosophy and ability to mold a championship team.

It is no contradiction to speak of men with both independence and interdependence in the same organization, for this is exactly how the Cowboy leadership has always worked. Brandt has complete freedom to direct scouting, but he works closely with Schramm in the actual recruiting of college players and with Landry in evaluating the results of the search for talent. Landry has full control of his team, but he relies on Brandt and Schramm to provide new players and to keep his veterans happy with adequate salaries and fringe benefits. Many business organizations claim they are a team; the top Cowboy leadership, like the players it puts on the field, truly functions as a unit.

In building the Cowboys, Schramm, Brandt, and Landry agreed that a professional football team cannot trade itself into consistent championship contention. Their view is in marked contrast to that of some clubs, notably the Los Angeles Rams.

The Rams have often exchanged young players and future draft choices in the quest for immediate success. Landry admits that Los Angeles may be the exception, but he still contends that "history has proven that if you try to trade yourself into a championship you will usually fall short and age will disintegrate your club." In their first years the pressure to compete led the Cowboys into trades which cost valuable draft choices, but the club's management and coaches always believed that building a consistent winner essentially depended on success in recruiting quality players from the college ranks.

This philosophy, reinforced by the paucity of first-class athletes on their team, made the Cowboys the most innovative recruiters of college talent in professional football. Tex Schramm brought to the organization a long-standing interest in scouting techniques and contributed much to developing the Cowboy system, but primary responsibility for finding new talent fell on Gil Brandt. For the first three years, Brandt worked without aid from any other full-time scout, becoming virtually a twenty-four-hour man in the search for players. In 1961 he traveled an estimated seventy thousand miles and visited seventy to eighty major colleges and universities. He collected thousands of pages of information and processed them with his phenomenal memory for names, facts, and figures. By 1963 some teams were already willing to concede that the Cowboys had the best draft in the NFL. Of the twenty-five draftees signed by Dallas in 1961 and 1962, nine remained with the Cowboys through at least two years. The percentage of those who made the club might have been lower had the Cowboys been a stronger team, but the record was still impressive.

In some instances, the Cowboys' draft in 1961 and 1962 was little short of brilliant. George Andrie, for example, was a sixth-round choice in 1962 in spite of the fact that he played no football his senior year. His school, Marquette University, had

dropped intercollegiate football in 1961. Andrie became a starting defensive end almost immediately, won All-Rookie honors in 1962, and remained a fixture in the defensive line in 1969. On another draft choice in 1962 the Cowboys made what Gil Brandt admits was the biggest mistake of their scouting history. Sonny Gibbs of Texas Christian University, a six-foot, seven-inch quarterback with apparently great potential, was drafted as a future player while still in his junior year. After being signed to a no-cut contract in 1963, he threw only eleven passes for the Cowboys against NFL competition and failed completely as a major-league quarterback.

In 1962, after three years of searching for college football talent, Schramm and Brandt found that their ability to collect information had outrun their capacity to use it effectively. Each year, the Cowboys collected data on several thousand college players, beginning with each man's first season of varsity competition. Eventually the scouting system simply had too much data on too many players, and there was no way to process it efficiently. They also found disturbing evidence that prejudice, emotion, and personality played too large a role in recruiting players. Tom Landry, for example, always gave special consideration to a player with a high rating in character. All members of the organization subconsciously favored the athlete who said, "I've always wanted to play with the Cowboys, they are my favorite team," and rated him higher than one who said, "I don't care where I play just so I play pro football."

In an attempt to solve the problem of too much data and too little objectivity, the Cowboys turned to the most advanced data-processing instrument available, the electronic computer. It alone could handle with necessary speed the systematic calculations required to evaluate and summarize the mass of statistical information collected for each year's player draft. The computer, of course, is not a creative thinker; it is a timesaving de-

vice, only as good as the material collected and the program developed for the processing of that data. But included in that concept is another advantage of the computer—its capacity for dispassionate analysis of players and its built-in checks to compensate for the biases or weaknesses of scouts through the differential weighting of their reports.

The Cowboys' experiment with computer-aided evaluations of football players began in 1962 when the Services Bureau Corporation, a subsidiary of International Business Machines, approached the club and offered new machinery to handle its accounting problems. Tex Schramm, in a moment of inspiration, challenged the SBC representative to develop a computer program that would deal with the increasingly complex problems of scouting. SBC took the challenge and soon dispatched Salam Qureishi of its Computer Sciences Division to Dallas. As Gil Brandt remembers, Qureishi, an Indian from Bombay University, had no idea whether a football was filled with air or feathers. But to that man fell the task of applying computers to the scouting of football players. Qureishi and Schramm signed a contract and the Indian went to work. He soon discovered that "American football is easily the most scientific game ever invented."

Qureishi's task was first to learn the qualities to be looked for in prospective Cowboy players and then design a program which would allow the computer to process scouting data that measured those qualities. From many sessions with Cowboy coaches and scouts and college coaches, he learned just how subjective the rating of players can be. Any fan running through his mental list of the characteristics that make a successful professional player can imagine the variety of suggestions offered by the football experts; they came up with a total of three hundred factors which affected their judgment of football talent. This, no doubt, was a distressing number to Qureishi, who in-

formed the Cowboy organization that the most sophisticated computer system of that day could work with only eighty variables. Obviously, there was a need to reduce and standardize the multifarious terms used to describe the qualities considered essential for NFL players. Even among football experts there was a problem of semantics. One coach would describe a player as "quick as a cat," another, "quick as two cats," and still another would say "quick as greased lightning." The difficulties that subjectivity posed to Qureishi, as a non-expert in football, are not pleasant to contemplate.

Slowly, he and the Cowboy staff defined the dimensions of a successful pro football player in a language all could comprehend. They found that the problem could indeed be reduced to a reasonable degree of simplicity. Three obviously essential physical qualities—weight, height, and speed—were tangible and easily measurable by the scout. He then faced the more difficult and important assignment of measuring five intangible characteristics—character, quickness and body control, competitiveness, strength and explosion, and mental alertness. The scout next had to rate players on the specific requirements of a position. Quarterbacks, for example, were to be rated on eleven position specifics: ability to throw short, ability to throw long, ability to time the pass, delivery, ability to scramble, courage, quickness to set up, determination to stay in the cup, running ability, poise, and quickness of delivery. In addition, Cowboys scouts also determined position specifics for tight end, split end, defensive lineman, offensive lineman, outside linebacker, middle linebacker, offensive back, and defensive back.

After defining the eight basic qualities and the specifics for nine different positions on the team, Qureishi and the Cowboys had to design a grading system that permitted statistical measurement of these characteristics and abilities. "We have discovered," Qureishi once explained in *Sports Illustrated*, "that

the human mind is not capable of judging degrees on a scale with more than nine ratings." Accordingly, the grading scale devised offered a range of choices from one to nine; the higher the number assigned, the better the grade. For example, a scout's final judgment of a player's prospects of making an NFL team could vary from a grade of one, meaning "none," to nine, meaning "cinch."

The Cowboys' player scouts were divided into two basic categories. Individuals in the larger group, known best as "unofficial scouts," were located in virtually every American college and university with a football program. Their scouting questionnaire contained fifteen declarative statements, each designed to measure one of the five intangible characteristics. To grade competitiveness, for example, the scout rated the player from one to nine on the basis of the statement, "He wants to win at all costs." The fifteen statements were designed to avoid confusion and allow each unofficial scout to know exactly the characteristic to be graded. The scouts also graded prospects on the specific requirements of their position and their chances of playing in the NFL.

The other Cowboy scouts were the professionals, experts engaged in a full-time search for football talent. Their scouting questionnaires differed slightly from those of the unofficial scouts. They used the same form to grade players on position specifics, but they alone were responsible for measuring the height, weight, and speed of a prospect. The five key characteristics were described in a written statement as well as graded numerically. Beyond that, there was a statement of the player's offensive and defensive abilities, his strong and weak points, his best position for pro ball, and a summation of his potential for playing in the NFL.

Having defined a workable number of essential characteristics and abilities and developed forms for the statistical measurement

of these qualities in prospective players, Qureishi was prepared to write a program for processing the data. The final result would be a single numerical rating of each player. All his problems, however, were far from over at this point. A major difficulty lay in determining the proper value or "weighting" to assign each of the five intangible characteristics—character, quickness and body control, competitiveness, strength and explosion, and mental alertness—in relation to the playing position of the prospect. For example, mental alertness should receive a heavier weighting in the evaluation of a quarterback than of a defensive lineman, while strength and explosion should be weighted in just the reverse manner for the two positions. Qureishi and the Cowboys defined acceptable weighting of the key characteristics in relation to position and began to experiment, realizing that there should be an annual re-evaluation of the values so assigned.

Considerable variety in the sources of scouting data posed an additional problem. If the reports of all scouts, unofficial and professional, were processed without distinction, the degree of accuracy would be greatly reduced. Many of the unofficial scouts tended to be swayed too much by personal feelings toward the prospect or by the won-lost records of the team on which he played. Even among the professionals, one scout might be too harsh and another too lenient in judging a player. Schramm, Brandt, and Qureishi solved this problem by working over scouting reports and assigning a value to each scout based on position and/or past performance.

The prospect's school, conference, and the caliber of intercollegiate competition he faced made up still another factor requiring differential weighting. For purposes of computer analysis, all schools were put into one of three categories and assigned values accordingly. Class I included approximately 125 major colleges and universities, class II grouped small

schools employing four or more coaches, and class III incorporated small schools with fewer than four coaches.

Nearly two years of planning and development went into the computerized scouting system before the Cowboys applied it for the first time in the 1964 college-player draft. Ironically, the Cowboys had discovered in 1963 that they lacked enough scouting information to provide an adequate initial sample for their computer program. The problem of too much data had led to the use of the computer, which in turn created a need for more data. The solution was to invite the Los Angeles Rams and the San Francisco Forty-Niners to join the Cowboys in a combined scouting operation called Troika. The three clubs hired a number of full-time scouts and assigned them to certain areas of the country. Reports of these area scouts and those of each team's unofficial college scouts, amounting together to about 40 per cent of all the information collected, were shared equally by the three clubs. The Cowboys thus enjoyed an important increase in the amount of scouting data available but maintained exclusive use of the more detailed material collected by their own professional scouts, approximately 60 per cent of the total. Gil Brandt hired his first full-time assistant in 1963 and prepared to put his new system into operation at the completion of that year's college season.

Drafting college prospects is risky business at best. A multitude of incalculable factors affect the success or failure of each player. One rookie may make the scouts look brilliant by stepping into the shoes of an aging veteran, while another prospect of equal promise and ability may fail to make the squad because he has to compete with an established star. Some individuals mature physically in college and show no improvement after entering the pro ranks. Other athletes develop more slowly and reach their full potential several years after entering professional

football. The psychological make-up of any player affects the use he makes of his more measurable physical skills. Brandt knew that football players, because they are human, can never be reduced to totally measurable quantities. Accordingly, Tom Landry and the scouting staff began to adjust the computer's final numerical rankings by taking into account such factors as position needs, the past injury records of the draftees, and the written statements accompanying numerical ratings by the professional scouts. The result, beginning in 1964, was a final, adjusted list that served as a guide in selecting the best athlete available at the time the Cowboys picked in each round of the draft.

In spite of these subjective considerations, Dallas still went into the 1964 draft with a more objective evaluation of a greater number of players than ever before. Because of trades, Dallas had no first-, third-, or fifth-round choices in 1964, but still managed to choose seven players who remained active in the NFL through the 1969 season. These draftees included Mel Renfro, Bob Hayes, and Roger Staubach of the 1969 Cowboys.

In the 1965 draft the computer system helped Dallas choose Craig Morton, Malcolm Walker, and Jethro Pugh, all regulars for the Cowboys in 1969, as well as three other players—Brig Owens, Ernie Kellermann, and Mitch Johnson—who remain active with other NFL teams. That year saw Dallas acquire Ralph Neely, too, effectively as a draft choice. Baltimore had drafted Neely, but when he seemed destined to sign with Houston of the AFL, the Colts traded their rights to him for Dallas' fourth-round choice in 1966. Cowboy rookie selections in 1966 included John Niland, Willie Townes, Les Shy, and Craig Baynham. Such good choices evoked general agreement that the Cowboys' already successful scouting system showed marked improvement after 1964. *Sports Illustrated* commented that the

rise of the Cowboys in 1965 could be attributed directly to successful scouting and concluded that their computerized system "could revolutionize that phase of the game."

Conclusive statistical proof of improvement or of Cowboy superiority over other teams' scouting systems cannot be offered. Fate and circumstance are too much involved in each rookie's success or failure. But the Cowboys did discover an increasing number of players who stuck with the team for four years, equaling the average active career in the NFL. Clearly, the other NFL teams considered the Cowboys' innovations in scouting a success, for they hurried to copy them as closely as possible. By 1966 the Bears, Lions, Eagles, Steelers, and Vikings had formed an association known by the acronym Blesto-V, while CEPO (Central Eastern Personnel Organization) served the Falcons, Colts, Browns, Packers, Giants, Cardinals, and Redskins. The New Orleans Saints turned Troika into Quadra by purchasing its area reports in preparation for the 1966 draft, and then formally joined the Cowboys, Rams, and Forty-Niners in 1967. Evidence plainly indicates that the observation made by *Sports Illustrated* was correct: the Cowboys' use of the computer did revolutionize scouting in professional football.

The Cowboys naturally attempted to measure the success or failure of their computerized scouting system by analyzing the results of each annual draft, beginning in 1964. How many of their draft choices made the team? How many of the players they rated in the top one hundred college prospects in the country made a professional club? What qualities appeared to account for the success of players with low ratings or the failure of players with high ratings from the computer? Answers to these questions provided feedback, an essential to the refinement of any system of measurement and evaluation.

On the basis of this feedback and experience, the whole system has been re-evaluated and revised annually since 1964.

Scouting forms are altered slightly each year. More importantly, the Cowboys are able to revise their weightings of all elements involved in the evaluation of players. For example, feedback may indicate that too low a value has been assigned to a specific characteristic such as competitiveness or mental alertness in relation to a specific position, such as split end. The result is constant revision, updating, and improvement of the program.

The case of Dan Reeves illustrates the need for improving weighting in computerized scouting. Reeves, a good but unspectacular quarterback at South Carolina, was not drafted by either league when he completed his college career. Signed by the Cowboys in 1965 as a free agent, he developed in 1966 into an All-Pro running back who led the team in rushing and touchdowns scored. Reeves had been rated by the computer for the 1965 draft, but the program at that time indicated he was not worth a draft choice. In 1967, after Reeves's success, the information available on him in 1965 was again fed into the computer but was programmed with the 1967 weightings. This time Reeves ranked ninety-third, a position that would have meant his selection in the fifth or sixth round. Perhaps Reeves himself influenced the 1967 weightings used by the Cowboys, but the advantages of revisions based on feedback are obvious. The Cowboys, because they were first to enter the field of computerized scouting, gained an edge on their competition in this area which they do not intend to give up. Many clubs may know of the Cowboys' procedures, and some have copied their scouting forms, but the weightings involved in their program are a jealously guarded secret.

From the beginning in 1960, the Cowboys aimed higher than mere success in the annual college draft. Because they missed the 1960 draft and traded some future choices for badly needed veterans in the early years, the Cowboys specialized in the search for free agents, players not chosen by any professional team in

the regular draft. Both Brandt and Schramm feel that "to be successful you have to be aggressive." They were determined to outwork other people, look harder for talent, visit more campuses, and grade more game movies. The Cowboys have traditionally brought more free agents to training camp than any other club, and they have not confined themselves to signing college football players. Brandt looked at basketball, soccer, and track stars who had never played collegiate football. His philosophy was that if he found only one player in these sports who could help the Cowboys it would all be worthwhile. In basketball he found two in ten years—Pete Gent and All-Pro cornerback Cornell Green—and in track he found Mike Gaechter, starting strong safety in 1969.

In signing free agents, Brandt looked for one outstanding quality, not the all-round great athlete. Professional football is a game played by specialists, and the Cowboys recruited on that basis. They adopted the attitude, for example, that a lineman should be six feet, five inches or taller to play in the NFL. As Brandt has put it, "by getting a big guy you are either going to have a guy that is nothing, that you would replace anyway, or you are going to have a great man, and that is the theory we went under. We wanted to get somebody that could eventually be great for us." In short, the Cowboys looked for potentially great specialists in signing free agents—athletes who would pay off in the future. Obviously, a basketball star like Cornell Green or a track star like Mike Gaechter could not step into starting assignments immediately. Head coach Tom Landry had to be convinced that a player with great potential was more valuable to him in the long run than a more experienced average player at the moment. The fact that Landry holds a long-term contract and has been associated with owners who did not demand immediate success permitted him to take more chances than a coach whose job is dependent solely on his won-lost record.

Emphasis on free agents paid off as early as 1961 when three such players, defensive tackle Ken Frost, defensive back Warren Livingston, and running back Amos Marsh, earned All-Rookie honors. In 1962 free-agent rookies included linebacker Dave Edwards, tight end Pettis Norman, and the previously mentioned defensive backs Mike Gaechter and Cornell Green, all of whom remained with the team as starting regulars in 1969. The Cowboys' reputation for success with free agents was well established by 1963, and they maintained this reputation in the next four years by signing Dan Reeves, Dave Manders, John Wilbur, and Mike Johnson, all of whom were also still with the team in 1969. The Cowboys have also discovered as free agents a number of outstanding players, such as Les Josephson of the Rams, who are established members of other NFL teams.

Several factors explain the Cowboys' success in developing free agents into professional football players. First, they refined the idea, which remains in use currently, of an all-rookie training camp opening ten days before the veterans arrive. Each rookie, regardless of his position in college football, works for five days on offense and five days on defense. During this time he is free of the pressure of competition with the established veterans. Some young players do not react well to the immediate pressures of professional competition; others may have the specialized skills for a position which they did not play in college. The rookie camp gives both the free agents and the draft choices a special opportunity to demonstrate their ability or potential among equals. Many teams employ this idea because it offers the coaching staff an opportunity for a fairer appraisal of new players.

Second, the Cowboys were admittedly a weak team in their early years. In such circumstances it was more likely that a free agent could make the team. As the team increased in strength in the mid-1960's, free agents became less and less common among

Cowboy veterans. Another factor, of course, is that by 1969 the scouting programs of all twenty-six professional teams developed to the point that few players of ability escaped the draft.

Gil Brandt's job only began with the finding of college prospects; his department then had to convince the players to sign contracts with Dallas. Clint Murchison's bank account was an obvious advantage, but the Cowboys were never known as a free-spending, big-bonus organization. Instead, the focus of Cowboy recruiting was on "selling" their team. Throughout their last year of varsity competition, college players who interested Brandt's office received a steady stream of correspondence, including the Monday sports section from both Dallas newspapers as well as clippings and news releases on the Cowboy organization. The publicity office put together a booklet called *Life with the Cowboys* which described all aspects of the organization and boosted the opportunities of the Dallas community. It placed special emphasis on the equal chance given to every player to make the Cowboy roster. Pettis Norman, a free agent from Johnson C. Smith College, was quoted as saying, "All the Cowboys wanted to know from me was whether I wanted to play football. They didn't question my small school background. In camp they treated me just like a high draft choice. I will never regret signing with them." Apparently draft choices did not object to being placed on an equal footing with free agents. From the six annual drafts through 1966, the Cowboys signed eighty-four of one hundred players selected (losing twelve to the AFL, two to the Canadian Football League, and two who did not play).

The personnel of the 1966 team, which signaled the arrival of the Cowboys as a championship contender with its 10–3–1 record and narrow 34–27 loss to Green Bay in the NFL title game, demonstrated the success of Brandt's office in discovering football talent. The starting defensive eleven consisted of five

draft choices, four free agents, and only two players who came from trades. Four free agents, four draft choices, including tackle Ralph Neely, and three players acquired by trades started on offense. Of the forty-two active Cowboy players in 1966, only nine had been obtained by trades.

While the Cowboy scouting system under the leadership of Gil Brandt provided talented players in increasing numbers, head coach Tom Landry worked to apply his coaching system to molding a winning team. Landry's record for the years 1960–62 was far from spectacular—nine won, twenty-eight lost, and three tied—but most observers recognized that he had faced impossible odds in those years. Robert Riger, writing in *Esquire* in 1962, called Landry "a careful planner, a confident coach, and above all an inventive strategist" who might become "one of the greatest coaches of them all." Many Cowboy players testified to confidence in their coach, but none so prophetically as quarterback Don Meredith in 1962: "Landry knows just what kind of personnel he wants at each position, and he knows precisely what he wants to do with them. . . . When he gets it, the Cowboys and the Packers will be playing for the championship."

Tom Landry, while working with the Giants, had gained a reputation for genius in defensive football. In New York, he played a key role in creating the 4–3 defensive alignment, now the standard professional defense. He has always believed that "defense is the key to building any championship team" but that "it is much more difficult to play defense." Lacking the personnel to play superior defense during his early years in Dallas, Landry concentrated instead on fielding an exciting offensive football team. In Landry's opinion, a good attack would be easier to create, would partially compensate for defensive weaknesses, and would help create fan interest in the Cowboys.

Characteristically, Landry planned his offense by thinking in terms of defense. As he explains it, "I conceived the idea of a

model formation of attack in order to defeat what I considered the best defense at this time." The best defense, the 4–3, was aimed at stopping the straight T formation; Landry sought to defeat the 4–3 by creating a multiple offense which used a variety of formations all triggered by the T quarterback. For example, the Cowboys would set offensively in a double wing, triple wing, or slot formation and then run a number of plays from each. The strategy was designed to force the defense into making mistakes as it faced a multiplicity of unfamiliar formations.

The multiple offense was complex—too complex, according to its critics—but it did help compensate for weak personnel. A simple offense such as that used so effectively by Green Bay in the early and middle 1960's requires great physical ability and perfect execution. Neither quality was present on the early Cowboy teams. Landry's multiple offense, in spite of its complexities, gave Dallas an explosive attack which became the team's trademark. It is a "big play" offense that is intended to force mistakes by the other team rather than to grind down opponents with short yardage plays.

The Cowboy offense could, and often did, sputter and look bad, but it could also score quickly, for each play was designed to score a touchdown. In their best years during the building period, the Cowboys scored quickly and often, averaging over twenty-eight points a game in 1962 and thirty-one per game in 1966.

The 1962 season saw the introduction of one of Landry's most unusual experiments with offensive football, the shuttle system. He alternated his quarterbacks, Eddie LeBaron and Don Meredith, on each play as he called the game from the sidelines. There were several reasons for the shuttle, including the fact that the Cowboys probably did not have enough depth at any other position to afford alternating players. The primary

factor, however, was Landry's unique knowledge of his complex offense, which allowed him to call plays more effectively, and gave him the opportunity to discuss strategy with his quarterbacks on the sidelines. The shuttle created a brief sensation, and the Cowboys' offense had a productive year. But it did not please either quarterback, and Landry returned to more conventional practices in directing the team. He simplified the multiple offense at times and added new formations at others, but he never changed the basic concept involved. NFL teams continued to use the 4–3 defense, and Landry continued to counter with the multiple offense. Gradually he developed the kinds of players who could make his offense work better—a versatile halfback like Dan Reeves and a game-breaking receiver like Bob Hayes.

The multiple offense may have been exciting, and it may have caught the mood of the 1960's, but Landry always recognized that the foundation of a winning team in the NFL would be defense. He began to develop in Dallas a new concept of defense designed to stop any offensive formation thrown against it. The basic concept involved was that of a co-ordinated defense, with each player being responsible for securing a position in the defensive alignment while co-ordinating with others in response to offensive action. In conventional defense, the players react to the flow of the play in an attempt to get through blockers and make the tackle. Under Landry's system, each defender must first maintain his area of responsibility, read certain keys to the developing offensive play, and then move to co-ordinate the arrival of three or four men at the point of attack. No one is permitted to pursue the ball carrier automatically and thereby leave holes elsewhere in the defense. Landry has said his defense "is designed to stop every play on the line of scrimmage." "This," he adds, "is the theory, you have to remember, not necessarily the result."

Landry's concept of defense went against the theories instilled in most players before they came to the Cowboys, and it violated their basic instincts. As line coach Ernie Stautner put it, "If the ball carrier is going inside, it isn't easy for a lineman to learn to go outside." So Landry's defense, like the multiple offense, was complicated and difficult to teach. It also required at least average intelligence at most positions. In the case of the defense, new players found that they had to act on faith before they understood the principles involved. Among other teams in the NFL, there were fewer converts to Landry's innovations in defense than to his offense, but he maintained unshaken faith in it. When it began to develop as he expected, the Cowboys began to perform as a winning team.

Landry's teams had shown impressive improvement during the three years from 1960 through 1962 when they were also in competition with the Texans. After the first winless year, the Cowboys performed well enough to gain fifth place in the seven-team Eastern Conference in 1962. Their offense was so impressive in 1962 that *Sports Illustrated* entitled its cover story in the 1963 scouting reports issue, "The Cowboys Can Ride High on Defense." Tex Maule, after explaining the roles of Murchison, Schramm, Brandt, and Landry in creating one of "pro football's soundest and most intelligently operated franchises," picked the Cowboys to win their conference title. As he put it, "If they can achieve even mediocrity on defense—and they should achieve more—the Cowboys will win the first of their Eastern championships." Maule was, again, too optimistic about the Cowboys. They lost six of their first seven games and staggered to a 4–10 record that left them in fifth place in the conference. The defense did not even achieve mediocrity, having given up an average of twenty-seven points a game, and the offense was even less effective than that of the 1962 team.

Tom Landry's four-year record stood at 13–38–3, but he had

never believed, given the circumstances at the time, that Dallas could be more than a "bad National Football League team" in its early years. Clint Murchison indicated his satisfaction with Landry by giving him a new ten-year contract in 1964. Because Landry had one year remaining on his original pact, the new one was announced as an eleven-year contract, a good number for a methodical football perfectionist. Some wits speculated that he would work one year on each defensive position and then be given a similar contract to work on the offensive team. But even Landry did not anticipate the need for so much time. He believed that the Cowboys were ready to move into contention for the Eastern Conference championship in 1964.

Preseason reports in 1964 emphasized the potential of the Cowboy offense. Eddie LeBaron had retired, and Don Meredith was established as the starting quarterback. Two all-NFL receivers, Tommy McDonald of Philadelphia and Buddy Dial of Pittsburgh, had been acquired in trades. Optimism was tempered, however, by pointing out that the Cowboys had a porous defense. *Sports Illustrated* concluded that Dallas could finish second if its defense held up. Caution concerning the Cowboys' chances in 1964 was certainly justified, but reasons for their failure to become a winning club were precisely the opposite of the predictions for the season. The defense, under Landry's personal supervision, turned in its best performance ever, but the offense regressed to its level of 1961. Preseason speculation on whether McDonald or Dial would catch more touchdown passes was killed when neither caught one in the first seven games. The offense, often hampered by injuries to Meredith, averaged only 17.8 points a game. The team's 5–8–1 record placed them fifth in their conference. Tom Landry admitted that he was "disappointed" in the 1964 season. He added, "We knew the defense was coming around, and we thought we had a chance."

Landry and the Cowboys looked forward to the 1965 season; it was their year, they believed, to move into contention. They opened with solid victories over New York and Washington, but then fell apart and lost five consecutive games. Meredith, bothered by a sore arm developed in training camp, was benched after the first loss. Landry again returned to the shuttle system against Philadelphia, using his two rookie quarterbacks, Jerry Rhome and Craig Morton, but again the shuttle was unsatisfactory. He then started Rhome against Cleveland and Morton against Green Bay, losing both times. Finally, he went back to Meredith for a game against Pittsburgh only to see his veteran look worse than the rookies as the Cowboys lost 22–13 to what was then the weakest team in the NFL. Following the Steeler defeat, Landry, usually an unemotional, computerlike coach, locked the clubhouse doors and wept. He thought seriously of starting his rookie quarterbacks in the remaining seven games but decided with his staff to start Meredith, win or lose, for the remainder of the season. Meredith was the Cowboys' best quarterback—Landry had to go with him and hope that injuries and poor performances were all in the past. At that point the team and Landry passed their last crisis. The Cowboys righted themselves and won five of their last seven games for a 7–7 season record and second place in the Eastern Conference. They were blasted 35–3 by Baltimore in the Playoff Bowl in Miami, but Landry's team had the look of a winner that intended to stay at the top.

The 1966 season marked the arrival of the Cowboys as a team of championship quality in the NFL. Following their opening-day 52–7 demolition of the Giants, they rolled over Minnesota, Atlanta, and Philadelphia before being tied by St. Louis and losing 30–21 to Cleveland. Sportswriters and many observers sensed another Cowboy collapse. After the Cleveland loss, Andy Anderson of the *Fort Worth Press* entitled his col-

umn, "To Be Blunt, Cowboys Choked," but the predicted collapse did not come. The Cowboys won three of their next four games and faced critical return matches with the Browns and Cardinals in Dallas. A 26–14 victory over Cleveland on Thanksgiving Day gave the Cowboys an 8–2–1 record and set up a showdown game with St. Louis, also 8–2–1, the next week. For a second straight week Dallas won the "big one," this time by a 31–17 score. St. Louis lost its last two games, so it did not matter that the Cowboys were upset 34–31 by Washington before closing the season with another victory over New York. Landry's team had a 10–3–1 record and its first Eastern Conference championship.

The stage was set for a dramatic contest in Dallas with the Green Bay Packers for supremacy in the NFL. The Packers opened the game as if they meant to run the Cowboys out of the Cotton Bowl. They took the opening kickoff and drove downfield to score, picked up a fumble on the ensuing kickoff, and scored again. They led 14–0 with less than four minutes gone in the game. The Cowboys hardly gave the crowd time to realize they were behind by two touchdowns. Before the first quarter ended, Dan Reeves and Don Perkins scored to tie the game at 14–14. In the next fifteen minutes, Green Bay scored another touchdown while Dallas managed only a field goal to make the score 21–17 at the half. The Cowboys pulled within one point on another field goal in the third quarter, but the Packers then scored twice more to move ahead 34–20 with 5:20 left in the game. Down by two touchdowns again, the Cowboys struck back quickly with a sixty-eight-yard pass from Meredith to Frank Clarke. Trailing by seven points, they forced Green Bay to punt from deep in its own territory and began one last offensive series from the Packer forty-seven-yard line. They reached within two yards of the goal with 1:52 left, were penalized for going off side, got back to the two-yard line on a pass play, and

then on fourth down and with goal to go, Meredith's pass was intercepted in the end zone. The great comeback fell two yards short of forcing the game into a sudden-death playoff.

Tex Maule thought the game was not the best ever played but added that "for pure suspense and unremitting excitement no championship game has approached it for the past eight years." Columnist Arthur Daley wrote, ". . . if ever a team attained tremendous stature in defeat, it was Dallas." Dallas fans, players, and the whole organization said, "Wait until next year," and there was no hollow ring to their promise.

The Cowboy organization was justifiably proud of building an expansion team that broke even on the field in its sixth year and emerged as a true title contender in its seventh. Tex Schramm still maintains that their success in developing the team is the greatest contribution of his organization to professional football. In their example of going from a winless team to conference champions in seven years, the Cowboys provided a special incentive for other clubs. The rise of a team from perennial loser to consistent winner emphasized the equality of competitive opportunity in the league, a condition necessary for the success of professional football as a sports attraction.

But the Dallas Cowboys' contribution to the game in 1966 did not end with the building of a winning team. The organization's leadership also played a key role in the merger of the National and American Football Leagues that ended off-the-field competition, which was becoming ruinous to the whole of professional football.

THE BUSINESS OF TOTAL COMPETITION: NFL VS. AFL, 1960–66

Success in building a winner on the field steadily improved the business fortunes of the Dallas Cowboys after 1962. The team, freed of intracity competition with the Texans, had moved into contention for the NFL title, and as title contenders, the Cowboys enjoyed increasingly strong support from the Dallas community. Attendance in 1963 rose 23.8 per cent above 1962 totals to an average of 26,961 per game and then increased by another 41.8 per cent with a 38,237-per-game average in 1964. The first two home games in 1965 attracted 120,943 fans, only 7,557 short of the total attendance for the six home games of 1960. Attendance for 1965 showed a spectacular 45.3 per cent advance over 1964. The Eastern Conference championship team of 1966 attracted a record average home crowd of 67,625 a game, an increase of 21.7 per cent over the previous year. Cowboy road games over this same period improved steadily, if less spectacularly, in attendance from an average of 40,009 in 1963 to 58,413 a game in 1966.

The Cowboys' financial records easily illustrate the meaning of these attendance figures for the business success of the organization. Gate revenue in 1963 totaled $750,317, an increase of almost $200,000 over the figure for 1962. It continued upward to $1,035,334 in 1964, $1,370,675 in 1965, and $2,288,290 in 1966. Larger crowds also meant additional income from several minor sources such as game programs and concessions

at the Cotton Bowl. Net revenue from programs increased from $25,662 in 1963 to $49,741 in 1966. A new contract with the Cotton Bowl management in 1965 allowed the Cowboys 50 per cent of the proceeds from concessions, a share which amounted to $19,744 in 1965 and $28,435 in 1966.

Building a title contender obviously paid off in gate revenue, but the single item of income which showed the greatest increase from 1963 through 1966, revenue from television rights, did not depend essentially on the team's won-lost record. Beginning with the 1962 season, the National Football League's front office, headed by Commissioner Pete Rozelle, negotiated league-package television contracts. In the interest of maintaining relative competitive equality, NFL teams shared equally in revenue from these television contracts. The Cowboys could hardly quarrel with this business practice, since the first league contract with CBS in 1962–63 had doubled their television revenue.

Yet better things were to come. At the expiration of the first two-year contract with CBS, all three major networks bid for the rights to televise NFL games in 1964 and 1965. The surprisingly high bids were a tribute to the rising popularity of the NFL as well as professional football. CBS offered the high bid of $28,200,000, defeating ABC and NBC which bid $26,100,000 and $21,500,000, respectively. The new contract brought each of the fourteen league franchises a little over $1,000,000 in television revenue annually. For the Dallas Cowboys it meant that income from television and radio bounded from $331,856 in 1963 to $1,021,878 in 1964 and $1,063,724 in 1965.

Bargaining for a third league-package contract for 1966 and 1967 was more difficult for the NFL, but the final result produced still more riches for its members. NBC had signed a contract with the American Football League while ABC was negotiating with the National Collegiate Athletic Association

(NCAA) for the rights to college games when Commissioner Rozelle opened negotiations on a new contract in late 1965. Accordingly, CBS was the only network interested in the NFL, and its first offer was reportedly very close to the existing figure of the previous contract. Rozelle countered with a threat to create the NFL's own network, which would undoubtedly attract many CBS affiliates. Negotiations ended in a new contract calling for an incredible $37,600,000 for 1966 and 1967. An option gave CBS the right to the 1968 season at an undisclosed increase in price if the NFL expanded to sixteen teams. Atlanta received a franchise for the 1966 season, New Orleans for the 1967 season, and CBS raised its payment to approximately $20,000,000 for 1968 alone. CBS did gain some concessions from the league, including the right to telecast more Sunday doubleheaders and to carry another game into NFL cities where a home game was being blacked out. Each minute of commercial time in any regular-season game would cost its purchaser $60,000; additional games meant extra millions for CBS. The network profited but so did the NFL; the contract meant over $1,200,000 for each NFL member in 1966. Dallas' share, along with revenue from radio rights, totaled $1,282,038, an improvement of nearly a quarter of a million dollars over 1965 and a fantastic $950,182 jump from the 1963 figure.

Another source of income for NFL franchises, although admittedly a relatively minor one, resulted when Commissioner Rozelle capitalized on the expanding popularity of professional football. In 1963 the league began operation of an enterprise called NFL Properties, Inc., which controlled all merchandise endorsements or licensing for the member clubs. It administered royalty agreements for everything from NFL training-table foods to the Packer tie clasps sold in Green Bay, Wisconsin. NFL Properties, Inc., not only brought in revenue from royalty agreements, but it protected the league's name from being as-

sociated with shoddy products by endorsing only quality merchandise made by established firms. The strength of the league's image was an asset to every team. In 1965 NFL Properties was joined by NFL Films, Inc., which controls the filming of all games and the distribution of those films to television networks, advertisers, and others. NFL Films, through the sale of official game films and the production of special-interest shows such as "How to Watch Football," proved to be a substantial money-maker as well as a source of valuable promotion for the professional game. By 1966 the Cowboys' share of incomes from the properties and film subsidiaries of the NFL amounted to $38,309.

Expenses of operation, as would be expected, rose sharply for the Cowboy organization from 1963 through 1966. The combined costs of salaries for management, coaches, and players; players' bonuses; and the improved scouting system provide the best example. These expenses rose from $941,150 in 1963 to $1,500,330 in 1964, $1,596,430 the following year, and a new high of $1,716,115 in 1966. Less important items of expense showed more gradual yet costly increases. Office costs, for example, moved from $125,000 in 1963 to $220,000 in 1966. Nevertheless, the Cowboy organization paralleled its team's successes on the field in this period by moving into the black as a business venture.

Murchison and his associates had lost approximately $700,000 in 1960, $700,000 in 1961 and $600,000 in 1962 for a three-year total deficit in the neighborhood of $2,000,000. The balance sheet for 1963 reflected a sizable increase in revenue from paid attendance, but still showed a loss of approximately $300,000. In 1964, increases of over $250,000 in gate revenue and nearly $700,000 in television income were offset so effectively by rising costs, especially in salaries, bonuses, and scouting, that the club had yet another deficit. At least the Cowboys'

losses decreased to slightly less than $100,000, their best financial showing to that time. Finally, in 1965 another strong advance in paid attendance and a $600,000 share for the NFL franchise in Atlanta moved Dallas to the positive side of the ledger with profits of $780,000. The Cowboys were in the black at last for a single season, but after five years of losses totaling nearly $2,400,000, there was still a considerable deficit to overcome.

The 1966 season marked a major step in wiping out that deficit. Thanks largely to an increase of $1,200,000 in live-gate and television revenue, plus the business losses carried forward from previous years to reduce the tax bite, the balance sheet showed a net income of $1,000,000 for the Eastern Conference champions. There had been an obvious correlation between on-the-field and off-the-field improvement of the Cowboy organization by 1966.

The financial success of Dallas was matched by booming prosperity in the National Football League as a whole. Attendance at league games moved from 4,003,421 in 1962 to 4,807,884 in 1964 and 5,542,508 in 1966. At the same time, all members shared in the bonanza of the television contracts of 1962, 1964, and 1966. Increasing gate and television revenues, coupled with the growing popularity of professional football, caused a tremendous appreciation in the value of NFL franchises. And in this sense, too, the Cowboy organization had profited handsomely in inflated values. For example, Clint Murchison, Jr., and his associates had paid $600,000 for a new franchise in 1960, while the Cleveland Browns sold for $3,800,000 in 1961. By 1966, when the Atlanta Falcons entered the league, the cost was $8,500,000, a figure that was considered reasonable. The Falcons immediately sold forty-five thousand season tickets and were on their way to financial success even before the signing of players and hiring of coaches. All NFL

members were in the black in 1965 and confidently looking to the future.

Although the NFL seldom cared to admit it, the future of professional football in the mid-sixties did not depend solely on one league. The AFL had struggled through its infant years and was growing up. It had benefited by moving the Chargers from Los Angeles to San Diego in 1961 and the Texans from Dallas to Kansas City in 1963, for these smaller cities offered a warm welcome to the AFL teams and freed them of direct competition with the NFL. The new league, with its eight members, played an improving brand of football before 1,241,741 fans in 1963, and attendance figures steadily climbed to 1,447,875 in 1964, 1,782,584 in 1965, and 2,160,369 in 1966. The AFL's biggest breakthrough came in 1964 when it signed a five-year, league-package contract with NBC for thirty-six million dollars. It meant an average of slightly less than one million dollars annually for each team beginning in 1965. The contract was not as lucrative as that of the NFL with CBS, but it was apparently the final boost the AFL needed to prove that it was here to stay.

AFL Commissioner Joe Foss sought to emphasize the new league's success by challenging the NFL in 1963 to a world championship game to be played at the end of the 1964 season. With much to lose and very little to gain from such an encounter (like the Cowboys when challenged by the Texans), Commissioner Pete Rozelle of the established league flatly refused the challenge. The NFL, he pointed out, still remembered the AFL's antitrust suit and did not think the new league worthy of a chance to prove itself on the field. Tex Maule of *Sports Illustrated* indicated that the possible dilution of NFL income resulting from recognition of the younger league also affected Rozelle's thinking. In 1964 the NFL planned future expansion to perhaps sixteen teams with new franchises in Atlanta and New Orleans. At that point it was probable that the league

would follow Tex Schramm's idea of having two eight-team conferences with each divided into two four-team divisions. That system would keep more teams in contention longer for playoff berths, add two new games to determine conference winners, and set up the NFL title game between the conference champions. Expansion and Schramm's plan would add greatly to the appeal and financial strength of the NFL, regardless of what the AFL did.

Club owners in the NFL had long recognized that professional football as a sport and business required controlled competition within their league, but there was little or no indication, certainly none in public, that in the early years of competition with the AFL the NFL contemplated anything but the eventual demise of the younger organization. On the other hand, the AFL fought to survive by using almost every available weapon in its arsenal. Finally, after five years of all-out struggle between the leagues, leaders in both the NFL and AFL began to acknowledge that total competition between the two, much like uncontrolled competition within one league, could be ruinous. Unlimited NFL-AFL war would undoubtedly hurt every club financially and probably detract from the game's popular appeal. Recognition of these facts did not, of course, lead to immediate agreement. The ruinous possibilities of total competition had to be demonstrated very clearly in 1964 and 1965 before the merger of 1966 allowed controlled competition in off-the-field business.

In several areas of interleague warfare, the established NFL enjoyed an apparently insurmountable advantage. The AFL's television contract with NBC brought in $36,000,000 for five years beginning in 1965, and television ratings of its games jumped 48 per cent that year. But when the AFL's title game on December 26, 1965, conflicted in part with the NFL's Western Conference playoff between Baltimore and Green Bay (a

thirteen-minute, thirty-nine-second sudden-death overtime thriller), the result was a 26.5 rating for the NFL game and a 1.7 rating for the AFL. The NFL then signed a $37,600,000 contract for 1966 and 1967 and picked up more income from television in two years than the AFL earned in five. The older league also held an incontestable advantage in expansion into new cities and used it to deal their rivals an embarrassing defeat. Commissioner Foss of the AFL announced in the spring of 1965 that a franchise had been awarded to Leonard Reinsch, president of the Cox Broadcasting Company. Reinsch would field a team in the new Atlanta Stadium. Before accepting Reinsch's plan, the Atlanta Stadium Committee investigated the possibility of obtaining an NFL franchise. Commissioner Rozelle agreed that Atlanta could have a team in 1966 if public opinion in the city endorsed the idea. Even the *Atlanta Constitution*, one of Reinsch's properties, supported the NFL. Rankin Smith of Atlanta received the franchise, and the Falcons became the fifteenth NFL club in 1966.

Superiority in television ratings and the ability to expand into the most desirable cities indicated that the NFL was more popular with professional football fans than the AFL. The new league, like any underdog, had many ardent supporters, but more fans preferred the generally superior performance of NFL clubs. When the Dallas Texans and the Los Angeles Chargers moved to Kansas City and San Diego, respectively, live-gate competition existed only in New York and San Francisco–Oakland, areas capable of supporting two professional football franchises.

In the struggle for popular support, it would appear that the years in which the NFL held a decided advantage did not involve the two leagues in truly destructive competition. Rather, ruinous competition that led to the merger of 1966 developed over players, the acquisition of the raw material, in a sense, of

professional football, rather than over the sale of the finished product.

Athletes do not, to use a doubly obvious cliché, play professional football for their health. As a rule, the outstanding college football player expects to make more money from a pro career than he could realize from any other occupation immediately after leaving college. This is not to deny that most professional players enjoy the game for a variety of reasons, but it is a fact that professional football is a demanding way to make a living. The men on the field expect to be paid as much as possible for making the sacrifices required by the game. That fact allowed the AFL, with the great financial backing of most of its club owners, to challenge the NFL from the beginning in bidding for the services of the best college talent.

The Dallas Cowboys, a new team themselves, lost few draft choices to the AFL, but the older league, as a whole, did not respond promptly to the new-found bargaining power of college players. As a result, the AFL paid top money and won an impressive number of the top college athletes in its early years. In 1960, for example, the Houston Oilers signed Louisiana State University's Heisman Trophy winner Billy Cannon to a contract that reportedly brought him one hundred thousand dollars over a three-year period, an automobile, a chain of filling stations near his home, and a ten-thousand-dollar gift for his wife. Other generous contracts, even if no match for the one which attracted Cannon away from the NFL's Los Angeles Rams, claimed fullback Charlie Flowers of the University of Mississippi for the Chargers (besting the New York Giants), tackle Don Floyd of Texas Christian University for the Oilers (over the Baltimore Colts), halfback Johnny Robinson of LSU for the Dallas Texans (beating the Detroit Lions), and many other truly first-rate football players for the new league. Perhaps the AFL also appealed to young athletes because it could virtually guarantee

starting positions to rookies, which the NFL could not. It likewise benefited from the desire of some individuals to play in a particular part of the country, but the basic element in its success was the money its clubs were willing to pay unproven players.

It appears that many college players, including Cannon and Flowers as outstanding examples, did not realize the potential of their bargaining power. Both Cannon, with the Rams, and Flowers, with the Giants, signed NFL contracts first, then received better offers from AFL teams and signed with the new league. The result was much confusion and legal maneuvering in the federal courts. Cannon was awarded to the Oilers on the grounds that his three-year contract with the Rams was not binding because he withdrew from it before NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle approved it. The Flowers case was more complicated. On December 1, 1959, he signed the Giants' contract with the understanding that it would not be submitted to the commissioner or made public until after January 1, 1960, when he was to compete in the Sugar Bowl game. Secrecy was necessary to preserve Flowers' eligibility in postseason play. Flowers then began discussions with the Chargers and attempted to withdraw from his NFL contract. The Giants promptly filed the contract with Commissioner Rozelle, who approved it but withheld public announcement. Flowers reached an agreement with the Chargers on December 29, officially informed the Giants that he was withdrawing from their contract, played in the Sugar Bowl on January 1, and then formally executed a contract with the AFL team. The Giants brought suit to uphold their contract and acquire the services of Flowers.

A federal district court ruled that Flowers' contract had never been properly approved by Rozelle because the Giants had broken their promise in sending the agreement to the league office. When the Giants appealed, the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals made no effort to decide the case on the basis of this legal issue. It instead ruled that Flowers belonged to the Chargers under the "doctrine of clean hands," that is, "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands." The Giants, because of bad faith in the contract and their use of it, had no right to seek relief against the Chargers and Flowers. A court of equity existed to enforce the requirement of conscience and good faith. It could not operate as the "abettor of iniquity"—in this case a contract improperly executed. The Dallas Cowboys probably had only passing interest in the Flowers case. They had no way to know that a quite similar case would be of critical importance to their role in the NFL-AFL warfare in 1965–66.

There were few such legal struggles after 1960, but the AFL continued to pay top money for several years and accordingly succeeded in obtaining much top player talent. By 1963 and 1964, most NFL clubs began to reverse themselves and become more competitive in the bidding for college players. Counting on their established position as a better league, they began to appeal strongly to the pride as well as the pocketbooks of outstanding collegians. Tex Schramm summarized the tactic late in 1964: "Any athlete who has the pride and confidence will sign with the NFL now that we have snapped out of our lethargy to meet salary demands." What had happened in fact was a dramatic escalation of the struggle between the leagues.

The draft at the end of the 1964 season marked the opening of spectacular competition for top-flight college players. Quarterback Joe Namath of the University of Alabama highlighted the salary and bonus battle by signing with the New York Jets for a then unbelievable four hundred thousand dollars. His contract called for one hundred thousand dollars a year for three years and a one-hundred-thousand-dollar bonus. Namath overshadowed a number of other players, such as John Huarte of Notre Dame (also with the Jets), who received contracts for as

much as two hundred thousand dollars. It was reported that the Cowboys paid three hundred thousand and two hundred thousand dollars, respectively, for rookie quarterbacks Jerry Rhome of Tulsa University and Craig Morton of the University of California. Tex Schramm admits that Dallas may have paid outright bonuses of as much as one hundred thousand dollars during 1965 and 1966. In any case, the salaries and bonuses paid by the NFL and the AFL in 1965 were by far the highest paid to untested rookie performers in the history of professional sports in the United States. Only a few established superstars in baseball, for example, could command a salary of one hundred thousand dollars per year.

Spectacular as it was, the inflation of salary and bonus figures was not the whole story of the interleague struggle for football talent. Each team worked frantically not only to outbid its competition but to see that every other club had as little contact as possible with prospective draftees. The Cowboys had learned from the Holub case in 1961 the dangers of dealing with a player once he was out of their sight. Their reaction, which corresponded to similar steps by several other NFL teams, was to appoint a club representative to stay with each of their draft choices until the player made his decision. The practice became known as "babysitting" and was established on a league-wide basis in the NFL as the struggle for players escalated in the mid-sixties. The babysitter's job was to keep the contact of his charge with representatives of the other league at a minimum and exert all the pressure possible to convince the prospect to sign with the NFL. Dallas had its own babysitting corps, in addition to those sponsored by the NFL, and tried to make contact with likely draftees well before the draft was held. On the basis of a relationship already established, the Cowboy babysitter would simply take the draftee to the city of his choice and work on contract terms free of troublesome competition. Recruiting be-

came a matter of promoting a team as well as the league, outbidding rival clubs, and outwitting the competition by trying to maintain exclusive contact with the prospect.

Severe escalation of the NFL-AFL struggle for players in 1964–65 created difficulties for all of professional football. Inflated salaries for rookies naturally brought grumbles of discontent from veteran players. Reportedly, the average pay for veterans in both leagues at the end of 1964 was $20,000, a far cry from the terms given Joe Namath. Quarterback Frank Ryan of Cleveland exemplified the general sentiment of established players when he said, "I guess I'll have to ask for a raise of about $980,000. If a fellow who hasn't even pulled on his cleats in pro ball is worth $400,000, then I must be worth a million dollars." This type of complaint was to create fertile ground for the growth of more serious trouble between the leagues. Among the general public many observers disapproved of the recruiting tactics used by the NFL and AFL.

The evil effects of the professionals' checkbook war on the college game were demonstrated dramatically by the Gator Bowl game of 1965. The University of Oklahoma Sooners dropped four players from the squad before that game when head coach Gomer Jones discovered that they had signed professional contracts. Florida State University won, 36–19, and television recorded several of that school's players signing contracts during the waning moments of the game. Perhaps Senator Mike Monroney of Oklahoma underestimated the business acumen of the players and betrayed a partisan concern as well when he voiced a rising concern about "money-mad club owners who apply pressure on young athletes." Head coach Norman Van Brocklin of the Minnesota Vikings, who had signed three of the Oklahoma players, expressed the prevailing view among the professionals: "We got the players. I really don't know what to say about the ethics of this sort of thing. In our business we

live by results." It appeared that the golden game of the sixties might be ruined by too much emphasis on gold.

Bitter competition for players led to more legal actions similar to those originating from the dual signings of Billy Cannon and Charlie Flowers in 1960. In 1965 the Dallas Cowboys became a party to the most spectacular of these legal disputes, a contest with the Houston Oilers for the services of Ralph Neely. Neely, an All-American tackle at the University of Oklahoma, was drafted by both Houston of the AFL and Baltimore of the NFL in November and December, 1964, before his team completed its season in the Gator Bowl on January 2, 1965. Wishing to stay in the Southwest, Neely frankly told the Colts that he would not accept their offer, however attractive they might make it. He negotiated with Houston, and the Oilers offered him a very tempting contract on a "take it or leave it" basis on December 1. It called for a twenty-five-thousand-dollar bonus, a four-year, no-cut contract at sixteen thousand dollars a year, an off-season job guaranteeing five thousand dollars a year for four years, and a service station site worth thirty to sixty thousand dollars to be paid out in twenty years. Neely accepted these terms, but the bonus agreement and the contracts were left undated. It was agreed that they would remain undated and secret—not even the AFL commissioner was to know of the agreement—until after January 2, which would preserve Neely's eligibility for the Gator Bowl.

Undoubtedly the twenty-one-year-old athlete had been pressured by Houston, but he acknowledges that he was willing to sign in December because it meant receiving his bonus in one year and his salary in others, thus avoiding a huge tax bite. Neely's father-in-law, R. A. Forte, acting as trustee, took the bonus check from Houston, and Neely considered himself an Oiler, for tax purposes at least, in early December. Neely did not know that the Houston organization then dated the bonus and

player contracts "12/1/64" and filed them with the commissioner of the AFL on December 7, 1964. At this point, with Neely signed by the Oilers more thoroughly than he knew, the Cowboys entered the picture.

As competition with the AFL increased, NFL clubs began to encourage players who were unwilling to sign with them at least to play for another team in the same league. By keeping the best players in the NFL, the whole league profited, and, as Tex Schramm points out, it was not totally a matter of altruism. The NFL club that encouraged a player to sign with another under such circumstances was giving up something it had already lost, and it expected to get something in return as well. Baltimore, finding that it could not sign Ralph Neely, traded their draft right for him to the Dallas Cowboys for quarterback-punter Billy Lothridge and a fourth-round draft choice in 1966.

Gil Brandt's department then went to work to lure Neely away from Houston. Neely meant to keep his promise to the Oilers, but the Cowboys were, as he puts it, "persistent as Hell." Brandt spent a good part of December, 1964, in Neely's living room. Neely, wanting to play with the Cowboys because of their location and their prospects for the future, talked to Brandt. Despite his awareness of Neely's agreement with the AFL club, Brandt negotiated with the University of Oklahoma star without attempting to pressure him out of the contract.

By December 29, 1964, Neely, who was in Jacksonville for the Gator Bowl, decided to sign with the Cowboys. He mailed the Oilers written revocations of all agreements with their organization and had his father-in-law return the bonus check. The Houston organization immediately attempted to force Neely to keep his word to them. Overlooking their breach of faith in dating and filing the contracts, they announced on December 31 that Neely had contracted to play for the Oilers, and head coach Gomer Jones of Oklahoma declared Neely ineligible to com-

pete in the Gator Bowl. Neely then signed a four-year contract with the Cowboys on January 1 for an estimated two hundred thousand dollars in bonus and salary payments. His bonus was paid on December 31, thus avoiding heavier taxes in 1965. Undoubtedly many Sooner fans and players cursed professional football (and perhaps Ralph Neely, too) as their team lost to Florida State on January 2. Some might even have been pleased to know that Neely, the Cowboys, and the Oilers were yet to endure almost two years of bitter legal wrangling before this battle in the NFL-AFL war ended.

Houston had more than enough incentive to fight the Cowboys for Neely. In 1965 Dallas humiliated the Oilers by recruiting the AFL club's first, second, and sixth-round draft choices—quarterback Jerry Rhome of Tulsa, center Malcolm Walker of Rice University, and linebacker Russell Wayt, also of Rice. Unwilling to concede further defeat, Houston brought suit against Neely in the United States District Court for Western Oklahoma, asking for a judgment enforcing his original undated AFL contract and an injunction to prevent his playing for any other team. The district court's judgment in September, 1965, was entirely in favor of Neely and the Dallas Cowboys. It ruled that Neely had a right to rescind the contract, even if it had been legally consummated, because the Houston organization had violated the agreement by dating it, sending it to the AFL office, and making it public. This part of the decision, in effect, was another application of the "doctrine of clean hands" almost exactly like the ruling in the case of Charlie Flowers in 1961. The Court further ruled that Neely's letters of December 29 and his return of the bonus check effectively rescinded any binding nature of the contract and that the service station site agreement violated the Texas Statute of Frauds in that it was vague, indefinite, uncertain, and unenforceable. Therefore, Houston was not entitled to a declaratory judgment or an injunction against



Craig Morton, Cowboy Quarterback, 1965–



Dan Reeves behind All-Pro John Niland

Calvin Hill, the Ivy League's finest hour in the NFL



Bob Hayes catches another "bomb"

Lance Rentzel takes a breather



Bob Lilly menaces Fran Tarkenton of the Giants



George Andrie draws a bead on Tarkenton

Linebacker Chuck Howley fends off a Lion

Neely. He joined the Cowboys in 1965 and, as a rookie, won a starting position at offensive tackle. Unfortunately for Neely and Dallas, they had not heard the last of Houston. As Neely began play with the Cowboys in September, 1965, the Oilers carried their case to the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver. The Cowboy-Oiler struggle over Neely grew more bitter as it continued into 1966, but until June of that year it was only a minor part of the NFL-AFL battle that threatened all of professional football.

Both leagues kicked off to a profit in the 1965 season. The NFL, for example, sold over $15,000,000 in tickets before its first regular season game. Although most clubs were financial successes in the fall of 1965, their owners had no cause to relax. Undoubtedly each franchise kept a wary eye on income as the checkbook war for college players loomed ever larger toward the end of the season. The 1966 draft touched off furious bidding for the services of professional athletes and surpassed the records set in the previous year. More than a dozen college seniors signed contracts calling for over $100,000 in bonus and salary payments. Donny Anderson, a halfback from Texas Tech University, topped the payoff parade with a $600,000 contract from the Green Bay Packers. Halfbacks Mike Garrett of Southern California and Johnny Roland of Missouri each reportedly received more than $300,000 from the Kansas City Chiefs and the St. Louis Cardinals. They were joined in the over-$300,000 category by Harold Lucas of Michigan State, who went to the Cardinals, and Francis Peay of Missouri, to the Giants. Green Bay paid $250,000 for fullback Jim Grabowski of Illinois, who joined Anderson in the most publicized rookie backfield in pro football. Atlanta signed Tommy Nobis, the great University of Texas linebacker, for a reported $225,000, although the Houston Oilers claimed to have offered him $887,000.

The NFL gave the AFL a thorough beating in the competi-

tion for players, signing thirteen of sixteen first-round draft choices during December, 1965, and losing only one to the AFL (Carl McAdams of Oklahoma to the Jets) in that month. The younger league, in the same period, signed only five of its ten first-round choices and lost such distinguished players as Grabowski and Nobis. The NFL publicly chortled over its recruiting success while the AFL faced an embarrassing setback, but many club owners in both leagues felt that the unbelievable inflation in player bonuses and contracts was an ill omen for the future. Professional football may have been a $65,000,000-a-year business at the end of 1965, but the economic effects of unlimited competition for players could be ruinous. Huge bonus and salary payments obviously cut into the profit margins of all teams and weakened the position of each as a business operation. Perhaps more seriously, some teams lacked the resources or were unwilling to meet the inflated costs of untried college players. Tex Schramm of the Cowboy organization saw this danger illustrated with great clarity during the 1966 draft.

Dallas planned to select Jim Grabowski if they could come to terms that would virtually guarantee his signing a Cowboy contract if drafted. Schramm negotiated until six in the morning on the day of the draft with Arthur Morse, a Chicago attorney who represented Grabowski, but they reached no suitable terms. The Cowboys then by-passed the Illinois star in the first round, and he was later selected by Green Bay. Schramm saw that uncontrolled competition with the AFL was undercutting the long-standing controls aimed at preserving competitive equality within the NFL. Teams were drafting the players they could afford to sign, not the best football players available. Consequently, the best players in each league were concentrated in those clubs with the ability and the willingness to pay top money. Schramm was especially concerned that the appearance of negotiating agents, or "third parties," as representatives of pros-

pective professional players would drive costs to even more ruinous heights. He believed it to be only a short step from attorneys like Morse to professional agencies like Music Corporation of America, which would inject show-business techniques and prices into promoting football players. The Cowboy general manager foresaw economic as well as competitive disaster if the NFL-AFL struggle continued.

Recruiting tactics after the 1966 draft injured, in the opinion of many, the image of professional football. The story of John Niland, a guard at the University of Iowa who was the Cowboys' first-round draft choice, illustrates the situation all too well. Niland, as he recalls it, received the attention of NFL babysitters in his senior year, and he agreed to talk to them about NFL football when the collegiate season ended. After the NFL contacted Niland, a Denver Bronco scout approached him to discuss the AFL, the Broncos, and bonus and salary figures. As Niland entered the dressing room after Iowa's final game, both the AFL scout and the NFL babysitters were waiting for him. He had committed himself to attend a Minnesota–Green Bay game with the NFL representatives, but he talked to the Bronco scout, who offered him a cash payment on the spot to remain neutral and out of the clutches of the NFL on draft day. Niland refused the money, but promised to be neutral on the day of the draft. He and his babysitters went to Milwaukee, New York, and San Francisco. In San Francisco, the Washington Redskins came into contact with Niland on the day of the draft. Niland heard the Redskins' offer, then telephoned the Broncos, who topped the NFL club. After several alternate offers from the Redskins and Broncos, Niland received a call from the Cowboys, who indicated that they intended to draft him in the first round before the Redskins had a pick. Niland then talked to the Broncos after hearing from the Cowboys, but Dallas had outbid Denver's highest offer for his services. The Cowboys drafted him first,

and Denver passed him over completely. Perhaps Niland's NFL babysitters lacked vigilance in allowing him so much contact with the AFL, but his case demonstrates how college players were flown around the country, offered payoffs, and generally fought for with any means by both leagues.

Veteran players watched the checkbook recruiting contest for rookies in 1965–66 with increasing discontent. Established stars compared their salaries in the twenty- to forty-thousand-dollar range with those of Anderson, Grabowski, and others and angrily mused over the motto, "start cheap, stay cheap." Open discontent appeared on several teams. In Dallas, the *Morning News* and the *Times-Herald* reported that many veteran Cowboys were dissatisfied with rookie pay scales. Implicit in this situation was a nagging and frightening question for both leagues—what if veteran players chose to bargain with rival teams as free agents in the same manner as rookies? Under the option clause, a veteran could become a free agent by playing out his option, that is, by playing one year without a contract and at a 10 per cent cut in salary. The NFL and AFL had never tried to take each other's players, but there was no rule against it. Heated competition between the two leagues and the attitude of veteran players created the potential for disastrous raids on the personnel of many teams.

The situation worsened in the spring of 1966 when a rumor developed that three AFL stars who had played out their options, defensive linemen Ernie Ladd and Earl Faison of San Diego and place kicker Pete Gogolak of Buffalo, would sign with NFL clubs. Tex Schramm believed the rumors untrue. In any event, the Cowboys did not intend to sign AFL veterans. "I feel," Schramm said, "that if a player will play out his option on one team, he'll play out his option on me too, and you can't build a team with those kind of men." The Cowboy general manager meant what he said, but undoubtedly he was more concerned

that the two leagues avoid the dangers of raiding for veteran players. His fears were realized in May, 1966, when the New York Giants signed Gogolak to a three-year, $96,000 contract. K. S. "Bud" Adams of the Houston Oilers commented, "This can mean only one thing—retaliation from our League." Al Davis, former head coach and general manager of the Oakland Raiders and AFL commissioner from April, 1966, led in creating a retaliatory scheme that called for raiding the NFL's key players—the quarterbacks. Oakland reportedly signed Roman Gabriel of the Los Angeles Rams for 1967 with a down payment of $100,000. Houston promised John Brodie of San Francisco $750,000 over a ten-year period. Other NFL quarterbacks and star performers discussed terms with AFL teams. After negotiating with the Miami Dolphins, thirty-year-old defensive tackle Alex Karras of Detroit found the Lions willing to give him a new seven-year contract at approximately $30,000 a year. Many veterans in both leagues were jubilant at their bargaining position, but it was a different matter for the men who held NFL and AFL franchises. As Sam Huff of the Washington Redskins put it, "the owners are headed down the road to destruction."

THE BUSINESS OF CONTROLLED COMPETITION: THE MERGER, 1966

From the inception of ruinous NFL-AFL competition, there was one way to end it—by merging the two leagues. It was generally believed in the spring of 1966 that the signing of Pete Gogolak and the retaliation which followed forced the NFL to negotiate an agreement with the AFL. But serious negotiations were in progress well before the player raids began. The Gogolak, Brodie, and Gabriel cases were, in actuality, serious stumbling blocks to agreement between the leagues. Undoubtedly there will always be those who argue that Al Davis "strong-armed" the NFL to the bargaining table. This argument defies the chronology of events; the terms of the merger, which hardly reflect a bloodied and bowed NFL; and the logic of the situation, which called for settlement between the leagues long before player raiding began.

Sports Illustrated reported informal merger talks in May, 1965, and offered a plan for realignment of the clubs when agreement, expected to come within two years, was reached. Beginning in early 1966, Tex Schramm, well aware of the developing consensus for a merger, took the lead in finding terms acceptable to NFL owners. With Commissioner Rozelle's approval, he went to work on a peace plan designed to win the approval of the New York Giants and San Francisco Forty-Niners—the two NFL clubs in cross-city competition with the AFL. Both clubs were unenthusiastic, but after much discussion

they agreed to put no special stumbling blocks in the way of merger negotiations. Schramm and Rozelle then agreed that the Cowboy general manager should serve as principal negotiator with the AFL. They chose to approach Lamar Hunt, founder of the AFL and owner of the Dallas Texans–Kansas City Chiefs, because he was known to have the desire for peace in professional football and the willingness to listen to merger plans. Hunt also had the prestige to swing other AFL owners into a merger agreement. Schramm and Hunt met secretly on April 6 in a parked car at Love Field in Dallas. After the meeting, Hunt flew to an AFL meeting in Houston. The Texas multimillionaire had been noncommittal on the general plan presented to him, but he accepted Schramm's suggestion that the two serve as direct contacts between the two leagues.

Schramm and Hunt did not meet again until early May. In the meantime, both worked with key individuals in their leagues to devise an acceptable merger plan. They met in Dallas on May 3 and May 10 and agreed that all problems could be worked out. Success seemed likely until the NFL meeting in New York a few days later. The New York and San Francisco franchises had new doubts about merging into one league, and then on May 17 the Giants announced the signing of Pete Gogolak. This upset owners in both leagues, but it was especially serious in the AFL, where Hunt needed feelings of harmony rather than retaliation if he was to get merger acceptance. Rozelle and Schramm did not panic. Schramm called Hunt to reassure him that the NFL still wanted peace; the prospects for a merger were then revealed to all NFL club owners. In general, the franchise holders were receptive to the idea, and Rozelle worked frantically with the owners through the last week in May to iron out details of the proposed plan. He then came to Schramm's home in Dallas on May 27 to put the proposed agreement in final form. It was finally completed on

Monday, Memorial Day. Lamar Hunt, in Indianapolis for the five-hundred-mile race, was late returning to Dallas because of a major wreck which delayed the race, so it was May 31 before he saw the final NFL plan. He then had to win acceptance from the other AFL owners.

Hunt met in early June with a committee composed of owners Ralph Wilson of Buffalo and Billy Sullivan of Boston. In spite of trouble with some AFL members, who were still burning over the Gogolak case and wanted retaliation, Hunt finally informed Schramm that the NFL's plan was acceptable with twenty-six points of difference and additions. Rozelle, Schramm, and Hunt, in conjunction with the various clubs involved, then settled the points of contention to the satisfaction of most owners. AFL Commissioner Al Davis made comments about a sellout like Yalta, and three AFL club owners expressed opposition, but the two leagues reached final agreement by June 7. They planned to appoint committees on details and release a carefully worded statement on the merger to the press, but rumors and stories about negotiations and player raids were flying at that stage, and the NFL's lawyers advised a quick release of correct information. Work on details was finished and a New York press conference hastily called. The NFL-AFL agreement became public knowledge at 6:00 P.M. on June 8, 1966.

Shortly after the public announcement, Schramm and Hunt in New York spoke by telephone-speaker to reporters assembled at Cowboy headquarters in Dallas. Schramm, in an aside, lamented the fact that he was in teetotaler Lamar Hunt's hotel room without a drink to celebrate. His enterprising secretary, Eilene Gish, who had been privy to the secret merger negotiations and was so tense over security that she had alienated fellow workers by slamming doors in their faces when Hunt or Rozelle called Schramm, immediately phoned the hotel in New York

from Dallas and ordered her boss a double scotch. Before the interview was over, Schramm had his drink, and his secretary could begin apologies for her peculiar behavior.

The merger was to be implemented over a four-year period from 1966 to 1970. First, there would be a world championship game, quickly labeled the Super Bowl, at the end of the 1966 season. Also, in January, 1967, the two leagues would begin a common player draft to end the wild bidding for rookies. Interleague preseason games would begin in 1967. Two franchises were to be added by 1968, one to each league and stocked by that league, but the franchise payments were both to go to the NFL. All existing franchises were to remain as they were in 1966, including two in New York and two in the San Francisco–Oakland area. For this concession to the AFL's New York Jets and Oakland Raiders, the agreement called for an eighteen-million-dollar indemnity payment to the NFL, largely for the Giants and the Forty-Niners. Beginning in 1970, the twenty-six teams would compose one National Football League with Pete Rozelle as commissioner. The only important unfinished business was the realignment of the clubs into two conferences. That detail was to be taken care of before the 1970 season.

Opinions concerning the merger varied greatly. Joe Namath voiced relief at having "graduated just in time," while college stars such as halfback Floyd Little of Syracuse University bemoaned an agreement which cost them millions in bonuses and salaries. Many veterans were happy to be able to settle down and concentrate on football. Dan Reeves of the Cowboys probably voices a common reaction to the merger when he says it was "something that had to come about." Veterans waited to see whether it would mean a dispersal to them of the benefits formerly showered on rookies. Those most pleased, of course, were the coaches and management. Tom Landry viewed the merger as a "necessity if pro football was to have stability. We would all

have been priced out of the game, and it would have been the wreck of professional football if we had continued at the rate we were going." Most club owners agreed with Landry—love of the game as well as love of money had prompted the merger.

The sportsmen-businessmen of professional football recognized that their rivalry had become too expensive and that making rookies so costly endangered the relative competitive equality so essential to the popularity of the game. The ruinous results of uncontrolled competition between the two leagues prompted the owners to rationalize competition. They broadened the field controls on competition, already developed within each league, into a single, unified NFL. In a way, their experience paralleled that of most big businessmen in twentieth-century America. Few businesses in the United States are genuinely competitive in the costs and prices of what they buy and sell. Any comparative shopper can attest to this fact. Companies compete in the quality of their products and in the advertising and selling of those products, but they do not practice total price competition in a way that could be economically ruinous to themselves. The classic example of rationalized competition can be found in the three large automobile makers of the American automobile industry. The United States government, while it has outlawed monopoly, recognizes business agreements for controlled competition. Agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission prevent takeovers of any area of the economy by one corporation or trust, but these same agencies have often worked to help businessmen rationalize potentially disastrous competition in their fields. Professional football's 1966 agreement controlled competition to the point of merging two leagues into one by 1970. The owners are now watching the federal government to assess its reaction to the completed merger.

Leaders in the NFL and AFL recognized that congressional

approval was essential to the merger. Before the agreement was announced, Commissioner Rozelle had probed the legal and political aspects of the merger in the light of antitrust laws. Rozelle talked with Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, a key member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. As the spokesman for pro football, the commissioner took the position that the merger could not take place unless Congress exempted it from antitrust laws. Without this exemption, the teams would have left themselves open to treble damage suits by dissatisfied players in both leagues and businessmen who were seeking new franchises. As Tex Schramm puts it, "We would have been letting ourselves open for a liability which would have been impossible for the teams to bear."

These fears were not unrealistic. One group in Chicago immediately began an antitrust suit on the grounds that the merger denied them a new franchise. Quarterback John Brodie of the San Francisco Forty-Niners, who had been promised $750,000 for a five-year contract with Houston, refused to admit that the merger left him with only promises. He threatened to sue professional football for $1,000,000 plus $100,000 in legal fees. The two leagues, desperate for peace and unwilling to face the delicate antitrust questions certain to be raised by Brodie's suit, chose not to contest his claim. Brodie received a settlement reportedly giving him an incredible $921,000 over a twelve-year period and $75,000 in legal fees. The case alone demonstrated that the owners obviously needed Congressional approval.

The needs of professional football in 1966 received more prompt attention in the Senate than in the House of Representatives. In 1965 the upper house had shown itself favorably disposed toward the game by passing the professional team sports bill, which exempted all major professional sports from antitrust laws. The House, which had passed a similar bill back in

1957, did not take action on the Senate bill in 1965. After the merger, the Senate promptly passed a bill on September 26, 1966, to exempt the agreement from antitrust action. The House Judiciary Subcommittee, headed by Representative Celler, then opened extensive hearings which continued into mid-October. Key testimony came from the principals in the merger, including Rozelle, Schramm, and Hunt, but the complete list of individuals and organizations to be called indicated that the House could not possibly act on the Senate's bill during the 1966 session. In the meantime, the liability of the clubs involved in the merger increased. Under these circumstances, Senator Everett Dirksen moved on October 14 to add an amendment or rider to a House-passed anti-inflation bill. Dirksen's amendment, technically an addition to the act of September 30, 1961, which had exempted league-package television contracts in professional sports from antitrust proceedings, simply extended this exemption to the NFL-AFL merger. The Senate, seeing that this amendment had exactly the same effect as the Professional Football Merger Bill already passed in the upper house on September 26, readily approved it on October 14.

The House Conference Committee accepted the Senate rider to its anti-inflation bill and recommended approval by the lower house. Strong opposition came from Representative Celler, who insisted that there should be further investigation of just what the merger entailed. He did not, he said, want to buy "a pig in a poke." Instead, he wanted to investigate the merger thoroughly and learn its details concerning the draft, indemnities for the NFL, division of territory, and so on. Celler did not necessarily oppose the merger; he did object to Congress blindly rescuing football club owners from what he called their own "folly of inflated player contracts." He opposed allowing them special immunity from the laws without even knowing the extent of this immunity. Perhaps, he suggested, the merger shrouded

professional football's intention to move into pay television. Several other representatives supported Celler, primarily with the argument that the merger cost college players a chance to bargain fairly with professional clubs.

Supporters of the Dirksen rider answered Celler by emphasizing that the measure did not give professional football any greater immunity from antitrust laws than it already enjoyed. Its only effect was to allow the two leagues to join without fear of antitrust suits based on the merger itself. Proponents of the amendment also emphasized the necessity of ending bonus and salary wars in order to assure relative competitive equality through a fair share of the best players for each team. They quoted Commissioner Rozelle to prove that the merger would create financial stability and ultimately improve the status of the men who played professional football. After pointing out that the NFL existed alone without antitrust problems in the 1950's, Representative John Byrnes of Wisconsin summed up the arguments in favor of the measures in question:

> So far as all the other aspects [of professional football] are concerned, including the draft, they are left undisturbed by this amendment. . . . Whether [professional football] violates the antitrust laws is not decided by this amendment. Let me say this: Green Bay, Wisconsin, would not have a football team, . . . if there were not some system to equalize competition.

After some concluding debate and an unsuccessful attempt by Representative Celler to recommit the amendment to the House-Senate Conference Committee, it passed by a margin of 161 to 76 with 195 congressmen not voting. The Senate acknowledged the House's approval of the Dirksen rider and other changes in the anti-inflation bill on October 21, and the marriage of the NFL and AFL bore the stamp of legality.

"On with the golden game!" was the cry in the fall of 1966 as professional football looked to a future of peace and prosperity.

The Dallas Cowboys, however, had one outstanding problem left over from the days before the merger—its legal dispute with the Houston Oilers for the services of Ralph Neely. The Oilers, undaunted by the refusal of Judge Stephen S. Chandler of the federal district court in Oklahoma City to order enforcement of their contract with Neely and grant an injunction against his playing for any other team, appealed in September, 1965, to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver. Neely's attorneys and the Cowboy organization were confident that the district court decision, based primarily on the doctrine of clean hands, would be upheld by the Denver court. They were understandably shocked and surprised when the appeals court decision in May, 1966, reversed the ruling of the lower court. The three-man circuit court ruled that there had been no violation of the terms of Neely's contract. The extrinsic oral agreement to keep secret Neely's ineligibility for the Gator Bowl, even if violated by the Oilers, had been recognized as a deliberate deception by both parties when they signed the contract. Houston had no legal obligation to refrain from dating and publicizing the contract, the court ruled, and Neely, a knowledgable young man with a degree in business administration, was well aware of that fact. The court therefore flatly denied that the doctrine of clean hands, as stated in the case of Charlie Flowers in 1961, was applicable to the Neely case. There had been, it ruled, no unlawful, unconscionable, or inequitable conduct on the part of Houston. The appeals court also totally rejected the lower court's ruling that the service station site agreement violated the Texas Statute of Frauds, arguing that it was not vague, indefinite, uncertain, or unenforceable. Accordingly, the Oilers' contract with Neely was upheld, and the district court was ordered to issue the injunction against his playing for any team other than Houston.

Now it was the turn of Neely and the Cowboys to appeal the

verdict. The merger of early June, 1966, placed a premium on peace between the leagues which both Dallas and Houston recognized, but both organizations appeared determined to go through with the legal battle already enjoined. On July 30, Neely's lawyers asked the United States Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari and review the ruling of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The request for certiorari was based on four points, the most important of which was the appeals court's direct contradiction of precedent, based on the doctrine of clean hands, in the case of Charlie Flowers. The Supreme Court was to act on this petition during its October session. In the meantime, Neely, his future with the Cowboys hanging in the balance, began his second season with Dallas.

On October 10, the Supreme Court, without comment, denied Neely's petition for a writ of certiorari. His lawyers immediately applied for a stay of the order denying certiorari so that Neely could continue to play for Dallas until a petition could be filed for a rehearing of his appeal to the Supreme Court. It was argued that Neely would possibly make All-Pro with the Cowboys and that he could not move to Houston in time to help the Oilers anyway. This application for a stay was rejected on October 18. It then appeared that once the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari reached the court of appeals, and it in turn ordered the district court to issue the injunction, there would be no choice for the district court except to issue the order limiting Neely's services to the Houston football club. As a result, Neely played part of the 1966 season, not just under the threat of a court decision, but virtually on a day-to-day basis. According to Neely, it was like carrying a hundred-pound weight on his back. "We'd work before a game," he remembers, "and I couldn't even prepare properly. The coaches never knew whether I'd be able to play or not. So they had to get somebody else ready, too."

Neely continued to play for Dallas into November, 1966,

because the district court in Oklahoma, having been overruled by a superior court, did not hurry to issue the injunction. In the meantime, the Cowboy organization filed a suit in the 68th Judicial District Court of Texas seeking an injunction to prevent Neely from violating his contract with them by playing for any other professional team. It appeared that he might be hemmed in by federal and state injunctions to the point of losing his right to play for either team.

On November 4, Neely's attorneys petitioned for a rehearing of their original request for a writ of certiorari to review the appeals court's decision. This petition pointed to a new and substantial ground for granting certiorari—the animosity and ill will of the court of appeals for Federal District Court Judge Stephen S. Chandler. In reversing his original decision in favor of Neely, the circuit court in Denver had even, in effect, called Judge Chandler "irrational." The fact that Judge Chandler himself had a suit against the appeals court pending in the Supreme Court at that very time was further proof of hostility between the district and circuit courts. Neely's lawyers had suspected from the first, they contended, that this animosity between judges prejudiced the decision on Houston's appeal from the district court. They chose, however, not to raise the question originally because they felt their grounds for requesting certiorari were sufficiently strong without bringing in such an unpleasant subject. Now they had no choice except to ask the Supreme Court to consider the degree to which personal enmities had influenced the decision against them. Neely's attorneys in this petition for rehearing also mentioned the Cowboys' suit for an injunction in Texas which would prevent Neely from playing for Houston. The argument was that Dallas, as an indispensable party in the case, had to appear in court before a final adjudication could be made. On the same day, Neely's attorneys applied again for a stay of execution of the injunction ordered by the court of appeals.

At this point the situation became intolerable for Neely and the Dallas organization. Their chances of winning the legal battle were virtually nil after the Supreme Court, on November 7, rejected both of their petitions filed on November 4. The pressure of the situation affected Neely's play, and the recently completed merger called for an end to contention between the leagues. Dallas, under these circumstances, accepted the obvious but costly way out—Tex Schramm flew to Houston and paid the necessary price for Neely. In the presence of Commissioner Rozelle, he agreed to give Houston the Cowboys' first-, second-, and two fifth-round choices in the 1967 college-player draft. Dallas also paid all legal costs (approximately two hundred thousand dollars) and agreed to play three preseason games in Houston beginning in 1967. Schramm said later, "I'd do it all over again and never look back. He'll be worth every cent of it." Neely has since lived up to expectations and has become one of the finest offensive tackles in professional football. Schramm also received some consolation from the preseason games with Houston. Before the first one in 1967 he said, "I don't know if the players are up, but the front office is. If we lose I'll throw up." The Cowboys soothed Schramm's pride and perhaps eased his nervous stomach by winning all three contests with the Oilers.

The 1967 college-player draft proved, as *Time* put it, that "two can live cheaper than one." Wild bidding for player talent was over and the future of professional football, certainly for the off-the-field organizations involved, looked bright. The Dallas Cowboys, primarily through the person of Tex Schramm, had played a larger role than any other NFL club in ending uncontrolled competition between the leagues. Building an ex-

pansion team into a winner was a major contribution of the Cowboy organization to professional football; helping end the ruinous NFL-AFL competition was another. Significant as these achievements are, they fail to tell the whole story of the Cowboys' importance in the 1960's, for the team also had considerable impact on a major metropolitan area of the United States—Dallas, Texas.

THE COWBOYS IN THE DALLAS COMMUNITY

When two-year-old Robbie Westerman of Dallas watched men on horses chasing cattle across the television screen, he objected, "They're not cowboys. Cowboys play football." Robbie's mistaken observation was entirely understandable in December, 1969, even for a Texas child. During their ten years in Dallas, the Cowboys had become unquestionably the premier sports attraction in the city and a highly significant part of the whole community. By 1966, attendance at home games in the Cotton Bowl averaged a near-capacity 67,625 fans at each contest. Countless other Dallasites drove out of town on the dates of important home games and rented motel rooms within range of television stations located outside the seventy-five-mile blackout radius. Every fall in the Dallas metropolitan area, newspapers advertise "Cowboy antennas" designed to receive home games telecast from those same stations. The Cowboys have ardent fans in every part of Texas, and they are the favorites of much of the Southwest. Assistant General Manager Al Ward knows of one ardent Cowboy fan in Houston who has a complete football uniform and dresses for each game that he watches on television. A standard joke among staid university professors is that they tape their wives' ankles before each television appearance of the Cowboys to prevent unnecessary injuries to their spouses as they throw make-believe blocks for Bob Hayes. In a more serious vein, it is an unusual Texas town that does not have a

little-league football team named after the Cowboys. But in Dallas itself, the Cowboys are more than a professional team—they are a social institution.

The Cowboys came to Dallas at the very time professional football began to challenge baseball for the position of "national pastime," and they benefited from all the things which made professional football popular in the 1960's. Dallasites were offered a fast, violent, action-packed game—a game that already enjoyed tremendous popularity at the high school and college level in Texas. From the beginning, television gave the Cowboys the added advantage of sending road games back to the home fans. When the Texans left Dallas in 1963, the Cowboys were the city's only major-league professional franchise in any sport. Even so, the Cowboys captured neither the imagination nor dedicated support of Dallasites until 1965 and 1966.

Tom Landry explains why it was the mid-sixties before his team won an established place in the Dallas community. "The popularity," he says, "is in winning. I know it takes winning to establish a strong pro backing. Once you have established a strong pro backing—I'm talking about a large season ticket backlog—then they'll come out and see you as they do in New York . . . , and as they do in Pittsburgh, and as they do in Philadelphia." The welcome given NFL teams in Atlanta in 1966 and New Orleans in 1967 may call into question Landry's emphasis on winning, but the rise of the Cowboys strongly supports his statement. Many business and civic leaders in Dallas agree with Landry that winning was the single most important element in building the popularity of the Cowboys. Most observers feel, however, that the Cowboys would not fall back to the generally low attendance figures and the level of popular interest of the early sixties, even if they suffered a number of losing seasons; they have become too popular and too much a part of the Dallas

scene. In any case, the Cowboy organization is not anxious to test this hypothesis.

The Cowboys, in becoming a social institution in Dallas, contributed much more to the community than a mere winning professional sports team. Dallas in the 1960's was still new in the company of big cities in the United States, and it was tremendously proud of its wealth and power as the leading urban and financial center of the Southwest, but Dallasites appeared to suffer from basic insecurities about the status of their city. Outsiders stereotyped Dallas as a city of extremist politics and *nouveau riche* society. This none-too-bright image was tarnished for years to come by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November, 1963, the murder of accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald while in police custody, and the subsequent trial of Oswald's killer, Jack Ruby. By 1965–66 the Cowboys, as the city's only major-league team, enjoyed national attention as a spectacular rising power in the NFL. As such they became a source of intense identification for many Dallasites, who recognized what an attractive, winning team in the NFL meant to the public image and prestige of their city.

The image of a metropolitan area of over one million people is not susceptible to precise definition and measurement. Nevertheless, evidence that the Cowboys contribute heavily to the Dallas community in that image is unmistakable. Their explosive big-play offense, featuring stars like Bob Hayes, creates the kind of expectation of exciting action that attracts pro football fans everywhere. Clint Murchison, Jr., receives letters from people all over the United States expressing their admiration for the Cowboys. They frequently request a Cowboy emblem, a decal, or a similar souvenir of the team. Cowboy players Dan Reeves and Ralph Neely testify to meeting fans of their team in areas of the country far from Dallas, and it has even been argued

that the Cowboys have more avid fans coast to coast than any other athletic team in our history. Landry's team is noted for sportsmanship on the field, although some players in Philadelphia and New Orleans may disagree, and the off-the-field and out-of-town conduct of Cowboy players is generally above reproach. In general, the Cowboys have won national attention and respect during their ten years in the NFL.

The Cowboys' own public image at the end of the decade may have been somewhat tarnished by their playoff collapses in 1968 and 1969, but their position since 1965 as the glamour team of the NFL has undoubtedly been advantageous to Dallas. Business and civic leaders of the community agree that national television exposure of Dallas, with its generally pleasant climate and its enthusiastic fans, coupled with the usually good showing of the team, has brought favorable attention to the city. Tex Schramm argues that day in and day out, the Cowboys probably "get the name of Dallas used more across the United States than any other single factor in Dallas." Even Lamar Hunt, an observer whom few would expect to harbor a soft spot for the Cowboys, agrees that they have improved the national image of their city.

Within Dallas "community pride is high," says one downtown business leader, "and the Cowboys are an easily understood symbol of that pride." The thousands of Cowboy-symbol decals that appear on automobiles in the Dallas metropolitan area offer perhaps the most striking demonstration of the pride taken in "their team" by the people of the region. The desire to identify with a winner and a source of community pride is remarkable. Pride and intense identification undoubtedly account for much of the merciless booing given Cowboy stars, especially in the case of quarterback Don Meredith, when they do not perform well in the Cotton Bowl. Most of the "boo birds" are not fair-weather fans; they are avid Cowboy supporters venting the

frustrations of wounded pride. Dallasites are proud of the Cowboys as winners, and no one likes something in which he takes pride to lose.

As one of Dallas' social institutions, the Cowboys serve as more than a source and symbol of community pride. They also contribute as a team and as individuals to the unity of the people of the city. Most Cowboy players demonstrate an awareness that their position as professional athletes enables them to perform worthwhile services for all of Dallas. They have actively assisted in charity drives, urban rehabilitation programs, education and recreation development, and projects to aid poverty-stricken areas. Players often make good-will appearances in all areas of the city. Most observers admit that a successful professional athletic team like the Cowboys pulls the many elements of a community together, at least for a time. Cowboy games attract people from every segment of Dallas society; there is a oneness in supporting their team against opponents from another city. The degree and lasting significance of such unity cannot be measured and should not be exaggerated, but for approximately four months each fall a sizable proportion of the people of Dallas have a sense of supporting something important to the whole community.

The whole Dallas community has also benefited from the impact of the Cowboys on race relations. Unlike some NFL clubs, most notably the Cleveland Browns and the St. Louis Cardinals, the Dallas Cowboys as a team have been virtually free of racial conflict. Don Meredith told a *Look* interviewer in 1969 that he "couldn't point to a single case of racial friction" on the Cowboys. Don Perkins told the same interviewer: "On the football field, we've always in my opinion, gotten along well and been close as a team." That testimony from two team leaders, one white and one black, appears to receive unanimous support from the Cowboy management, coaches, and players. This suc-

cess in good race relations on the team is explained by the simple fact that Cowboy players come together as professionals who respect each other's abilities regardless of color or background. They are then treated as equals by the Cowboy management and coaching staff. Some players, such as Dan Reeves, a native of Georgia, frankly admit to changing their racial views after associating with teammates of the other race, others may retain more racist views, but the point is that there is no room for racial differences on the team. The Cowboys removed one remaining vestige of racial separation in 1968 when rookies were assigned to rooms alphabetically rather than on the previous basis of color. Veterans who did not have regular roommates at that time were also paired alphabetically. When long-established roommates are separated, either through retirement or trade, Cowboy roommates will depend solely on the first letters of their surnames.

In August, 1969, when a Dallas women's organization invited only the wives of white Cowboy players to model for its charity fashion show, Tex Schramm immediately blocked their participation. A similar show several months later featured Cowboy wives without regard to race. The efforts of the Cowboy organization to treat all their players fairly is a tribute to all concerned, and proof, too, that racial problems can not be allowed on a club seeking to become a success in professional competition or its community.

It is obvious, of course, that the efforts of the Cowboy organization have hardly solved all the problems of black-white relations in Dallas. Nevertheless, the influence of the organization has largely been a positive one in this area. When Don Perkins first came to Dallas in 1960, he was denied the right to eat in a cafeteria at the Cowboy offices and was refused transportation by a taxi company in the city. In 1969, Mel Renfro and other Negro ballplayers were accepted at every public place in Dallas.

They no longer faced the sort of discrimination that existed ten years before. Naturally the Cowboys can claim only a small share of the credit for integration in Dallas—years of patient civil rights activity by many individuals and groups were necessary to break down even the more crude aspects of segregation in the city. Yet the Cowboys did bring to town the men who first integrated Dallas hotels in 1960. Individuals from the team helped bring down other barriers of a similar nature in public accommodations. In a more general sense, Negro Cowboy players whose ability commanded the respect of all fans, white and black, undoubtedly helped shake the more fundamental psychological blocks on which segregation was built. It is difficult to watch and cheer a Don Perkins or Mel Renfro on the field and retain an unshaken faith in a system that denies them entrance into a restaurant. By the same token, the presence of such professional stars in the city must certainly strengthen the conviction of the black community that they are an important part of Dallas, deserving fair treatment as individuals.

In the late 1960's several Cowboys played major roles in first publicizing and then breaking one of the more subtle barriers of racial separation in Dallas—restricted residential housing. When he joined the Cowboys in 1960, Don Perkins found that he could rent an apartment only in predominantly Negro South Dallas, far from the Cowboy practice facilities in North Dallas. He chose to leave his family behind in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he had attended the University of New Mexico, because living conditions and the school situation there were better for Negroes than in Dallas. After Perkins had spent six years of semibachelor existence in inferior, roach-infested housing during the football season, he began to let Dallas sportswriters know of his discomfort. Gary Cartwright of the *Morning News* told his readers in April, 1967: "What Dallas likes about Don Perkins is he runs with the ball, runs well, and does not

complain. What Dallas does not like about Don Perkins is that he wants to rent an apartment close to his business."

Then in the summer of 1968 Steve Perkins of the *Times-Herald* published a direct statement from Perkins concerning his inability to find decent housing in Dallas. Instantly a furor developed. Some Dallasites were more indignant that Perkins had complained than at the cause of his complaint. The Cowboy management promised to do everything necessary to find satisfactory housing for its players, but the pledge was not put to a test. One of Perkins' friends knew of a nice home for lease in a predominantly Negro neighborhood. Since he was more interested in a decent place to live than in integrating any restricted neighborhood, Perkins rented the home and let the matter drop.

In 1969 the problem of segregated housing centered on the situation of the Cowboys' star defensive back, Mel Renfro. Renfro had long been dissatisfied with having to live thirty to forty-five minutes from the North Dallas practice field, while white teammates were able to find housing within a few minutes' drive. For several years he and his wife sought an apartment in North Dallas only to be automatically referred to a Negro apartment selector service in South Dallas.

Finally, in the fall of 1969, after again being refused housing in an all-white North Dallas duplex complex, Renfro brought legal action under the Fair Housing Act of 1968. The Cowboy star asked the United States district court of Judge Sara T. Hughes to issue an injunction ordering the builder of the complex and the realtor who had previously refused him an apartment to lease a unit to his family. Renfro also asked for ten thousand dollars in damages. The suit attracted a good deal of attention in Dallas, including television coverage of the story as it developed. At the end of December, 1969, Judge Hughes issued a permanent injunction as requested by Renfro, the first such court order enforcing the Fair Housing Act in Dallas. He

was awarded fifteen hundred dollars in damages and the right to lease an apartment in the complex in question if he so wished. Renfro chose not to move because while the suit was pending he had rented an apartment in the same North Dallas neighborhood. His lawsuit, however, may well have tumbled the barriers against Negroes in that section of the city. Once again a Cowboy ballplayer had led the way in what must be considered a step toward racial equality in Dallas.

The wide-ranging social impact of the Cowboys on Dallas is matched by a broad economic impact that is equally difficult to measure. There is no way to determine precisely the economic contribution of any single business or corporation to a community the size of Dallas, and certainly it would be a mistake to overemphasize the benefits of the Cowboys to a trade area which includes more than a million people; yet it is equally obvious that Dallas does profit economically from the Cowboys as a team and as individuals. The Cowboy corporation employs only about thirty Dallasites on a full-time basis in addition to its approximately fifty players, but it has an annual payroll well in excess of $1,000,000. It also represents a sizable investment in office space and practice facilities in the city. The club purchases 90 to 95 per cent of its equipment, supplies, and services from Dallas-based companies or Dallas representatives of other firms. Expenditures for equipment and supplies alone amounted to $54,439 in 1968. Dallas-based Braniff Airlines consistently submits the low bid for Cowboy air transportation, a large annual expenditure. The building of a new stadium in suburban Irving at the beginning in 1969 has added millions to the business of the whole area. Thus the Cowboys, like any large corporation in Dallas, help the community by placing money into its economy.

These contributions by the Cowboy corporation are only one aspect of the economic impact of the team on the community.

Cowboy home games, according to M. Cullum Thompson, president of a large life insurance company in Dallas, have an effect similar to that of a "one day convention on the economy of the city." Thousands of Dallasites and out-of-town visitors attend the games, creating additional business, especially for transportation and food services. The Dallas Transit System has special "Cotton Bowl flyers" operating from various points in the city on home-game days. Andy Stasio, owner of a popular restaurant, points to increased sales on days the Cowboys play in town; it is reasonable to assume that most restaurants in the city are affected in a similar manner. Although beer is sold on the state fairgrounds, alcoholic beverages are not sold in the Cotton Bowl, and the influx of sixty thousand to seventy thousand football fans is not considered injurious to the liquor and beer dealers of Dallas. Some of the city's business leaders argue that the economic impact of a home game extends beyond Sunday, in that out-of-town visitors often visit for the weekend, providing additional hotel and retail trade. As one member of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce puts it, "The hotel and motel people are solid NFL supporters."

In a broader sense, the Cowboys may aid in the economic advance of Dallas by making it a more exciting and attractive city. A corporation seeking to locate a plant or home office in the Southwest could be influenced in favor of Dallas because a nationally-known professional football team is located there. Some may consider this possibility fanciful, but a city that did not attempt to use its professional sports attractions in appealing to new business and industry would be a rarity indeed.

Communities within fifty to one hundred miles of Dallas feel the economic impact of the Cowboys. In Denton, thirty miles north of Dallas, television services sell literally thousands of "Cowboy antennas." With this special equipment the Cowboy home games telecast from Ardmore, Oklahoma, and Sherman

and Denison, Texas, on the Oklahoma border, can be received. Motels in the same Ardmore-Sherman-Denison area have profited noticeably on the weekends of key games as Dallasites drive out of town to view the contest. Many people in these surrounding communities think of the Cowboys as their team and use the proximity of Murchison's club as a point in favor of their towns.

The personnel of the Cowboy team, drawn from all parts of the United States and always subject to trade to another club, naturally have limitations on their opportunities to make an economic contribution to Dallas. They, of course, draw their salary and spend much of it in the city during the football season, and in 1969 thirty-one players out of a total of fifty regulars and taxi squad members chose to make their full-time homes in Dallas and become involved in off-season business affairs. The surest opening for player employment, as guard John Niland points out, is in public relations or as a salesman. A check of the part-time and off-season work of Dallas ballplayers in 1968 supports the truth of his contention. Such jobs take advantage of the player's name and offer very little in the way of security or chance for advancement.

There are, however, a significant number of Cowboys who plan to make Dallas a permanent home and have found the opportunity to take a long-term job or make large investments in the community. Frank Clarke retired in 1968 to a position as sportscaster for a Dallas television station. Don Meredith retired in 1969 to manage a variety of investments and for full-time work as a stock broker. In the same year, Lee Roy Jordan took a position promising a future in commercial real estate. Pettis Norman took a year-round position with the loan office of a local bank. In addition to his numerous long-range investments in the Dallas area, Bob Lilly, in partnership with George Andrie, opened the School of Fundamental Football in nearby Arling-

ton during July, 1969. Ralph Neely and Lance Rentzel, both of whom have invested in several business ventures in the community, opened the Pearl Street Warehouse, an imaginative new Dallas night club, in December, 1969. These examples by no means exhaust the list, but the point has been made that many Cowboy players aid the economic advance of Dallas both individually and as members of the Cowboys.

In their ten years as an outstanding part of the Dallas community, the Cowboys naturally have not escaped all differences of opinion with the leadership of the city. The most notable clash between the club's leadership and city government arose over the question of improved stadium facilities for Cowboy home games. The Cotton Bowl, in the Texas State Fair Park, is located in one of the oldest and least attractive parts of Dallas. Inadequate streets and severely limited parking create massive traffic congestion in the Fair Park area on Sunday afternoons in the fall. For much of the 1960's, spectators in the stadium suffered, crowded together on hard, splintery wooden bleacher seats. Those in the east stands baked in the September and October sun, while those in the upper decks of the west stands often shivered in the November-December wind. The closest things to important visitors' or owners' boxes, said the *Fort Worth Press* in 1967, are "a few cold, semi-open cubicles of concrete which are not used by the press. . . ." Dressing room and storage facilities, before remodeling in 1969, were woefully inadequate. For example, as late as 1966 there was no air conditioning in the visiting team's dressing room. In 1967 the Football Writers of America pronounced the Cotton Bowl press box "hopeless." Thousands of people attended Cowboy home games in the mid-sixties, but they clearly underwent a good deal of inconvenience and discomfort in the process.

As early as 1963, Murchison became seriously concerned with the need for improved stadium facilities. He recognized the

inadequacies of the Cotton Bowl, and he knew that other major cities had begun to improve their sports facilities only after years of planning and organization for the effort. Television, especially with the widening use of color equipment, provided ever-tougher competition for the fans' interest. Murchison believed the Cowboys had to have a stadium attractive enough to encourage people to leave their television sets and go out to a game. "The amount of discomfort," he still maintains, "that people will put up with is decreasing as the quality of television is increasing." The Cowboy owner began to think in terms of a new football stadium that would avoid the problems of the Cotton Bowl and at the same time be attractive in itself.

Murchison believed from the beginning that the best solution for the City of Dallas was a new downtown sports stadium and adjoining center for the performing arts. But he was willing to consider staying in Fair Park if a new stadium with adequate parking was constructed there. The State Fair Commission, which manages the Cotton Bowl, and the Dallas city government, which would have to provide funds for a new stadium, were unresponsive at first to any of Murchison's ideas. After several years of intermittent discussion, the question came to a head in the spring of 1966. Robert Cullum, president of the State Fair Commission, announced that the Cotton Bowl would receive a general face-lifting, including the installation of new theater-type seats and renovation of the dressing rooms and press facilities. The leaders of the city government headed by Mayor Eric Jonsson, faced with the promotion of a $175,000,-000 bond issue at this time and convinced that a great many projects took priority over the building of a stadium, were unwilling to promote additional funds for Murchison's proposal. Cullum and city officials pointed out that the Cotton Bowl could be rehabilitated for approximately $2,600,000, making it more attractive for the immediate future without enmeshing the city

of Dallas in a vastly expensive new stadium project. Murchison refused to accept this argument, replying that plans to remodel the existing stadium were economically unsound in that it would be pouring good money into a basically hopeless situation.

While he sought a decision in Dallas, Murchison bought land suitable for a stadium site in Irving, a suburb to the west of Dallas. Some Dallasites apparently considered the purchase in Irving as "Clint's Bluff," but in reality it was Murchison's hole card. In January, 1967, he chose to play it. Since neither, he said, the State Fair of Texas or the city of Dallas "will build a new stadium in the foreseeable future," the Cowboys would move to Irving. "As I see the situation," he continued, "Irving would like to build the stadium and the City of Dallas wouldn't."

Murchison's announcement of his intention to move the Cowboys to Irving did not by any means end the stadium controversy. Instead it generated the only open debate that took place among Dallas leaders concerning the matter. In February, 1967, Councilman William Cothrum broke the silence of City Government by speaking out in support of Murchison's call for better sports facilities. Dallas should, he said, place a new downtown stadium on a par with projects such as the Dallas–Fort Worth regional airport. James Bond, president of the Dallas Civic Opera Company, warned that "unless action is taken soon, Dallas may face the loss of its resident performing art groups, just as it now faces loss of its professional football team." In April Murchison reiterated his arguments for a downtown complex before the city council. Such a sports-cultural complex, he argued, would prove far more feasible financially than renovation of the Cotton Bowl. In fact, building downtown instead of in Fair Park would save millions of dollars required to implement slum clearance plans for the area around the Cotton Bowl. A sports-cultural center near Memorial Auditorium, just south of the center of the city, would take advantage of facilities de-

signed to handle forty-five thousand automobiles on an ordinary day and would have the additional advantage of giving the downtown area life after 5:00 P.M. and on Sundays. He also announced the results of a poll conducted by Lou Harris Associates which showed that Dallasites favored a stadium site other than Fair Park by a margin of four to one.

Murchison's efforts were in vain. The leaders of Dallas were willing to consider building a new stadium in Fair Park in the future and even allowing Murchison to run it, but he had by then closed his mind in favor of only two sites—downtown or in Irving—and he did not get the support of Dallas' city government for the downtown sports-cultural complex. The opposition of Mayor Jonsson and others rested first on their assessment of the priorities for city spending, but it also depended on their belief that the approximately thirty-two-acre downtown area was not large enough to accommodate a complex of the type sought by Murchison. There was much sympathy, too, among city leaders and members of the State Fair Commission, a group with many close personal ties, for preserving the traditions of the Cotton Bowl in Fair Park. For these reasons, Dallas made the proposed improvements in the Cotton Bowl and watched Clint Murchison, Jr., go ahead with his stadium in Irving. Formal announcement of his plans came in December, 1967.

The new facility was to be named Texas Stadium and was designed to house football rather than serve as a multipurpose sports arena. Originally, plans called for fifty-eight thousand seats in a $15,000,000 open-domed structure. The right to buy season tickets within the thirty yard lines could be obtained only by buying $1,000 in long-term bonds. A $250 bond guaranteed the right to purchase a season ticket elsewhere. Seating priorities for bond holders were determined by the longevity of their Dallas Cowboys season tickets in the Cotton Bowl. For example, a bond purchaser who had bought season tickets since 1960

would have a higher seating priority than a purchaser who began buying season tickets in 1964. At maturity each $250 bond would pay its holder $300. Public drawings each year would determine the redemption of bonds in accord with available funds drawn from the operation of the stadium. In no case would bond maturity be more than forty years from date of issue.

Irving voters approved the bond issue in a referendum held during April, 1968. Later, revisions of the original plan called for twenty-five changes including expansion from fifty-eight thousand seats to sixty-five thousand, and provisions for a sliding plastic dome to be used in inclement weather. The revisions, inflation, and the unexpected cost of obtaining additional land boosted the estimated building costs to twenty million dollars. An Irving resident, Howard Currens, filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction against Irving city officials to block issuance of the bonds to finance construction. Currens maintained that Texas Stadium was "a cheap imitation of the Cotton Bowl" and that "the only dome now planned for it is the natural sky above." On January 16, 1969, the city of Irving held a second referendum and voters again approved the stadium with its five million dollars in extras. Ground-breaking ceremonies for Texas stadium came on January 25; they included Tex Schramm, Clint Murchison, and Don Meredith standing on a caterpillar tractor and posing for photographers. The whole affair, as reported by sports writer Bob St. John, had the atmosphere of a county fair. The autograph hunters were so eager that St. John jokingly claimed to have signed "two Don Merediths and one Danny Reeves."

The Cowboys are scheduled to begin their home season in the fall of 1971. In the meantime, Murchison had to sign a new Cotton Bowl contract for the 1968, 1969, and 1970 seasons. Rental charges under the new contract remained at the same figure (8 per cent of the gate) as before the stadium controversy,

but the Cowboys' share of the income from concessions was reduced from 50 per cent to 25 per cent.

Dallasites in general do not seem to feel that they will lose the Cowboys in 1971. Unquestionably there are those who are displeased at the arrangements on season ticket options at Texas Stadium, and there are those who value the traditions of the Cotton Bowl in spite of its disadvantages, but most people will readily admit that Texas Stadium will be a convenient, attractive place to watch professional football. Although the economic contribution of the Cowboys to the Fair Park area will obviously be lessened, their more general social and economic impact on the Dallas metropolitan area will not be greatly altered. Building the stadium itself will pump millions of dollars into the economy of the region. Certainly the suburb of Irving will receive numerous benefits from the stadium and the activities associated with it and national television exposure, as well as the largely profitable impact of the thousands of fans attending Cowboy games in the city. Some writers predict, for example, that the Cowboys will mean as much to Irving, Texas, as Disneyland does to Anaheim, California. But the team will still be the Dallas Cowboys. No one could better summarize the role and the future of the Cowboys in their community than Alvis L. Dowell, president of the Dallas Junior Chamber of Commerce, when he says, "I see no possibility of them being anything but a continuing asset to the City and County of Dallas."

IN SEARCH OF A CHAMPIONSHIP, 1967–69

Green Bay's narrow victory (34–27) in the 1966 NFL title game in Dallas ended the Cowboys' first winning season on a sour note, but the loss was hardly a crushing defeat. The Cowboy organization, justifiably proud of having built an expansion team into a winner so quickly, moved confidently ahead toward its ultimate goal—the championship of professional football. Three years later, at the conclusion of their tenth season, the NFL title and a place in the Super Bowl were still beyond the Cowboys' grasp. They were consistent winners in those three years, compiling a fine regular-season record of 32–9–1, but their failure to win the big playoff games left them puzzled and frustrated. Losing "the big ones" not only concerned all those associated with the Cowboys, but brought a rash of complaints from their fans. Nevertheless, no one doubted that the Cowboy organization, in spite of its failure to bring an NFL championship to Dallas, was one of the best operated and most successful franchises in professional football.

Clint Murchison, Jr., as the principal owner and chairman of the board of the Dallas Cowboys Football Club, gave every indication that he was happy with the operation of his franchise. After ten years, the key personnel of his organization remained in the positions they held in 1960, and the basic relationships between the leaders likewise remained unchanged since the creation of the club.

Tex Schramm continued to give executive direction to the Cowboy corporation, serving as both president and general manager after 1965 and seeing that his organization worked as a team off the field as well as on. In 1969 he increased his stake in the Cowboys by taking preliminary steps to exercise an option to purchase 20 per cent of the Dallas franchise. The Cowboy general manager has always been much more than a key executive for one NFL franchise—he has proved to be an innovative thinker for all of professional football. For example, in 1967 the league implemented Schramm's plan for adding to fan interest by creating four divisional champions and two additional playoff games. The playoff games determined the Eastern and Western Conference champions, who then played for the NFL crown. Schramm also sought to improve the conditions of the game itself. In 1969, for example, he originated the use of bright red plastic markers placed on the ground to indicate the yardage necessary for a first down. This innovation is a boon to both players and fans. Regardless of the general conception that a player always aims for as much yardage as he can, that is often not the case. The plastic markers offer perfect targets for receivers running sideline patterns on critical third downs or for a quarterback looking for the haven of the sidelines after rolling out and picking up just enough yardage for a first down. For the alert fan, the markers provide the added interest of judging if the first down effort failed or succeeded.

Like Tex Schramm, head coach Tom Landry also remained firmly established in his position with the Cowboys through 1969. Ironically, among head coaches in professional football only Landry and Hank Stram of the Dallas Texans–Kansas City Chiefs began and finished the decade with the same club. Throughout the sixties, Landry, who was voted coach of the year by his NFL peers in 1966, did not alter his philosophy of coaching. He continued to teach the multiple offense and co-

ordinated defense. Both systems had their critics, but his faith in the fundamental ideas involved remained unshaken. In 1969, *Newsweek* picked the Washington Redskins to beat the Cowboys in the Capitol Division race, largely because of the Redskins' new head coach, Vince Lombardi. But *Newsweek* also predicted that "Tom Landry's wildly complicated offense" could not be handled by quarterback Craig Morton, a four-year veteran who was new in the role of a starter. If Landry read the article, he would undoubtedly have commented, much as he did in 1967, "You have to coach as you are, . . . what you believe in." At times he cut down or increased the number of offensive formations used, and he experimented with the defensive line and secondary, but his basic coaching philosophy did not change.

Landry remained surprisingly taciturn during the Cowboys' quest for a championship. It was reported that he celebrated his first Eastern Conference title in 1966 by drinking one beer. His demeanor has changed little in victory or defeat over the years. Most close observers of the Cowboys agree that Tom Landry is not an unemotional or unfeeling man, but there have been no repeat performances of locker-room tears since the Pittsburgh game of 1965. As Dallas sportswriter Sam Blair once put it, "He may feel a great deal more inside, but outwardly, Landry handles most situations as serenely as a Methodist Sunday School teacher, which is exactly what he is in the off season."

Tom Landry's emotional control in defeat is all the more remarkable in that he is totally committed to his work. In effect, he has no off season. He follows a heavy work schedule throughout the year. There have been stories, which seem entirely believable, about his returning for a full day's work at the office on the Monday morning following the last game of the season. Landry expects his assistant coaches to have a dedication and willingness to work long hours that match his own. In July of

1969, the Cowboy management personnel, sportswriters, and camp guests at Thousand Oaks, California, motored out to the local country club to watch television coverage of man's first walk on the moon. Landry and his assistant coaches held the usual staff meetings that evening. In *The Paper Lion*, George Plimpton tells of a training camp in which the Lion coaches enjoyed fun-filled cocktail hours and dollar poker in the evenings. There is none of that at Thousand Oaks. The Cowboy assistants may have a beer before dinner, but they remain on the job until bedtime around midnight. It is not surprising that there was a noticeable turnover in the coaching staff during the early sixties. None of the original assistant coaches remained with the club by 1966, but over the years Landry has collected an outstanding staff of highly efficient aides.

Ermal Allen and Jim Myers came to the Cowboys in 1962 as offensive backfield coach and offensive line coach, respectively. Both had solid football backgrounds, Allen as an assistant coach at the University of Kentucky and Myers as head coach at Texas A. & M. Dick Nolan, one of Landry's pupils with the New York Giants, served so well as a defensive coach with the Cowboys from 1962 through 1967 that he became the head coach of the San Francisco Forty-Niners in 1968. His work with the defensive backfield became the responsibility of Bobby Franklin, a veteran of seven years' experience with the Cleveland Browns. Since 1966 the defensive line coach has been Ernie Stautner, one of the all-time great defensive tackles. Stautner, a member of pro football's Hall of Fame, played fifteen seasons with the Pittsburgh Steelers. Jerry Tubbs, one of the original Cowboys and an All-Pro selection in 1962, took over the coaching of the linebackers in 1966. The Cowboys moved up to seven full-time assistants in 1968 with the hiring of Ray Renfro to handle pass offense and Raymond Berry to coach the offensive ends. Both had enjoyed sensational professional careers, Renfro with the

Browns and Berry with the Baltimore Colts. Berry resigned early in 1970, primarily to find time to complete a series of films on pass receiving. His resignation required a minor reorganization of the Cowboy coaching staff for 1971, and it provided an opening for the appointment of Dan Reeves, a popular player and fan favorite, to the position of player-coach. Berry's departure again points up the demands placed on Cowboy assistant coaches—working for Tom Landry is a full-time job.

The responsibilities of player scouting and recruitment require dedication and commitment similar to those of the coaching staff. Few would argue with the contention that Gil Brandt is the best scout and recruiter in the NFL. The introduction of computerized scouting provided more rapid evaluation and objective analysis of prospective players and altered the nature of scouting, but it did not reduce the amount of work involved. Instead, the computer's ability to process quickly huge amounts of information, much of which had to be shared with several other NFL teams, placed a premium on the collection of more detailed data by the scouts who worked exclusively for the Cowboys. By 1966 Brandt had Red Hickey, former head coach of the Forty-Niners, and Bucko Kilroy searching for new player talent. With the addition of Bob Griffin as an assistant to Brandt in 1967, Dick Mansperger in 1967, Bill Taylor in 1968, and Jim Garrett in 1969, the Cowboys employed seven full-time employees in the area of player scouting. (This number was reduced to five in early 1970 when Taylor and Garrett left the Cowboys). Brandt and his staff have learned how to look for the specialized skills that mark a successful professional. They are not afraid to make a definite judgment of a player's prospects with the Cowboys and to stand by it. The Cowboy scouts as well as Troika scouts are present each year at training camp in Thousand Oaks. Just as the computer program is refined and improved by feedback, each scout can observe how the

rookies he has rated stack up in actual competition with all other rookies. He can also hear the coaches' evaluations of prospective recruits, which can be invaluable for a man working in the field during the next year. Bringing everyone in the organization together at Thousand Oaks also solidifies the concept that management, coaches, scouts, and players are all part of the Cowboy "family." No one feels left out or slighted, and it gives cohesiveness to an organization dedicated to excellence in professional football.

The Cowboys' outstanding success in the annual college-player draft justly received much credit for the club's rise to the top of the Eastern Conference. In 1967, however, circumstances put new and especially severe pressure on Gil Brandt's department. The merger agreement of 1966, calling for a common college-player draft beginning in 1967, added nine AFL teams to the sixteen NFL clubs (the New Orleans Saints entered the league that year). In a combined NFL-AFL draft, the Cowboys could choose only once in twenty-five picks rather than once in every fifteen as before. As it turned out, bonus choices for the New Orleans team made the ratio even more unfavorable. The number of available players in 1967 was further limited by a prohibition against drafting college "redshirts," that is, players who had been held from varsity competition for seasoning. Redshirts had been subject to the pro draft in the past because they had spent four years on campus. The willingness of professional football franchises to pass up these prospects removed the pressure on athletes to sign a pro contract when they still had a year of varsity eligibility remaining, and it demonstrates a sensitivity toward intercollegiate football. To make matters even worse for Dallas, 1967 was the year it had to pay most of the price for Ralph Neely. The Houston Oilers held the Cowboys' first-, second-, and two fifth-round choices. Dallas had only two choices in the first five rounds, and because of their 10–3–1

record in 1966, each pick came late in the round. Accordingly, over seventy top college players were chosen before the Cowboys made a selection. Tex Schramm entered the draft saying, "We'll just have to make our choices good ones, as we have in the past," but prospects were hardly bright.

No team with the Cowboys' philosophy of building its strength from the college draft could afford two consecutive years such as 1967. Their first choice (in the third round), defensive back Phil Clark of Northwestern University, made the team and became a starting corner back in 1969 only to falter badly late in the season and be traded to the Chicago Bears in early 1970. Other than Clark, Rayfield Wright from Fort Valley State College in Georgia became the only draftee to remain on the Cowboy squad through the 1967 season. Wright became a tribute to scouting by playing exceptionally well at tight end and offensive tackle through 1969, but this single bright spot hardly made the 1967 draft an overwhelming success. There was still the possibility of help from the recruitment of free agents, but even in that area, in which the Cowboys had been so successful in the past, they found that their opportunities had been limited. At the time of the merger, Schramm attempted to have the draft limited to eleven rather than seventeen rounds. Had he succeeded, there would have been a large pool of quality players left undrafted each year; but he failed, partly because other clubs sought to neutralize the Cowboys' success in recruiting free agents. The only free agent to make the 1967 team was Ron East, a defensive lineman from Montana State University. Nevertheless, according to Gary Cartwright of the *Dallas Morning News*, the Cowboys kept their record of "doing more with leftovers than a French hyena." Unfortunately, by 1967 there were fewer "leftovers" and more competition for them.

Dallas' scouting system may have had an unproductive year, but Brandt's office proved spectacularly innovative in searching

for a new kicker. Danny Villanueva, the Cowboys' kicker since 1965, did not give a really championship-level performance in 1966. Despite finishing second in the NFL scoring race with 107 points, he hit only seventeen of thirty-one field-goal tries and averaged 39.2 yards per punt. The Cowboy organization decided it needed a new kicker, and Gil Brandt came up with the idea of touring the United States in search of talent. His idea, derived from the old traveling baseball tryout camps, called for holding punting and place-kicking tryouts in various cities. The project received a lot of attention from the press and became known as the Kicking Karavan. Because it took on the air of a barnstorming campaign, Villanueva lost his sense of humor. He denounced the Karavan as a publicity stunt, not really aimed at replacing an "unnamed Mexican kicker." Nevertheless, Brandt was serious and stuck to his original goals. He took along part-time kicking coach Ben Agajanian, Ermal Allen, and other members of the organization. They traveled ten thousand miles, to twenty-eight cities, in Murchison's private airplane. In the spring of 1967, an estimated fifteen hundred kickers, some of whom were highly unlikely prospects, to say the least, tried out for the job. In Memphis, a bus driver left his passengers waiting while he took his turns punting and place kicking. Perhaps the changemaker he wore on his belt prevented a better performance. In Oklahoma City a young newspaper correspondent, admittedly the poorest kicker in the Karavan's short history, went through the whole tryout in order to write a better story for his paper.

The Kicking Karavan of 1967 did not turn up a kicker, at least not for the Cowboys. Harold Deters of North Carolina State seemed promising enough to merit a twelfth-round draft choice, but he chose to make his career in teaching rather than professional football. The Karavan also discovered Mac Percival, a former Texas Tech basketball star who lived in the Dallas

suburb of Garland. Percival lost his chance with the Cowboys after he missed two short field-goal tries in an exhibition game against Green Bay, and he and another player were traded to the Chicago Bears for a third-round draft choice in 1968. Ironically, Percival went on to kick twenty-five of thirty-six field-goal attempts for the Bears in 1968 and win several games with long three-pointers in the last minute of action. Villanueva continued as the Cowboys' kicker through 1967, and a second Kicking Karavan, which visited only eight cities in 1968, was no more successful than the first in finding his replacement. Finally, in 1968 place kicker Mike Clark, acquired from the Pittsburgh Steelers, and punter Ron Widby, who had been cut by the New Orleans Saints in 1967, solved the Cowboys' kicking problems. The Kicking Karavan had, in a sense, been a costly failure except for the draft choice received for Percival, but it was an interesting experiment, and, as Gill Brandt says, it "was a real success as far as spreading good will for the Cowboys if nothing else."

In the 1968 draft the Cowboys began to recover from their poor year of 1967. They chose Dennis Homan, a flanker from the University of Alabama, in the first round, much to the dismay of some fans who noted the presence of veterans Lance Rentzel and Pete Gent at that position. The Cowboy organization, however, remained true to the philosophy of generally choosing the best professional football prospect still available when its turn came in the draft. Homan vindicated this approach by making the squad in 1968 and 1969. Blaine Nye, an offensive guard from Stanford University, made the squad as a fifth-round pick and became a strong reserve in 1969. The scouting system scored another coup in 1968 when it made Larry Cole, a defensive end from the University of Hawaii, its sixteenth-round choice. Cole, the first player ever drafted from his school by the NFL, took over for the injured Willie Townes early in the

1968 season and performed brilliantly. He even became an offensive threat by scoring two touchdowns from his defensive end position. Two linebackers, John Douglas of the University of Missouri and D. D. Lewis of Mississippi State University, ran afoul of military service in 1968–69, but both are thought to have excellent chances of making the team in 1970.

The 1968 draft also produced a choice that will serve for many years to maintain the Cowboys' perspective against any claims of omnipotence for their scouting system. They drafted David McDaniels, a six-foot, four-inch, two-hundred-pound end from Mississippi Valley College, in the second round. Supposedly possessing a speed of 4.6 seconds for forty yards, McDaniels was considered by the Cowboy scouts to have great potential at either split or tight end. When he came to the Cowboys' rookie workouts in the spring of 1969, however, Gil Brandt was astounded to find that he ran a 4.8-second forty-yard dash—good speed for a linebacker perhaps, but not for a pass receiver. Preseason training camp found McDaniels eager to learn but lacking in mental attitude, especially in the confidence in himself that is so necessary for making the squad. He stuck with the team through 1968—no one cuts a second-round draft choice lightly—but he remained a forlorn figure, increasingly aware that he had no future with the Cowboys. In 1969 he was traded to the Philadelphia Eagles for former All-Pro tight end Mike Ditka. It was a fine deal for the Cowboys, but McDaniels failed to make the Eagles' squad.

What happened to the Cowboy scouting system in this case? Maybe the timing of McDaniels' speed in the forty-yard dash was thrown off by something as simple and unexpected as an incorrectly marked field. Gil Brandt once had a prospect timed at an incredible 4.3 seconds for the forty—faster than Bob Hayes—until he paced off the sidelines and discovered it was only thirty-six yards from the forty-yard marker to the goal line.

Maybe the scouts for once were carried away by statistics and glowing words from local people at Mississippi Valley College and failed to do a thorough job of evaluating McDaniels' physical skills, but his failure also resulted from intangible human qualities—lack of the attitudes and personality traits necessary for success in professional football. Gil Brandt agrees that the most difficult problem left in scouting is to determine and measure psychological factors. The Cowboys give personnel tests to all prospective players and they attempt to measure psychological makeup. The results are then used in evaluating why some players succeed and others fail. The search for improvement in psychological measurement goes on, but the Cowboy organization recognizes that this area of player analysis can never reach the precision of tangible physical data.

Any damage to the reputation of the Cowboy scouting system from the McDaniels case was more than offset by the 1969 draft. Second-round choice Richmond Flowers, a wide receiver turned defensive back from the University of Tennessee, and ninth-round choice Claxton Welch, a running back from the University of Oregon, were both playing in a reserve capacity and on the specialty teams at the end of the 1969 season. The Cowboys' two (thanks to a trade) third-round choices, linebacker Tom Stincic from the University of Michigan and defensive end Halvor Hagen from Weber State University in Utah, demonstrated great potential in limited action as reserves. At least two other draft choices, defensive tackle Clarence Williams of Prairie View A. & M. and quarterback Bob Belden of Notre Dame, showed enough promise to be kept on the reserve squad for another try in 1970. Then, of course, there was Dallas' first-round choice, a somewhat obscure running back from Yale named Calvin Hill.

Before the 1969 draft there was much talk of the wealth of running-back talent available. The fabulous O. J. Simpson of

Southern California and Leroy Keyes of Purdue headed the list. The Cowboys were expected to try for one of the top running backs, but it was also anticipated that the twenty-three clubs making selections before Dallas in the first round would select most of the outstanding backs. Many of the big names were selected early, but Schramm, Landry, Brandt, and the Cowboy scouts gathered in Dallas were overjoyed to find the six-foot, four-inch, 230-pound Hill still available. They instructed business manager Tom Hardin, the Cowboy representative at draft headquarters in New York, to announce what one Dallas sportswriter would soon be calling "those immortal words, Calvin Hill."

The Ivy League is hardly famous for producing professional football players, and the Cowboys' first-round choice, in spite of Hill's impressive statistics at Yale, did not bring cries of ecstasy from Dallas sportswriters and fans. Indeed, it was a popular thing on television for sportscasters to quip, "Calvin who?" Sportsmen had faith in the scouting system, but the second-round choice, Richmond Flowers, received as much or more publicity than Hill. The day after the draft, Sam Blair of the *Dallas Morning News* reminded his readers of the thirteenth-round choice in 1968, tight end Carter Lord of Harvard, who failed to make the team. "He was last seen," said Blair, "wearing a raccoon coat and tooling down Thousand Oaks Avenue in his Stutz Bearcat. By now he has probably made another fortune on Wall Street." Hill, it was pointed out, was not only a "Yaley" but planned to become a theology student at Southern Methodist University. The Cowboy organization knew, of course, that the computer ranked Hill as the fifth best prospect in the country, Ivy League or not. Tom Landry pointed out that Hill was a great athlete, the holder of records at Yale in the broad and triple jumps, and that he had all the credentials to become a superstar. He would be tried at three positions—linebacker,

tight end, and running back. Hill expressed a quiet confidence about making the team. "I read somewhere," he said, "where people . . . laughed when they heard scores of Ivy League games, so I guess I not only have something to prove for myself but also for the Ivy League."

Calvin Hill proved a lot in a hurry. He was not invited to the College All-Star camp in Chicago until it was clear that superstars Simpson and Keyes would not be available because they were contract holdouts. After a practice game with the Oakland Raider rookies, he boarded a plane for Chicago and prepared for the game with the New York Jets on August 1. He did not play a single down on offense or defense for head coach Otto Graham and missed invaluable time at training camp in Thousand Oaks. After he returned to camp in California, Hill quickly demonstrated that he was the best player to come to the Cowboys in a long time. Unable to play in the first preseason game against Los Angeles, he started at running back the next week against San Francisco.

Most people thought Hill to be too tall for a running back; his first performance at that position dispelled that notion. He gained 106 yards in sixteen carries against the Forty-Niners for a 6.6-yard average per carry, caught three passes for 28 yards, and had completed a 40-yard touchdown pass when it was called back because of a penalty. It was the most outstanding rookie debut in Cowboy history, and an instant "Calvin Hill Fan Club" sprang up. Cowboy coaches, players, and management could not say enough about their new star. Although Dallas sportswriters were naturally enthusiastic, too, Bob St. John asked his readers to maintain their perspective. "Calvin Hill showed Sunday that he has that charisma of a great football player. Now, maybe he will make a minus five yards against Green Bay Saturday night and maybe he will never make 100

again. But you can't take a particular Sunday in San Francisco away from Calvin Hill nor the millions who watched."

St. John's words of caution were quite reasonable, but in the case of Calvin Hill they were unnecessary. He performed so well in the next three preseason games against the Green Bay Packers, the Houston Oilers, and the New York Jets that he completely overshadowed veteran halfbacks Dan Reeves, who was slow in recovering from a knee injury, and Craig Baynham. Before the final preseason game with Baltimore, Tom Landry announced that Hill would be his starting halfback when the regular season opened. Landry had never begun a season with a rookie starting at halfback, but Hill's performance could not be denied. Much of the Dallas offense was redesigned to exploit their 230-pound running back with game-breaking speed.

Hill emerged as a superstar as quickly as anyone in NFL history. In his regular-season debut against the St. Louis Cardinals, he ran for 70 yards and threw a 58-yard touchdown pass to Lance Rentzel on the option play. The Associated Press voted him the NFL's Offensive Player of the Week for that performance. Against New Orleans the following week, he ran for 138 yards on twenty-three carries to set a new Dallas rushing record, and he scored the winning touchdown in the fourth quarter. As a rookie with two games behind him, Hill led the NFL in rushing, and through the first eight games of the season he easily maintained his lead. Most teams considered it a moral victory if they held Calvin Hill under 100 yards' rushing when they played the Cowboys, but when they stacked their defenses against Hill they provided other opportunities for the Cowboy offense. Hill's greatest game came on November 16 against the Washington Redskins, the Cowboys' only competitor in the Capitol Division race. Hill rushed for 150 yards, breaking his own record, caught two passes for 35 yards, and returned three

kickoffs for 100 yards as the Cowboys overwhelmed Washington, 41–28. After nine games, their season record was eight wins against one loss, and the only question seemed to be what Calvin Hill would do next.

At that point the injury jinx, which had already hit Craig Morton, Bob Hayes, and several other key players, took its toll on Hill. He sustained what was at first called a "jammed" big toe in the Washington game and found that it so hampered his running that he did not play against the Los Angeles Rams the following week. The Cowboys sustained their second loss. Hill started the Thanksgiving Day game against San Francisco but had to retire to the bench after one ineffective quarter. It was finally determined by a team of medical specialists that his problem was a separation of the sesamoid over the joint of his big toe and perhaps a torn capsule in the same joint. Playing on the injury after the nerves of his toe were blocked with a painkiller would not aggravate it, so Hill prepared to move back into the lineup in December. But his old effectiveness never fully returned. He gained just twenty-three yards in the rain and mud at Pittsburgh and forty-one against Baltimore. Then in the season finale with the Redskins, his first full game since November 16, he gained seventy-three yards.

Calvin Hill's toe injury cost him the NFL rushing title for 1969. He had gained 807 yards when he was injured in the Washington game, and with five games left he seemed certain to go well over the 1,000-yard figure in his rookie season. For the sake of comparison, it should be pointed out that Jimmy Brown gained 942 yards in his first year and Gayle Sayers, 867. Even with an injury that caused him to miss two games and to be hobbled for three more, Hill rushed for 942 yards on 204 attempts for an average of 4.6 yards per carry. He finished second in the NFL to Gayle Sayers for the season. The extent to which Hill was hampered by his toe injury did not become fully evi-

dent until after the final game in Miami with the Los Angeles Rams. Because of soreness and pain, the Dallas star no longer accelerated from his toes in the manner of most athletes but curled up his toes and ran from the balls of his feet. He developed callouses and then blisters under the thickened skin, and when the blisters became infected he spent over a month in Baylor Hospital in Dallas after surgery to clear up the problem.

Although Calvin Hill lost the rushing title, he won most of the honors awarded to rookies in the NFL. The Associated Press voted him the Rookie of the Year on offense, and both the AP and United Press International named him to the All-NFL first team. Other lesser honors, too numerous to list, poured in to the point of Hill's embarrassment. The high point of his season, he insisted, was "becoming a starter." As Bob St. John pointed out, that was only the beginning of the story of Calvin Hill.

The scouting success story of 1969 left everyone wondering what the Cowboy system could do for an encore in 1970, its tenth plunge into the big gamble of drafting college athletes. "When you draft as late as we do" (twenty-third among the twenty-six teams involved in 1970), said Tom Landry, "you have to be a little lucky. As you know, we were fortunate to find Calvin Hill sitting there when we drafted last year. Who knows? Maybe we can be that fortunate again." On the day of the draft it appeared that the Cowboys were indeed fortunate again. Their first-round choice, Duane Thomas of West Texas State University, had been rated in a tie for the top professional football prospect in the country by the computer, although the Cowboys ranked him about third. Gil Brandt had his eye on Thomas, a six-foot, two-inch, 220-pound running back with speed equal to Calvin Hill's, long before the draft, and Tom Landry said he was the player the Cowboys most wanted. With a new running back in the fold, Dallas then traded veteran Craig Baynham, along with defensive back Phil Clark, to Chicago. The Cow-

boys received the Bears' first choice in the second round and drafted Bob Asher of Vanderbilt University, a six-foot, five-inch, 255-pound tackle rated as the best offensive tackle in the country by the computer. Tom Landry noted that Asher has the potential of All-Pro Ralph Neely.

With their own second-round choice they selected Margene Adkins, a wide receiver from Henderson County Junior College who had played several years for Ottawa of the Canadian league. Landry remarked to sportswriters, "He's another Bob Hayes." Dallas had three choices in the third round—its own plus those of Cleveland and Houston. In 1969 quarterback Jerry Rhome had been traded for Cleveland's choice with the provision that Dallas would get something more if Cleveland in turn traded him before the 1970 draft. When Rhome went to Houston in early 1970, the Cowboys picked up another third-round choice from the Oilers. They used their selections for two defensive backs, Charlie Waters of Clemson University and Denton Fox of Texas Tech University, and linebacker Steve Kiner from the University of Tennessee. At the conclusion of the draft, Dallas had selected two running backs, four offensive linemen, two defensive linemen, two linebackers, two wide receivers, a tight end, a kicker, and five defensive backs. The organization, greatly pleased at these results, then had only to sign the players and wait until mid-July to test them in training camp.

The 1970 draft was largely a continuation of Cowboy philosophy—select the best athlete regardless of the position needs of the team. Despite obvious weaknesses in the defensive secondary team aggravated by a serious injury to strong safety Mike Gaechter in the Playoff Bowl, Dallas refused to use its highest draft choices for defensive backs. Big, aggressive linemen or fast, powerful running backs are usually valuable on specialty teams and as reserves, or they make excellent trade material;

whereas, in the words of Tex Schramm, a defensive back is likely either to "hit 100 percent or miss 100 percent," owing to the highly specialized nature of the position. Nevertheless, the critical need for defensive backs was so great in 1970 that the Cowboys drafted two in the third round and three more in later rounds.

The 1970 draft also demonstrated the long-range benefits of the Cowboys' insistence on building a team by keeping and developing their own draft choices. They were rich enough in player talent to trade away Baynham, Clark, and Rhome and wind up with six rather than three draft choices in the first three rounds. If the Cowboys, through a superior draft, are consistently able to select and develop surplus talent that can play elsewhere in the NFL, then they can trade for high draft choices and partially offset their low draft priority as a power in the league.

Although the college player draft seemed to be working well for the Cowboys in 1968, 1969, and 1970, they continued the search for free agents. Finding star performers among undrafted players was a trademark of the organization, something it was justifiably proud of. The Cowboys took forty-six free agents to training camp in 1969. Among them, Reggie Rucker, a wide receiver from Boston University, remained on the taxi squad and was activated for the 1969 Playoff Bowl game. Only one, defensive back Otto Brown from Prairie View A. & M., was active during the regular season, but he was a starter by December. In early 1970 Brown held an important place in Landry's plans for a stronger defensive secondary, while Gil Brandt and his assistants busied themselves signing another large crop of free agents for the next training camp in July.

By the late 1960's, the Cowboy organization functioned smoothly and efficiently, but it was not able to bring the championship of the National Football League to Dallas. It came

closest in 1967 when it lost to the Green Bay Packers in the last thirteen seconds of the game. Somewhat ironically, the 1967 team's won-lost record of nine and five was the poorest record compiled in the four years from 1966 through 1969, when the Cowboys were either Eastern Conference or Capitol Division champions. In 1967 they struggled throughout the season, losing to Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Washington, Baltimore, and San Francisco, but their nine wins easily put them at the top of the Capitol Division. The playoff contest with the Cleveland Browns, champions of the Century Division, was the Cowboys' most perfect performance of the 1960's. Before 70,786 delighted fans in the Cotton Bowl, they destroyed the Browns, 52 to 14.

Their second consecutive Eastern Conference title earned them a rematch with the Green Bay Packers for the NFL title. This time the contest was in Green Bay where the temperature at game time was an unbelievable (for playing football, at least) thirteen degrees below zero. The Packers scored twice for a 14–0 lead only to have the Dallas defense rise to the occasion by recovering two fumbles, one for a touchdown by George Andrie and one that resulted in a field goal. The 14–10 halftime score stood through the third quarter; then Dan Reeves hit Lance Rentzel on the option pass for a fifty-yard touchdown and the Cowboys led 17–14 with 14:52 left to play in the game. Green Bay still trailed by three points when it gained possession of the football on its own thirty-two-yard line with 4:50 remaining on the clock. Thirteen plays later, with thirteen seconds left in the game, quarterback Bart Starr scored the winning touchdown on a one-yard plunge. Several Cowboy players suffered frostbite as the temperatures sank to twenty degrees below zero before the game ended, and Dallas fans grumbled about settling a championship in an "Ice Bowl." "The field was not too cold," said Clint Murchison, Jr., "if you win." His team had little to be

ashamed of in losing a second time to Green Bay, especially after the Packers easily won their second consecutive Super Bowl.

The Cowboys looked forward to the 1968 season with a mood of optimistic determination. But before they could get down to the business of winning football games, a player strike developed to threaten, it appeared, the whole NFL. The strike, arising from player complaints about the league's pension plan, minimum salaries, and preseason pay, held the attention of management, coaches, and players alike in the first half of 1968.

Cowboy players, like members of all NFL teams after 1962, were participants in the Bert Bell NFL Player Benefit Plan, the pet project of Commissioner Pete Rozelle. The plan provided players with medical insurance for themselves and their families (up to ten thousand dollars for each family member), twenty thousand dollars in life insurance coverage, and sizable retirement benefits at age sixty-five for those who had played five seasons in the league. It was financed by the club owners with income from the playoff games, runner-up bowl, All-Star game, and several minor sources; the players themselves contributed nothing financially. The NFL boasted that it had the best player benefits program in professional sports, but the plan itself became a focal point for player discontent in 1968. Another complaint centered on salary payments, which did not begin until the day of the first league game; until then preseason pay was ten dollars a day. Many players considered the minimum salary of five thousand dollars for the season too low.

It appears that the strike movement of 1968 really had its roots in the wild bidding for rookie players before the merger of 1966 as well as the publicity given to the lucrative nature of professional football in that period. The merger ended giant bonuses and salaries for rookies, but veteran players remembered how club owners spent money in 1964–66. They read,

too, about increasing attendance and new television contracts. Slowly a feeling developed that the owners had arranged matters to make themselves rich while the players were denied a fair share of the bonanza of professional football. The NFL Pro Bowl games of 1967 and 1968 provided opportunities for players from different clubs to compare salaries and air what they felt were common grievances. As early as the 1967 season there was talk of tougher bargaining on salaries and perhaps even a union movement in professional football. The teamsters' union was reportedly very interested in representing the players, but the NFL Players Association decided in January, 1968, to act as its own union. *Business Week*, reported, "Just how the players groups will deal with the owners is as unclear right now as their demands. The only sure thing is that they'll be playing out of the union formation."

The questions of unionism in professional football, as everyone involved recognized in 1968, was extremely complex. Generally, people in management and coaching, including Tex Schramm and Tom Landry, opposed the whole idea. They feared that it could lead to increasingly costly group contracts in which mediocrity would be rewarded on the same level with excellence or to a situation in which emphasis on the top dollar would encourage player unions to break down such key restraints on off-the-field competition as the option clause. They also disliked the possibility of bargaining agents who had no interest in the welfare of the game being brought in. Moreover, Schramm argued that the players had a misguided notion of the lucrative nature of professional football since they saw only spectacular income figures and did not see operational costs. On the other hand, most of the players, certainly the Cowboy players, did not intend to use the union in a manner Schramm and Landry most feared. Salaries were good on the Dallas team. There had been excellent raises in 1967 and 1968, and the

players were hardly rebellious. They accepted the need for controlled competition, and they had no intention of using a union to negotiate individual salaries in a way that would skyrocket costs or reward all performers equally. Lee Roy Jordan summarized it well when he said that the Cowboys might need a union if they all did the same job for the same period of time each day. But since "we are different in talent, and we try to use the talent we have in football, I think there shouldn't be a union or anything to negotiate personal contracts."

The union movement in professional football became somewhat unique. It aimed at winning a larger share of the game's profits for the players, but not in organized labor's usual way of negotiating richer contracts at every opportunity. Although the NFL Players Association did want to increase the minimum salary to fifteen thousand dollars, this point was not crucial, for the average salary in the league was well above that figure. There was a demand for five hundred dollars per player for each preseason contest which could have cost the owners an additional thirty thousand dollars per game. Some of the players themselves, however, considered that an unreasonable figure, and they only wanted some improvement on the ten dollars a day they were then receiving. In their eyes, the most important player demand had little to do with immediate salaries. They wanted the owners to contribute five million dollars to the Player Benefit Fund over the next three years. This, they felt, was a way to share in the wealth of professional football without bringing detrimental effects of unionism to the game. Tex Schramm has argued quite reasonably that to pay greater fringe benefits would reduce the money available for contracts and inevitably lead to a leveling of salaries for all. But the players would not accept this argument; they united in support of the demands of their own association.

At their meeting in May, 1968, the NFL club owners refused

to accept the Players Association's terms. They argued that the players were paid well for six months' work and that professional football was not so profitable as popularly thought. Tex Schramm did not think the players really wanted a strike, and he believed they knew enough about the business of professional football to realize that they had no basis for one. He was correct in thinking that the players, certainly the Cowboy players, did not want a strike. Nevertheless, they meant to maintain a united front and see through what they had begun. As the opening of training camp approached with only the pension question blocking agreement, the Cowboy veterans planned to open their own camp in California. This was their year for the championship, they felt, and a delay in getting into shape was not to stand in the way. There was general relief when an agreement was reached on July 15 just before the Cowboys' camp began. The owners agreed to contribute a total of three million dollars to the pension plan in 1968 and 1969, making possible great increases in retirement income for veterans of five years or more in the NFL. Minimum salaries were set at twelve thousand dollars for first- and second-year men and thirteen thousand dollars for veterans of two years or more. No Cowboy player received as little as the minimum. The preseason pay question was settled by leaving rookies at ten dollars a day but paying veterans more once the exhibition games began. When the week of the first game arrived, second-year men received twenty dollars a day, third-year men thirty dollars, and so on up to fifty dollars a day for those with five or more years. It was still costly to the owners, but more reasonable than five hundred dollars a game. As veterans reported to training camps across the country, NFL fans breathed a sigh of relief that there would be a season after all.

The 1968 Cowboys turned in the best won-lost record in the club's ten-year history. After opening the season in Dallas with

a 59–13 rout of the Detroit Lions, they overcame a crippling injury to Dan Reeves and several minor injuries to Don Meredith to compile a record of twelve wins and two losses. Their only defeats came at the hands of their old enemies, Green Bay, by a score of 28–17, and the New York Giants. After easily becoming champions of the Capitol Division, the Cowboys again played the Cleveland Browns, winners of the Century Division, for the Eastern Conference title. They had defeated the Browns in four consecutive games stretching back into 1966, but this playoff game was in Cleveland, and the Cowboys were about to acquire a new nemesis. Dallas led 10–3 just before the half, but Leroy Kelly escaped for a forty-five-yard touchdown pass, and the momentum swung in favor of the Browns. They scored twice in the third quarter on a pass interception and a thirty-five-yard run by Kelly and won the game, 31 to 20. For Dallas it was a shattering end to the season that was to be theirs.

There remained, of course, the Playoff Bowl in Miami between the losers of the two conference title playoff matches, a game that was fast becoming an unbearable trauma for players who had just seen the regular season go up in smoke. The Cowboys, without getting very excited about the game, decided to think of it as the first contest of 1969 rather than the last of 1968. Their opponents, the aggressive young Minnesota Vikings, presented no easy mark to begin 1969 as a winner, but Dallas came from behind to win, 17–13. The victory meant a good deal more to the Cowboys than most fans realized. To one Dallas sportswriter it proved that "the Cowboys are at least alive, if not entirely well." The players felt that it demonstrated the determination and mental toughness necessary to win the playoff games. "We've been through most every situation," said Pettis Norman. "Now I honestly believe this team can handle anything it faces. I just wish the season started tomorrow."

The mood of the 1969 Cowboy team could be described as

one of grim determination. Admittedly a stronger and more mature team than ever, they had yet to prove they could win the critical playoff games. Off-season publicity focused on how talent-rich and mature the Cowboys were. Special stories highlighted the expected duels for starting positions between veteran players such as Dan Reeves and Craig Baynham at halfback, Malcolm Walker and Dave Manders at center, and Pettis Norman and Mike Ditka at tight end. But the battle for starting quarterback, expected to be hottest of all, between Don Meredith and Craig Morton did not come off.

Meredith, veteran of nine years, the most loved and hated member of the Cowboys, had had his best year in 1968. He nearly won the title as the NFL's leading passer, losing it in the final game of the regular season. After four years, Morton was a first-class reserve, ready to challenge for the number-one job. The Cowboy coaching staff considered itself ideally situated, with two veteran quarterbacks pushing each other into superior performances. The club thought it was so solid at this position that it had traded Jerry Rhome to the Cleveland Browns and counted on Roger Staubach as a capable third-string backup man. Then in early July, less than a month before the opening of training camp, Don Meredith announced his retirement. One of the most injured players in NFL history, and attracted by growing interests outside football, Meredith, at thirty-one, simply chose not to face another season. His retirement left the Cowboys with sound quarterbacking from Morton and the potentially great rookie, Roger Staubach, but it deprived the team of a seasoned quarterback who was just reaching the age of greatness for most NFL players at his position. Before the shock waves over Meredith had settled, fullback Don Perkins, the other Cowboy nine-year veteran, announced his intention not to play in 1969. Perkins, too, had enjoyed a fine 1968 season. He wanted to quit before his football abilities turned

downhill and to concentrate his efforts on a new career in television and radio. All too suddenly, the Cowboys had a new look for 1969.

Preseason play began against Los Angeles in a game billed as a likely preview of the NFL title game scheduled for January 4, 1970. The Rams defeated the Cowboys 24–17, but it was, after all, a game that proved nothing. Dallas then won four consecutive exhibition contests, including a 31–13 romp over their old tormentors, the Green Bay Packers. In the fourth victory, a 25–9 win over the World Champion New York Jets (minus Joe Namath), the injury jinx that was to haunt the Cowboys all through the 1969 season hit with a vengeance. Bob Hayes, hustling for a pass in pregame warmups, fell and suffered a shoulder separation. In the game itself, Craig Morton dislocated the index finger of his throwing hand when he banged the helmet of a Jet defensive lineman. There was time for the injuries of Hayes and Morton to heal, but the unfortunate pattern was already established. After a final preseason loss to the Baltimore Colts, the Cowboys prepared to open their tenth season against the St. Louis Cardinals.

The Cowboys quickly established the fact that the playoff loss in 1968 and the retirement of Meredith and Perkins would not offset their status as a winner in the NFL. Calvin Hill blossomed into a superstar, Walt Garrison proved a fine replacement for Perkins at fullback, and the entire team performed well in the early going. Even with rookie quarterback Roger Staubach at the helm, they defeated St. Louis convincingly (24–3) in the opening game, and Morton returned for the second game of the season against New Orleans. He remained healthy, however, for only two weeks, during which the Cowboys defeated the Saints and the Philadelphia Eagles. In the season's fourth game, a 24–17 victory over Atlanta, Morton received a slight shoulder separation. He continued to play for the rest of the season, but

pain in his index finger and shoulder often reduced his effectiveness. Regardless of Morton's injury problems, the Cowboys rolled over the relatively weak Eagles and Giants to stand at six wins and no losses. The season entered its seventh week, and the Cowboys paid a visit to Cleveland, where the Browns ruined their perfect record to the tune of 42–10. Dallas fans grew alarmed, and the Cowboys, it appeared, had flunked their first big test of 1969. Landry considered the fiasco with the Browns so detrimental to his team's morale that he never used the game film for instructional purposes. But he also realistically pointed out that one loss hardly cost Dallas its chance at the title. "What I think we'll all do," he said, "is put it in the back of our minds until December."

The Cowboys bounced back to defeat New Orleans again and Washington before returning to Los Angeles for a rematch with the Rams. Playing without injured regulars Calvin Hill, Ralph Neely, and Jethro Pugh, they came within one point, 24–23, of beating the then-undefeated Rams. It was a defeat with bright spots—spots that were quickly tarnished by a 24–24 tie with San Francisco and a narrow (10–7) victory over the Pittsburgh Steelers. The Steeler game clinched the Capitol Division title for a third consecutive year, but the Cowboys' performance against a club that had won only one game all year was far from heartening. Landry experimented with new player combinations in the defensive secondary as the season ended with victories over the Colts and Redskins. The over-all won-lost record was 11–2–1, an especially fine performance in view of the fact that virtually every Cowboy starter had been injured at some time during the season.

"The difference between this time and last time is that I'm nervous, afraid and scared about the whole thing." Craig Morton's comment on the Cowboys' third consecutive Eastern Conference playoff with the Cleveland Browns pretty well summarized the feelings of the whole squad before the December 28 contest. Everyone agreed Dallas was ready, but on a day of rain and cold in the Cotton Bowl the Browns continued their hex on the Cowboys. Dallas kicked off and stopped Cleveland without giving up a first down. Forced to punt, Don Cockroft got off a short kick, but it bounced off Rayfield Wright and was recovered by Cleveland at the Dallas thirty-four-yard line. It seemed to be all the Cowboy players and fans needed to destroy their confidence. Trailing by one touchdown, but still in the first quarter, Cornell Green intercepted a Bill Nelsen pass deep in Brown territory. The interception did not stand, however, because of a pass interference call against rookie Otto Brown. The Cowboy defense played reasonably well for about three quarters, but the offense never kept the ball long enough to relieve the pressure of the Browns' attack. The final result was a 38–14 debacle which left the entire Cowboy organization shaken and dejected. There was nothing to do for the moment, of course, except head for Miami to keep a date with the Los Angeles Rams, not in the NFL title game as so many had predicted, but in the Playoff Bowl. The Cowboys showed absolutely nothing of the attitude so prevalent in Miami the year before—they appeared totally deflated as a team. Accordingly, Los Angeles humiliated them by a score of 31–0. Only once before in the ten-year history of the team, and that in a preseason game in 1965, had the Cowboys been shut out. The playoff defeat, ironically, came on the tenth anniversary of Dallas' NFL franchise.

The total collapse at the end of the 1969 season raised one major and very obvious question—what was wrong with the Dallas Cowboys? As the Cowboy organization looks forward to 1970, it must find an answer to that question, but it should also look back into the 1960's and take note of how many things are right with the Cowboys. Their four-year record since 1966 stood at 42–12–2. No NFL team was a more consistent winner

in those years, nor had any other NFL club won either its division or conference championship in each year of that period. Fans in many NFL cities would have been pleased indeed to cheer such a consistent winner. The disappointment in Dallas over losing the final games was entirely understandable, but no one could deny that Murchison, Schramm, Landry, Brandt, and their staffs had built a competitively successful team.

The Cowboy organization also continued as a popular and financial success once it turned the corner in 1965–66. Average attendance at home games remained well above 60,000 in 1967, 1968, and 1969. Season ticket sales jumped from 15,492 in 1966 to 30,000 in 1967 and then leveled off somewhat to 31,500 in 1968 and 32,000 in 1969. The Cowboys were building the solid support Tom Landry expected to come only after years of being a winner. The club's financial balance sheet for 1967 and 1968 showed the impact of their position as the premier sports attraction in Dallas and the continuing popularity of professional football nationwide. Gate revenue in 1967 increased nearly $100,000 from 1966 levels to a total of $2,379,604; television and radio rights brought in an additional $1,310,552; and income from programs, concessions, and NFL Films—NFL Properties added $134,119. Operating costs increased too, most notably in the area of the scouting system and salaries plus bonuses for players, coaches, and management. Expenses in this area jumped from $1,716,115 in 1966 to $2,030,700 in 1967, primarily because winning the Eastern Conference championship in 1966 earned increases in salaries for coaches and players. The organization nevertheless had its best year financially in 1967 with a profit of slightly more than $1,300,000.

In 1968 gate revenue rose more than $200,000 to $2,597,366, and the Cowboys received approximately $150,000 as their share from the proceeds of the Super Bowl, Playoff Bowl, and Pro Bowl. But other sources of income remained relatively



Lee Roy Jordan steals a Forty-Niner pass

Cowboys' defense stops Browns' Leroy Kelly (1969 Playoff)

Cowboys' defense doesn't stop Leroy Kelly (1969 Playoff)

Calvin Hill works out at Cowboys' training camp, Thousand Oaks, California

Hill, 1969 Rookie of the Year, tries the Exergenie Program

Cowboy management tries the "Landry Mile"



Dallas Cowboys, 1969



Cowboys' practice field in Dallas



Locker room at the practice field

Weight room at the practice field

October 15, 1967—Rain drenches Cowboy fans in Texas

Raindrops fall on All-Pro Bob Lilly

December 31, 1967—Cold numbs Green Bay fans in Wisconsin

Ralph Neely protects Don Meredith in frozen Green Bay



Duane Thomas, number-one draft choice in 1970



Bob Asher, number-two draft choice in 1970



Denton Fox, one of the third-round draft choices in 1970



Charlie Waters, one of the third-round draft choices in 1970

The Cotton Bowl

Planning for the future—(l. to r.) Mayor Bob Power of Irving, Texas; Texas Stadium General Manager Bert Rose; and Tex Schramm at the site of Texas Stadium



Texas Stadium, home of the Cowboys in 1971

stable. At the same time, the costs of scouting and salaries plus bonuses increased by more than $300,000 to $2,393,875, and other expenses rose noticeably. Office expenses, for example, moved upward from $251,953 in 1967 to $321,976, and travel expenses reached an all-time high of $136,981. The club also faced heavy costs in developing the Texas Stadium plan and a huge tax bite because earlier losses had been written off from 1965 through 1967. The result was a greatly reduced profit of $583,000. Inflation was the story of the American economy in 1969, and the Cowboys' financial balance sheet naturally reflected rising costs and prices. Office expenses mounted to $383,335.78, and the costs of salaries, bonuses, and the scouting system increased to $2,345,789.75. Income from most sources, including television and radio, NFL Properties—NFL Films, programs, concessions, and the Cowboys' share from such events as the Super Bowl, remained fairly stable. But the gate revenue, under the impetus of excellent attendance throughout the fall, especially at preseason and playoff games, jumped sharply to $3,371,851.16. The result was a net income of approximately $675,000, a gain of almost $100,000 over 1968.

The Dallas Cowboys closed their first decade as winners in every area except the playoff games. Obviously much was right with their organization, but the season-end collapses of 1968 and 1969 required an agonizing reappraisal of what might be wrong with the club.

THE 1970'S: DECADE OF THE COWBOYS?

As the decade of the 1970's opened, professional football stood firmly established as the national spectator sport of the United States. Baseball struggled with several weak franchises, basketball faced a potentially ruinous struggle between the National and the American Basketball Associations, but football looked to a future bright with apparently unlimited prospects. Virtually every team in the NFL and AFL enjoyed a financially successful year in 1969, and they anticipate even more success in the years to come. The merger agreement of 1966 became final in 1969–70, eliminating the possibility of potentially ruinous competition between the two leagues. Beginning in 1970, the unified National Football League will have all the controls necessary to maintain the relative competitive equality of its twenty-six clubs. There were some weak teams and stadium problems, but no other major professional sports league could boast of such uniform stability among its franchise holders.

It was no simple task to bring the merger to completion and insure the future of professional football. Meetings to deal with questions such as the payment of money under the original agreement were held regularly from 1966 to 1969, but the thorniest problem of all—future alignment of the two leagues—remained to be settled in 1969–70. A joint committee composed of Tex Schramm and Lamar Hunt, the two principals in the first merger negotiations, joined by Dan Reeves of the Los Angeles

Rams, Carroll Rosenbloom of the Baltimore Colts, Billy Sullivan of the Boston Patriots, and Ralph Wilson of the Buffalo Bills studied the matter at length in 1968 and 1969. After eighteen months of work, they developed a variety of alternative alignment plans with studies of the advantages and disadvantages of each. The results of the alignment studies were presented at a meeting of the owners in Palm Springs, California, in March, 1969. No one seemed to know what to expect; they only knew that something had to be settled quickly so that matters such as scheduling and the negotiation of television contracts for 1970 could go ahead.

The fundamental question facing the owners was whether to maintain the existing alignment with sixteen teams in the NFL and ten in the AFL or to reshuffle completely and create two equal leagues of thirteen teams each. The joint committee agreed that either plan was practical, but it unanimously recommended that the identities of the two leagues be maintained. Although there would be no realignment, there would be interleague games before and during the season. Desire to retain the highly publicized ten-year-old NFL-AFL rivalry was the primary consideration among those who supported the plan. Commissioner Pete Rozelle, who supported it too, pointed out that public opinion favored retention of the two leagues' identities. The stunning victory of the New York Jets in the 1968 Super Bowl demonstrated the improved quality of AFL football, and it promised a competitive rivalry on the field to gladden the hearts and open the billfolds of partisan fans of both leagues. NFL owners generally favored the plan, as did most franchise holders in the AFL, but at least three AFL owners, Paul Brown of Cincinnati, Joseph Robbie of Miami, and Gerald Phipps of Denver, preferred total realignment. Since any plan had to have the approval of eight of the ten AFL owners for adoption, it was clear that the majority would not easily get their way.

Paul Brown, the leader in insisting on total realignment, had experienced a merger once before in 1950 as coach of the Cleveland Browns of the All-America Football Conference. The A-AFC had, of course, little choice about losing its identity in 1950, but Brown insisted that the AFL should abandon the status quo in 1970 for its own good. His argument centered on two reasons for altering the 16–10 imbalance favored by the majority plan. First, he said, the NFL would automatically acquire more star players each year. Mathematically this would not create stronger NFL teams, since the players would be divided among sixteen rather than ten teams, but it would mean greater strength in All-Star games and more national attention for players in the NFL. Second, he pointed out that NFL franchises, by a 2–1 margin, were in major cities. This meant financial imbalance from larger attendance in the NFL and richer television contracts for the league with the better home markets. As a result, franchises in the NFL would be worth much more than those in the AFL. Competitively and financially, Brown argued, the AFL needed total realignment. "I'm happy we did well in the Super Bowl," he said, "but you can't base your entire structure of the leagues and the future of pro football on one football game." "We can't," he told his AFL colleagues, "permit ourselves to be carried away with sentiment over identities when we're talking about something so vital." Brown's arguments were hard to refute, and he won support from the other AFL owners at Palm Springs. The Joint Committee's suggestion was not accepted, and the whole matter was postponed until another meeting in May.

Brown and the AFL owners objected primarily to the numerical imbalance resulting from a maintenance of the status quo, not to the idea of retaining the identity of the two leagues. The manner in which their objections were removed seems simple in retrospect—add three NFL teams to the AFL to create a 13–13

alignment, thereby maintaining the younger league intact. This plan would remedy most of the inequities feared by Brown, while only slightly diluting the valuable NFL-AFL rivalry. It took over a week of meetings capped by a thirty-six-hour session, however, to reach acceptance of this solution, decide which three NFL teams would move to the other league, and plan the divisions of that league for 1970. On May 10, 1969, the twenty-six club owners agreed that the Cleveland Browns, the Pittsburgh Steelers, and the Baltimore Colts would move to the American Conference of the unified National Football League. Cleveland and Pittsburgh were to play in a division with Houston and Cincinnati, while Baltimore was to join a division with Boston, Buffalo, Miami, and the New York Jets. The third division included Denver, Kansas City, Oakland, and San Diego. Cleveland and Pittsburgh welcomed Cincinnati to their regional rivalry, and Baltimore was happy to escape the NFL's Coastal Division with Los Angeles and San Francisco. The Colts then joined four other east-coast teams. Even at that, the NFL paid the Browns, the Steelers, and the Colts two to three million dollars each as compensation for moving to the American Conference.

Under the complicated playoff scheme necessitated by three divisions, the three divisional winners and the team with the best record among the non-winners would meet in a playoff to determine the American Conference championship. The agreement left most of the club owners happy. The AFL gave up its identity, but it obtained three NFL franchises worth a minimum of fifteen million dollars each, and in the Browns and the Colts the younger league acquired the 1968 Eastern and Western Conference champions of the NFL. Both teams packed huge stadiums for every home game. The completed merger thus was far from a defeat for the AFL, but there was nothing in it to make the NFL unhappy either.

For a few hours in Dallas on the night of May 10, many Cowboy fans feared that the ghost of the Dallas Texans had gained wrathful revenge at last. A reporter in New York, undoubtedly as weary as the owners after the lengthy meeting, gave out the story that Dallas, rather than Baltimore, was making the switch to the AFL. Television and radio picked up the story, and telephones were soon ringing at every sports news reporting agency in Dallas. "Well, if I find out it's true," said one irate caller, "I'm getting a lawyer first thing Monday morning and sue [*sic*] Clint Murchison for the money I've spent on those lousy Texas Stadium bonds." Actually the Cowboys had never seriously considered moving to the AFL, primarily because they had begun Texas Stadium with the understanding that they would remain in the NFL. According to Tex Schramm, the Texas Stadium commitment was a major reason Dallas did not consider moving to the American Conference. Within a short time he expected one conference to be as attractive as the other.

Commissioner Pete Rozelle and the owners of professional football clubs breathed a collective sigh of relief at the realignment settlement. But Rozelle and the thirteen franchise holders of the National Conference, as the old National Football League was to be called, were not yet through with all their difficulties. They had to realign that thirteen-team conference into three divisions also, and the job proved more difficult than the settlements already made. Many considerations such as home-and-home scheduling, traditional rivalries, geography, weather, population of member cities, and television market potential all entered into the decision. The Central Division of Green Bay, Chicago, Detroit, and Minnesota, for example, desperately wanted a warm-weather club. The thirteen National Conference teams met in May, 1969, and again in June without reaching agreement. Rozelle continued to talk with individual owners and

small groups, but at the end of the year there was no plan acceptable to all. While disagreement involved a variety of considerations, what each team wanted above all was a division they could win.

Nobody really wanted a strong team like the Cowboys. Dallas, despite warm weather, a huge stadium, and large home attendance, found that the other NFL clubs wanted no team in their divisions with a won-lost record like the Cowboys'. Tex Schramm wished to retain rivalries with Washington, Philadelphia, the New York Giants, and St. Louis, clubs that were not exactly the powers of pro football in the late sixties. He was, however, quite willing to see Dallas go into a division with Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New Orleans. Alignment with the two west-coast teams and New Orleans would give the Cowboys a natural rival in the Saints and all warm-weather opponents with good stadiums.

The showdown meeting on realignment of the National Conference came in January, 1970. It threatened to drag on endlessly until Commissioner Rozelle forced the owners into a marathon session which ended in a lottery to settle the question. Five different plans, arranged so that no more than two of them would be objectionable to any single team, were placed in a glass vase, and Rozelle's secretary drew one. She drew plan three, and eight months of disagreement were ended in seconds. Plan three left the delighted Cowboys in a division with their old rivals—Washington, New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis. Dallas received what it had wanted from the beginning. When it was considered, for example, that plan five would have placed Dallas with Green Bay, Chicago, and St. Louis, the Cowboys could count themselves lucky indeed. Some Cowboy fans and players expressed concern that the relatively weak competition in their division would not prepare them for the kind of performance necessary to win playoff games, but most observers

agreed that any professional football team is capable of becoming a power in a relatively short time. The general reaction was a realistic one—the Cowboys' competition may look like a relatively soft touch at the moment, but it is best to be in a division you can win and later worry about any potentially bad effects of weak opposition.

As the realignment of 1969–70 was completed, some sportswriters posed the question of who had ultimately won the war between the NFL and the AFL. Few people cared about an answer by 1970, for in reality the most obvious winner was professional football itself. The new twenty-six-team National Football League had peace, prosperity, and a bright future in 1970. It also had the good fortune to have the continued services of the man who had done as much or more than any individual to bring it into such a favorable position, Commissioner Pete Rozelle.

Rozelle had quietly masterminded the NFL through its great financial advances in the sixties and had played a critical role in the merger. His success, for example, in securing legislation necessary to legalize the league-package television contract and the merger agreement is a remarkable accomplishment in itself. Relying on persuasive rather than dictatorial methods, he easily became the strongest and most successful commissioner in major sports during the 1960's. Rozelle did not hesitate to suspend star halfback Paul Hornung of Green Bay and tackle Alex Karras of Detroit for a year when they violated NFL prohibitions against betting. Nor did he retreat in 1969 from ordering "Super Joe" Namath to sell his interest in a New York nightclub, a reported hangout for gamblers and underworld characters. Willingness to use his power has not made "Czar" Rozelle popular with everyone in professional football, but there is general agreement that his leadership and concern for the image of the game are essential to its continued success. Early in 1970,

Rozelle attended ceremonies in Kansas City honoring the Chiefs as Super Bowl champions. He forecast future expansion of the NFL to thirty-two teams, and he predicted an international flavor for the game with franchises in Mexico and Canada.

Completion of the merger generally removed the threat of controversies and legal actions rising among the various teams. The focus of attention in 1970 has shifted from the monopolistic nature of the National Football League. Although the future probably holds some type of antitrust challenge aimed at proving that the college-player draft and the option clause are illegal restraints of business competition by the league, the NFL, says Tex Schramm, would obviously resist such a challenge to the legal limit and then, if defeated, appeal to Congress for relief. When the record of the 1960's is examined, especially the legislation to exempt the league-package television contract and the merger from the antitrust laws, there is every reason to expect Congress to continue to recognize that controlled competition is an essential aspect of professional football.

Realignment opened new opportunities for the unified NFL in the negotiation of television contracts. CBS paid twenty million dollars for the NFL in 1969, while NBC gave nine million dollars for rights to AFL games. The movement of Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore, however, shifted at least 2,800,000 television homes in the areas of dominant influence of those three markets to the American Conference. Obviously, NBC would have to pay more to keep American Conference games while CBS could offer less to televise National Conference contests. Commissioner Rozelle set out to obtain approximately forty million dollars per year from television networks in the early 1970's. He exceeded that goal. First, ABC signed a three-year contract to telecast thirteen Monday night games for an estimated eight and one-half million dollars per year. Then in early 1970, NBC and CBS signed agreements promising an

estimated thirty-two and one-half million dollars per year for 1970 through 1973. These contracts included three preseason games, one Thanksgiving Day game, two Saturday games in December, and the divisional playoffs and conference championships as well as a full fourteen-week Sunday schedule for each network. CBS will offer an additional doubleheader game on eight Sundays beginning in October. The Super Bowl and All-Star games are to alternate between the two networks each year so that each will have one top attraction every season.

The rich new contracts, especially the Monday night plan of ABC, raises the question of overexposure. Does the American television-viewing public really want professional football rather than the more usual entertainment on a weeknight? Surveys conducted by the league indicated that they do. The definitive answer will not be available, of course, until the fall of 1970. In the meantime, if an opinion survey by the *Dallas Morning News* can be taken as representative, reactions are quite mixed. Women generally are not pleased at the prospect of remaining television-football widows for yet another day of the week, but most men have reacted favorably to the idea of Monday night professional football. As one Dallasite put it: "I can't speak for all men, but I control the dial on my TV. I'm gonna watch football." Perhaps those with less control over their sets but more money will become two-television families in the fall of 1970. Football on television has become a part of the American way of life, and the odds are that it will succeed on Monday night too.

Overexposure appears to pose a mild threat at worst to the future of the NFL; the possibilities of injury from bargaining agents and player unionism likewise seem slight. Few veteran players seem inclined to use agents to negotiate their contracts, and rookies are generally more anxious to make the team than haggle over their salary. On the other hand, as Tex Schramm

and Gil Brandt point out, no franchise can afford to treat its team unfairly in financial matters. Few teams win with players really dissatisfied with their management. Unionism has little support from players as an agent for collective bargaining except in the area of fringe benefits and retirement plans. It seems doubtful that player unions will push the owners too hard in that area. Undoubtedly club owners will suffer from rising costs in areas such as scouting, equipment, and so on, but the increase in revenue from television and live attendance promises to match rising costs. Franchise holders will have to remember that professional football has never been a way to get the best return on a capital investment or they will run the risk of over-commercialization. One doubts that the businessmen-sportsmen of the NFL will ever become more interested in capital gains than in the sport. In short, the few clouds on the horizon of professional football do not even suggest a storm in the future.

The Dallas Cowboys, having played a major role in the rise of professional football in the 1960's, naturally look forward to sharing in the bright future of the 1970's. Murchison's club sported an outstanding record of competitive and financial success in the late sixties. It expects to move to a superior new sports facility, Texas Stadium in Irving, in 1971 without sacrificing any of the benefits of being Dallas' team. Indeed, the performance of the Cowboys' off-the-field organization and their teams on the field has led to some talk of a pro football dynasty in Dallas, but the NFL's controls on competition defy the creation of a team capable of dominating the league year after year. Yet neither is there reason at the beginning of the 1970's to expect the Cowboy organization to falter seriously. Everything—Murchison's backing, the management, the coaching, the scouting system, and the playing personnel—seems prepared to maintain the club's position as a big winner indefinitely.

The attention of Cowboy fans and pro football fans in general

did not focus, however, on the club's strength and success at the end of 1969. Instead, there was much analysis of the Cowboys' glaring collapses in the 1968 and 1969 playoffs. The irony of seeing the Cowboys lose 31–0 to the Los Angeles Rams in the 1969 NFL Playoff Bowl while the Kansas City Chiefs demolished the Minnesota Vikings in the Super Bowl was almost too much for Dallasites. It gave Jimmy the Greek, the Las Vegas odds-maker who won the Dallas Bonehead Club's 1969 trophy for picking the Colts to beat the Jets in the Super Bowl, a chance to repay the honor. He attended the 1970 Bonehead Club awards ceremony and presented a trophy of his own inscribed: "Presented to the Dallas Bonehead Club by Jimmy (the Greek) Snyder for kicking the wrong team out of Dallas."

Some fans and sportswriters knew how he felt. Why, they asked, can't the Cowboys win the "big ones"? Is something seriously wrong with the Dallas organization and its team? Those questions are unfair, since the Cowboys have won big ones, if not the biggest one, in the past and have been in the playoffs for four consecutive years, a record that is unmatched in that period; yet they continue to be asked.

It is possible to argue that the Cowboys simply have not had championship-caliber players at all the critical positions on their team. At quarterback, for example, Don Meredith retired just as he reached the age of most truly great quarterbacks. Three of the four Super Bowl–winning teams have been quarterbacked by men older than Meredith was at the time of his retirement. Craig Morton became a regular only in 1969. Few professional teams with quarterbacks playing their first full year as regulars post winning records, much less get to the playoffs. A more glaring weakness existed in 1969 in the Cowboys' defensive secondary when opponents completed 235 of 458 pass attempts (51.3 per cent) for 3,109 yards and twenty-three touchdowns. The Cowboys' own passing attack had a slightly better record

over-all, but their pass defense made them especially vulnerable to stronger teams. During one five-game stretch in mid-season which included losses to Cleveland and Los Angeles and a tie with San Francisco, the Cowboys allowed 15 touchdown passes. In the Eastern Conference playoff game, Cleveland completed 20 of 29 passes for 247 yards. Some observers considered pass defense alone as the one fatal flaw in the Cowboys' drive for a championship.

Another often-heard explanation of the Cowboys' problems emphasizes the psychological limitations of the team, that the players convince themselves that they cannot win the big games against teams that have beaten them before. The suggestion might be nonsense, but after the first bad break of the 1969 playoff game with Cleveland (the Browns' first punt hit a Cowboy player and Cleveland recovered), fans could almost sense the team's despondent feeling. It is also possible, of course, that the fans felt that way first and communicated it to the team. Some critics also hold the idea that Cowboy players, with a few exceptions, are not mean or hungry enough for victory. The most recent Cleveland Brown criticism, this one from defensive end Jack Gregory after the 1969 playoff, summarizes that suggestion. "With all their talent," he said, "if you come out and stick it to Dallas early, something happens. If you come out fired up and attack them, it seems like they don't want to get it." The Cowboys admittedly do not play a mean brand of football. Meanness alone is obviously not enough (witness the Chicago Bears and New Orleans Saints of 1969), but there are many sportswriters, fans, and even players from other teams who think the Cowboys are too much the "nice guys" in a mean man's game. A few go further and add the suggestion that some Dallas players do not have the desire and dedication to give 100 per cent effort at all times.

These explanations of the Cowboys' failures plainly put much

of the blame on the players, but part of the fault-finding extends into the Cowboy organization. In the college-player draft, for example, Schramm, Landry, and Brandt have usually followed the philosophy of choosing the best athlete available, regardless of position. Other teams such as the Kansas City Chiefs draft to fill positions in which they need help. Critics wonder if the Cowboys should not have gone for a defensive back on their first pick in the 1970 draft instead of choosing another running back. Dallas did, of course, draft five defensive backs in 1970 in spite of its feeling that there is no percentage in using high choices for a position so difficult to fill. Head coach Tom Landry comes in for a share of the blame for his team's lack of meanness and fire. Landry, the man with perfect emotional control, does not attempt to be a fiery, inspirational leader; it is not his style. He remains analytical and professional in his approach. It should not be surprising that the Cowboys lack meanness, for Landry is known to emphasize finesse over the physical in football. Landry's personality and personal approach to the game necessarily affect his team, but whether or not those factors play a role in their failure to win the important games is largely a matter of speculation.

Landry's coaching system usually receives more attention than his personal approach in the search for explanations of Cowboy losses. Some insist that the multiple-formation, big-play offense, in spite of the fact that it ranked number one in the league in 1969, is too complicated to be effective and point to the victories of the Packers in the mid-sixties as proof. Even the 1969 Super Bowl victory of the Chiefs, a multiple-offense team, did not entirely still that complaint. These same critics think that emphasis on the big play makes the Cowboys a fair-weather team that is automatically in trouble in rain, mud, snow, or cold. Significantly, after the 1969 season many of Landry's players hotly rejected any suggestion that his system was their problem.

Walt Garrison pointed out that "Tom's system and his coaching brought the Cowboys from absolutely nothing to a winner. . . . I just don't see how anybody can knock the man or his system." Mike Ditka, who had experience with a World Champion Chicago Bears team and the Philadelphia Eagles, stated bluntly, "This is the best system I've ever seen." Hank Stram of the Chiefs, the only other head coach in football to remain with the same club ten years, offered a properly reflective rebuttal to Landry's critics. "Landry has a winning football team," Stram said, "and he's one of the best coaches in the business. Their day will come." Clint Murchison agreed. "No one has mentioned any unhappiness with Tom to me," he said, "and I suggest that they not."

The Cowboy organization and its critics are well advised to look for causes of the team's collapses that can be corrected, but there remains one important explanation—fate or luck—about which nothing can be done. Pettis Norman compared the playoffs to shooting dice: "I've seen somebody hit seven, five or six times and then seen the same guy roll and crap out five of six times." Most football experts agree that luck can be decisive in any single game, although they think it tends to balance out during the course of a season. The suggestion is not meant as a rationalization or consolation, but perhaps the Cowboys have just been unlucky in several critical games. In 1969, for example, they went into the championship game with Cleveland after an unbelievable run of injuries left such key personnel as Craig Morton, Calvin Hill, Mike Gaechter, and others at less than full speed. The game's first big break went against them, and they never recovered. In comparison, the Kansas City Chiefs finished second in the AFL's Western Conference and got into the playoffs only through an unusual one-year system that put the top two finishers in each conference into postseason contests. They narrowly defeated Oakland, benefiting from an

injury to the Raiders' quarterback Daryl Lamonica, and suddenly they had an opportunity to win the Super Bowl. The Chiefs are a fine football team, and it does not detract from them to point out that luck was on their side in 1969. No one should attempt to explain the Cowboys' losses in terms of only bad luck, but the amount of chance involved in a one-shot playoff system cannot be ignored.

The Dallas organization realizes that even with basically the same personnel it is difficult, if not impossible, to stand still near the top. Will the Cowboys go up or down in 1970? Obviously they intend to move up. A thorough re-evaluation has been initiated with the idea of sorting out and solving the team's difficulties. But new self-study and renewed vows of determination might become a problem in themselves. "Dallas has been the most consistent team in the NFL the last four years. . . ," says quarterback Fran Tarkenton of the rival New York Giants, "so I hope they start questioning themselves. It might help us, leaving that doubt in their minds." Given their circumstances and the nature of professional football, the Cowboys could wind up next season with anything from the World Championship to a record mediocre enough to lose them their divisional title. It seems certain that with the exception of a crash program to improve the defensive secondary they will rise or fall with the same organization and essentially the same system that took them so close to the top from 1966 through 1969.

Clint Murchison, Jr., the most important fan in Dallas as far as the Cowboys are concerned, agrees wholeheartedly that no fundamental changes have to be made for 1970. Pointing to their rapid rise to the top in all categories of the sport-business of professional football, he said, "There's no question but that this team is just reaching its prime. I have absolute, complete, unequivocal confidence that next season will be better than this season." Dallas fans were unhappy after the 1969 playoff col-

lapse, Murchison admitted, but he quite correctly expected them to get over it in a short time. Neither the Cowboys nor their Texas Stadium project would really suffer because their first ten years ended on a sour note. "I'm looking forward to the 1970's," he said, "the decade of the Cowboys."

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

1. National Football League Standings, 1960–69

1960

Eastern Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Philadelphia	10	2	0	.833	321	246
Cleveland	8	3	1	.727	362	217
New York	6	4	2	.600	271	261
St. Louis	6	5	1	.545	288	230
Pittsburgh	5	6	1	.454	240	275
Washington	1	9	2	.100	178	309

Western Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Green Bay	8	4	0	.666	332	209
Detroit	7	5	0	.583	239	212
San Francisco	7	5	0	.583	208	205
Baltimore	6	6	0	.500	288	234
Chicago	5	6	1	.454	194	299
Los Angeles	4	7	1	.363	265	297
Dallas	0	11	1	.000	177	369

Philadelphia defeated Green Bay, 17–13.

1961

Eastern Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
New York	10	3	1	.769	368	220
Philadelphia	10	4	0	.714	361	297
Cleveland	8	5	1	.615	319	270
St. Louis	7	7	0	.500	279	267
Pittsburgh	6	8	0	.429	295	287
Dallas	4	9	1	.308	236	380
Washington	1	12	1	.077	174	392

Western Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Green Bay	11	3	0	.786	391	223
Detroit	8	5	1	.615	270	258
Baltimore	8	6	0	.571	302	307
Chicago	8	6	0	.571	326	302
San Francisco	7	6	1	.538	346	272
Los Angeles	4	10	0	.286	263	333
Minnesota	3	11	0	.214	285	407

Green Bay defeated New York, 37–0.

1962

Eastern Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
New York	12	2	0	.857	398	283
Pittsburgh	9	5	0	.643	312	363
Cleveland	7	6	1	.538	291	257
Washington	5	7	2	.417	305	376
Dallas	5	8	1	.385	398	402
St. Louis	4	9	1	.308	287	361
Philadelphia	3	10	1	.231	282	356

Western Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Green Bay	13	1	0	.929	415	148
Detroit	11	3	0	.786	315	177
Chicago	9	5	0	.643	321	207
Baltimore	7	7	0	.500	293	288
San Francisco	6	8	0	.429	282	331
Minnesota	2	11	1	.154	254	410
Los Angeles	1	12	1	.077	220	334

Green Bay defeated New York, 16–7.

1963

Eastern Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
New York	11	3	0	.786	448	280
Cleveland	10	4	0	.714	343	262

Western Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Chicago	11	1	2	.917	301	144
Green Bay	11	2	1	.846	369	206

St. Louis	9	5	0	.643	341	283
Pittsburgh	7	4	3	.636	321	295
Dallas	4	10	0	.286	305	378
Washington	3	11	0	.214	279	398
Philadelphia	2	10	2	.167	242	381

Baltimore	8	6	0	.571	316	285
Detroit	5	8	1	.385	326	265
Minnesota	5	8	1	.385	309	390
Los Angeles	5	9	0	.357	210	350
San Francisco	2	12	0	.143	198	391

Chicago defeated New York, 14–10.

1964

Eastern Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Cleveland	10	3	1	.769	415	293
St. Louis	9	3	2	.750	357	331
Philadelphia	6	8	0	.429	312	313
Washington	6	8	0	.429	307	305
Dallas	5	8	1	.385	250	289
Pittsburgh	5	9	0	.357	253	315
New York	2	10	2	.167	241	399

Western Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Baltimore	12	2	0	.857	428	225
Green Bay	8	5	1	.615	342	245
Minnesota	8	5	1	.615	355	296
Detroit	7	5	2	.583	280	260
Los Angeles	5	7	2	.417	283	339
Chicago	5	9	0	.357	260	379
San Francisco	4	10	0	.286	236	330

Cleveland defeated Baltimore, 27–0.

1965

Eastern Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Cleveland	11	3	0	.786	363	325
Dallas	7	7	0	.500	325	280
New York	7	7	0	.500	270	338
Washington	6	8	0	.429	257	301
Philadelphia	5	9	0	.357	363	359
St. Louis	5	9	0	.357	296	309
Pittsburgh	2	12	0	.143	202	397

Western Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Green Bay	10	3	1	.769	316	224
Baltimore	10	3	1	.769	389	284
Chicago	9	5	0	.643	409	275
San Francisco	7	6	1	.538	421	402
Minnesota	7	7	0	.500	383	403
Detroit	6	7	1	.462	257	295
Los Angeles	4	10	0	.286	269	328

Green Bay defeated Baltimore, 13–10, in conference playoff. (Sudden Death—13.39.)
Green Bay defeated Cleveland, 23–12.

1966

Eastern Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Dallas	10	3	1	.769	445	239
Cleveland	9	5	0	.643	403	259
Philadelphia	9	5	0	.643	326	340
St. Louis	8	5	1	.615	264	265
Washington	7	7	0	.500	351	355
Pittsburgh	5	8	1	.385	316	347
Atlanta	3	11	0	.214	204	437
New York	1	12	1	.077	263	501

Western Conference	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Green Bay	12	2	0	.857	335	163
Baltimore	9	5	0	.643	314	226
Los Angeles	8	6	0	.571	289	212
San Francisco	6	6	2	.500	320	325
Chicago	5	7	2	.417	234	272
Detroit	4	9	1	.308	206	317
Minnesota	4	9	1	.308	292	304

Green Bay defeated Dallas, 34–27, for NFL Championship.
Green Bay defeated Kansas City, 35–10, in first AFL-NFL game.

1967

Eastern Conference

Capitol Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Dallas	9	5	0	.643	342	268
Philadelphia	6	7	1	.462	351	409
Washington	5	6	3	.455	347	353
New Orleans	3	11	0	.214	233	379

Century Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Cleveland	9	5	0	.643	334	297
New York	7	7	0	.500	369	379
St. Louis	6	7	1	.462	333	356
Pittsburgh	4	9	1	.308	281	320

Dallas won Eastern Conference championship, 52–14, over Cleveland.

Western Conference

Coastal Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Los Angeles	11	1	2	.917	398	196
Baltimore	11	1	2	.917	394	198
San Francisco	7	7	0	.500	273	337
Atlanta	1	12	1	.077	175	422

Central Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Green Bay	9	4	1	.692	332	209
Chicago	7	6	1	.538	239	218
Detroit	5	7	2	.417	260	259
Minnesota	3	8	3	.273	233	294

Green Bay won Western Conference championship, 28–7, over Los Angeles.
Green Bay defeated Dallas, 21–17, for NFL Championship.
Green Bay defeated Oakland, 33–14, in AFL-NFL game.

1968

Eastern Conference

Capitol Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Dallas	12	2	0	.857	431	186
New York	7	7	0	.500	294	325
Washington	5	9	0	.357	249	358
Philadelphia	2	12	0	.143	202	351

Century Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Cleveland	10	4	0	.714	394	278
St. Louis	9	4	1	.692	325	289
New Orleans	4	9	1	.308	246	327
Pittsburgh	2	11	1	.154	244	397

Cleveland won Eastern Conference championship, 31–20, over Dallas.

Western Conference

Coastal Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Baltimore	13	1	0	.929	402	144
Los Angeles	10	3	1	.769	312	200
San Francisco	7	6	1	.538	303	310
Atlanta	2	12	0	.143	170	389

Central Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Minnesota	8	6	0	.571	282	242
Chicago	7	7	0	.500	250	333
Green Bay	6	7	1	.462	281	227
Detroit	4	8	2	.333	207	241

Baltimore won Western Conference championship, 24–14, over Minnesota.
Baltimore defeated Cleveland, 34–0, for NFL Championship.
New York Jets defeated Baltimore, 16–7, in AFL-NFL game.

1969

Eastern Conference

Capitol Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Dallas	11	2	1	.846	369	223
Washington	7	5	2	.583	307	319
New Orleans	5	9	0	.357	311	393
Philadelphia	4	9	1	.308	279	377

Century Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Cleveland	10	3	1	.739	351	300
New York	6	8	0	.429	264	298
St. Louis	4	9	1	.308	314	389
Pittsburgh	1	13	0	.071	318	404

Western Conference

Coastal Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Los Angeles	11	3	0	.785	320	243
Baltimore	8	5	1	.615	279	268
Atlanta	6	8	0	.429	276	268
San Francisco	4	8	2	.333	277	319

Central Division	W	L	T	Pct.	Pts.	OP
Minnesota	12	2	0	.857	379	133
Detroit	9	4	1	.692	259	188
Green Bay	8	6	0	.571	269	221
Chicago	1	13	0	.071	210	339

Minnesota won Western Conference championship, 23–20, over Los Angeles.
Minnesota defeated Cleveland, 27–7, for NFL Championship.
Kansas City Chiefs defeated Minnesota, 23–7, in AFL-NFL game.

2. Cowboy All-Time League Play Results

1960

L	*28	Pittsburgh (30,000)	35	
L	*25	Philadelphia (18,500)	27	
L	14	Washington (21,142)	26	
L	* 7	Cleveland (28,500)	48	
L	10	St. Louis (23,128)	12	
L	* 7	Baltimore (25,500)	45	
L	*13	Los Angeles (16,000)	38	
L	7	Green Bay (32,294)	41	
L	*14	San Francisco (10,000)	26	
L	7	Chicago (39,951)	17	
T	31	New York (55,033)	31	
L	14	Detroit (43,272)	23	
	177	W-0, L-11, T-1	369	

1961

W	*27	Pittsburgh (23,500)	24	
W	*21	Minnesota (20,500)	7	
L	7	Cleveland (43,638)	25	
W	28	Minnesota (33,070)	0	
L	*10	New York (41,500)	31	
L	* 7	Philadelphia (25,000)	43	
W	17	New York (60,254)	16	
L	*17	St. Louis (20,500)	31	
L	7	Pittsburgh (17,519)	37	
T	*28	Washington (17,500)	28	
L	13	Philadelphia (60,127)	35	
L	*17	Cleveland (23,500)	38	
L	13	St. Louis (15,384)	31	
L	24	Washington (21,451)	34	
	236	W-4, L-9, T-1	380	

1962

T	*35	Washington (15,730)	35	
L	*28	Pittsburgh (19,478)	30	
W	27	Los Angeles (26,907)	17	
L	10	Cleveland (44,040)	19	
W	*41	Philadelphia (18,645)	19	
W	42	Pittsburgh (23,106)	27	
L	*24	St. Louis (16,027)	28	
W	38	Washington (49,888)	10	
L	*10	New York (45,668)	41	
L	*33	Chicago (12,692)	34	
L	14	Philadelphia (58,070)	28	
W	*45	Cleveland (24,226)	21	
L	20	St. Louis (14,102)	52	
L	31	New York (62,694)	41	
	398	W-5, L-8, T-1	402	

1963

L	* 7	St. Louis (36,432)	34	
L	*24	Cleveland (28,710)	41	
L	17	Washington (40,101)	21	
L	21	Philadelphia (60,671)	24	
W	*17	Detroit (27,264)	14	
L	21	New York (62,889)	37	
L	21	Pittsburgh (19,047)	27	
W	*35	Washington (18,838)	20	
L	24	San Francisco (29,563)	31	
W	*27	Philadelphia (23,694)	20	
L	17	Cleveland (55,096)	27	
L	*27	New York (29,653)	34	
L	*19	Pittsburgh (24,136)	24	
W	28	St. Louis (12,695)	24	
	305	W-4, L-10, T-0	378	

*Home games

1964

L	* 6	St. Louis (36,605)	16	
W	*24	Washington (25,158)	18	
L	17	Pittsburgh (35,594)	23	
L	6	Cleveland (72,062)	27	
T	13	New York (33,324)	13	
L	*16	Cleveland (37,456)	20	
W	31	St. Louis (28,253)	13	
W	24	Chicago (47,527)	10	
W	31	New York (63,031)	21	
L	*14	Philadelphia (55,972)	17	
L	16	Washington (49,219)	28	
L	*21	Green Bay (44,975)	45	
L	14	Philadelphia (60,671)	24	
W	*17	Pittsburgh (35,271)	14	
	250	W-5, L-8, T-1	289	

1965

W	*31	New York (59,366)	2	
W	*27	Washington (61,577)	7	
L	13	St. Louis (32,034)	20	
L	*24	Philadelphia (56,249)	35	
L	17	Cleveland (80,451)	23	
L	3	Green Bay (48,311)	13	
L	13	Pittsburgh (37,804)	22	
W	*39	San Francisco (39,677)	31	
W	*24	Pittsburgh (57,293)	17	
L	*17	Cleveland (76,251)	24	
L	31	Washington (50,205)	34	
W	21	Philadelphia (54,714)	19	
W	*27	St. Louis (38,499)	13	
W	38	New York (62,871)	20	
	325	W-7, L-7, T-0	280	

PLAYOFF BOWL GAME (Miami)

L	3	Baltimore (65,569)	35	

1966

W	*52	New York (60,010)	7	
W	*28	Minnesota (64,116)	17	
W	47	Atlanta (56,990)	14	
W	*56	Philadelphia (69,372)	7	
T	*10	St. Louis (50,673)	10	
L	21	Cleveland (84,721)	30	
W	*52	Pittsburgh (58,453)	21	
L	23	Philadelphia (60,658)	24	
W	31	Washington (50,927)	30	
W	20	Pittsburgh (42,185)	7	
W	*26	Cleveland (80,259)	14	
W	*31	St. Louis (76,965)	17	
L	*31	Washington (64,198)	34	
W	17	New York (62,735)	7	
	445	W-10, L-3, T-1	239	

1966 CHAMPIONSHIP GAME (Dallas)

L	27	Green Bay (75,504)	34	

1967

W	21	Cleveland (81,039)	14	
W	*38	New York (66,209)	24	
L	*13	Los Angeles (75,229)	35	
W	17	Washington (50,566)	14	
W	*14	New Orleans (64,128)	10	
W	24	Pittsburgh (39,641)	21	

L	14	Philadelphia (60,740)	21
W	*37	Atlanta (54,751)	7
W	27	New Orleans (83,437)	10
L	*20	Washington (75,538)	27
W	*46	St. Louis (68,787)	21
L	17	Baltimore (60,238)	23
W	*38	Philadelphia (55,834)	17
L	16	San Francisco (27,182)	24
	342	W-9, L-5, T-0	268

1967 EASTERN CHAMPIONSHIP GAME (Dallas)

W	52	Cleveland (70,786)	14

1967 CHAMPIONSHIP GAME (Green Bay)

L	17	Green Bay (50,861)	21

1968

W	*59	Detroit (61,382)	13
W	*28	Cleveland (68,733)	7
W	45	Philadelphia (60,858)	13
W	27	St. Louis (48,296)	10
W	*34	Philadelphia (72,083)	14
W	20	Minnesota (47,644)	7
L	*17	Green Bay (74,604)	28
W	17	New Orleans (84,728)	3
L	*21	New York (72,163)	27
W	44	Washington (50,816)	24
W	34	Chicago (46,667)	3
W	*29	Washington (66,076)	20
W	*28	Pittsburgh (55,069)	7
W	28	New York (62,617)	10
	431	W-12, L-2, T-0	186

1968 EASTERN CHAMPIONSHIP GAME (Cleveland)

L	31	Cleveland (81,497)	20

PLAY-OFF BOWL GAME (Miami)

W	17	Minnesota (22,961)	13

1969

W	*24	St. Louis (62,134)	3
W	21	New Orleans (79,567)	17
W	38	Philadelphia (60,658)	7
W	24	Atlanta (54,833)	17
W	*49	Philadelphia (71,509)	14
W	*25	New York (58,964)	3
L	10	Cleveland (84,850)	42
W	*33	New Orleans (68,282)	17
W	41	Washington (50,474)	28
L	23	Los Angeles (79,105)	24
T	*24	San Francisco (62,348)	24
W	10	Pittsburgh (24,990)	7
W	*27	Baltimore (63,191)	10
W	*20	Washington (56,924)	10
	369	W-11, L-2, T-1	223

1969 EASTERN CHAMPIONSHIP GAME (Dallas)

L	14	Cleveland (69,321)	30

1969 PLAY-OFF BOWL GAME (Miami)

L	0	Los Angeles (31,151)	31

3. Cowboy All-Time Preseason Results

1960 (1-5-0)

10	San Francisco (22,000)	at Seattle	16
13	St. Louis (14,000)	at San Antonio	20
10	Baltimore (40,000)	at Dallas	14
14	New York (10,663)	at Louisville	3
14	Los Angeles (13,500)	at Pendleton	49
23	Green Bay (20,121)	at Minn.	28

1961 (2-3-0)

38	Minnesota (4,954)	at Sioux Falls	13
7	Green Bay (30,000)	at Dallas	30
10	N. Y. (21,500)	at Albuquerque	28
35	Baltimore (19,000)	at Norman	24
10	S. F. (22,130)	at Sacramento	24

1962 (0-5-0)

7	Green Bay (54,500)	at Dallas	31
24	Detroit (77,683)	at Cleveland	35
10	Baltimore (14,000)	at Roanoke	24
7	S. F. (20,000)	at Sacramento	26
26	Minnesota (12,500)	at Atlanta	45

1963 (3-2-0)

17	Los Angeles (70,675)	at L. A.	14
10	Green Bay (53,121)	at Dallas	31
17	Los Angeles (29,349)	at Portland	20
37	S. F. (9,927)	at Bakersfield	24
27	Detroit (51,218)	at New Orleans	17

1964 (1-4-0)

6	Los Angeles (57,450)	at L. A.	17
34	S. F. (24,679)	at Portland	23
16	Los Angeles (30,565)	at Portland	25
3	Green Bay (60,057)	at Dallas	35
6	Chicago (35,000)	at New Orleans	21

1965 (2-3-0)

0	Los Angeles (31,579	at L. A.	9
7	San Francisco (24,837)	at Portland	27
21	Green Bay (67,954)	at Dallas	12
17	Minn. (41,500	at Birmingham	57
34	Chicago (33,525)	at Tulsa	21

1966 (5-0-0)

24	San Francisco (28,899)	at S. F.	13
20	Los Angeles (44,217)	at L. A.	10
21	Green Bay (75,504)	at Dallas	3
20	Detroit (31,250)	at Tulsa	10
28	Minnesota (58,316)	at Dallas	24

1967 (2-3-0)

6	Los Angeles (57,595)	at L. A.	20
30	San Francisco (31,212)	at S. F.	24
3	Green Bay (78,087)	at Dallas	20
30	Houston (53,125)	at Houston	17
7	Baltimore (58,492)	at Dallas	33

1968 (3-3-0)

30	Chicago (14,578)	at Canton	24
16	San Francisco (27,530)	at S. F.	14
42	Los Angeles (64,978)	at L. A.	10
31	Green Bay (72,014)	at Dallas	27
33	Houston (52,289)	at Houston	19
16	Baltimore (69,520)	at Dallas	10

1969 (4-2)

17	Los Angeles (87,381)	at L. A.	24
20	San Francisco (33,894)	at S. F.	17
31	Green Bay (73,764)	at Dallas	13
14	Houston (55,310)	at Houston	11
25	N. Y. Jets (74,771)	at Dallas	9
7	Baltimore (58,975)	at Dallas	23

4. Cowboy Statistical History*

OFFENSE	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
No. Rushes	25.8	29.6	31.0	30.0	31.1	29.7	33.6	34.1	34.3	38.0
Yards Rushing	87.4	103.0	145.7	128.2	120.8	114.9	151.6	135.7	149.3	162.5
Yards Passing	175.3	190.1	205.1	176.3	143.8	170.5	215.9	199.9	216.1	203.3
Total Yards	262.8	320.0	350.9	304.5	264.6	285.4	367.5	335.6	365.5	365.8
Pass Attempts	29.5	30.1	27.1	26.8	28.9	25.9	29.5	29.8	28.5	25.4
Pass Comp.	13.6	15.4	14.3	14.3	13.7	12.0	15.3	15.0	15.5	13.5
Had Int.	2.8	1.9	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.3	1.0	2.0	1.3	1.3
Pct. Comp	46.0	50.9	52.6	53.3	47.5	46.4	51.8	50.4	54.4	53.2
TD Passes	1.4	1.6	2.2	1.4	0.7	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.7
First Downs	15.0	17.1	17.6	17.7	16.4	15.1	20.5	18.6	21.2	19.6
Points Scored	14.8	16.9	28.4	21.8	17.9	23.2	31.8	24.4	30.8	26.4
Touchdowns	1.9	2.1	3.6	2.9	2.1	2.9	4.0	3.2	3.9	3.1
FG Attempts	1.1	1.7	1.9	1.4	2.1	1.9	2.2	1.6	2.0	2.6
FGs Made	0.5	0.8	1.0	0.6	1.0	1.1	1.2	0.6	1.2	1.4
No. Punts	5.0	4.4	4.1	5.1	5.6	5.2	4.6	4.8	4.2	4.5
Punting Avg.	41.3	36.7	45.4	44.2	38.9	41.3	39.2	40.4	40.9	43.3
Fumbles	1.8	3.3	2.3	2.1	2.8	2.2	1.6	1.9	1.5	1.9
Fumbles Lost	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.2	0.7	1.0	1.0	0.9
Penalties	5.2	3.4	4.4	4.8	6.9	5.6	5.9	5.8	5.5	5.8
Yards Penalized	50.0	30.5	45.6	44.8	68.0	50.7	58.9	56.1	53.6	60.0
Yds. Lost Att. to Pass	23.7	18.4	17.4	23.6	35.9	26.4	22.0	21.0	17.8	26.1
Losses Att. to Pass				3.1	4.9	3.9	3.0	3.0	2.4	3.1

DEFENSE	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
No. Rushes	37.3	32.4	27.6	32.5	31.3	30.1	25.4	24.2	26.4	22.4
Yds. Rushing	186.8	154.4	107.9	149.6	107.4	103.1	84.0	77.2	85.3	75.0
Yds. Passing	177.5	173.6	262.4	230.8	160.4	196.3	170.1	199.3	174.1	189.8
Total Yards	364.3	328.0	370.3	380.4	267.9	299.4	254.1	276.5	259.5	264.8
Pass Att.	32.8	23.3	31.2	28.8	26.9	30.3	32.6	34.4	30.6	32.7
Passes Comp.	13.3	12.0	16.6	14.4	12.3	14.6	15.1	18.6	15.7	16.8
Opp. Had Int.	1.3	1.8	1.4	1.9	1.7	1.3	1.2	2.1	1.9	1.7
Pct. Comp.	49.8	51.5	53.4	50.1	45.6	48.4	46.4	53.9	51.4	51.3
TD Passes	1.8	1.5	2.4	2.2	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.6
First Downs	18.0	18.1	19.6	19.0	15.1	17.1	15.8	16.9	14.4	14.5
Points	30.8	27.1	28.7	27.0	20.6	20.0	17.1	19.1	13.3	15.9
Touchdowns	3.8	3.5	3.7	3.4	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.5	1.6	2.0
FG Attempts	2.1	2.0	1.6	2.3	1.9	2.0	2.2	1.6	1.6	1.8
FGs Made	1.4	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.2	0.9	0.6	0.6	0.6
No. Punts	4.2	3.1	4.5	3.7	5.7	5.1	5.6	5.1	5.5	5.9
Punting Avg.	41.3	45.5	40.6	41.5	43.5	42.9	42.4	42.5	40.5	42.0
Fumbles	1.8	2.1	2.4	1.6	1.9	2.6	1.6	1.9	1.5	1.6
Fumbles Lost	0.9	1.3	1.1	0.8	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.4	1.0	0.8
Penalties	6.0	2.7	4.0	3.7	5.4	3.6	4.5	4.6	3.9	4.1
Yds. Penalized	56.0	25.9	40.6	34.2	55.8	34.5	55.6	50.5	46.9	47.8
Yds. Lost Att. to Pass	14.6	14.6	16.4	11.5	23.2	22.5	30.0	26.2	28.5	32.2
Losses Att. to Pass				1.4	3.2	2.8	4.3	3.2	3.7	3.9

*All figures are per game averages.

5. Cowboy Attendance Records

Total Attendance

Year	Home Games (no.)	Avg.	Change	Road Games (no.)	Preseason Games (no.)	Postseason Games (no.)	Total
1960	*128,500(6)	21,417	——	214,820(6)	120,284(6)	——	463,604
1961	*172,000(7)	24,571	+14.3%	251,443(7)	97,584(5)	——	521,027
1962	152,446(7)	21,781	−11.4%	278,807(7)	178,683(5)	——	609,936
1963	188,727(7)	26,961	+23.8%	280,062(7)	214,290(5)	——	683,079
1964	268,661(7)	38,237	+41.8%	356,339(7)	207,751(5)	——	832,751
1965	388,912(7)	55,559	+45.3%	366,390(7)	199,395(5)	65,569	1,020,266
1966	473,373(7)	67,625	+21.7%	408,889(7)	238,186(5)	75,504	1,195,952
1967	460,476(7)	65,782	−2.72%	402,843(7)	278,511(5)	121,647	1,263,477
1968	470,110(7)	67,158	+2.09%	401,626(7)	300,909(6)	104,458	1,277,103
1969	443,352(7)	63,336	−5.69%	434,477(7)	384,095(6)	100,472	1,362,396

Largest Crowds

Home

80,259—Dallas 26, Cleveland 14; November 24, 1966.
76,965—Dallas 31, St. Louis 17; December 4, 1966.

Away

84,850—Dallas 10, Cleveland 42; November 2, 1969.
84,728—Dallas 17, New Orleans 3; November 3, 1968.
84,721—Cleveland 30, Dallas 21; October 23, 1966.

Smallest Crowds

Home

*10,000—San Francisco 26, Dallas 14; November 20, 1960.
12,692—Chicago 34, Dallas 33; November 18, 1962.

Away

12,695—Dallas 28, St. Louis 24; December 15, 1963.
14,102—St. Louis 52, Dallas 20; December 9, 1962.

*estimated—no turnstiles in Cotton Bowl in 1960 and 1961

6. Cowboy All-Time Leaders

RUSHING

Player	Att.	Yds.	Avg.	Long	TD
Perkins, Don (1960–68)	1500	6217	4.1	59	42
Reeves, Dan (1965–69)	480	1813	3.8	67	23
Marsh, Amos (1961–64)	427	2065	4.8	71	14
Garrison, Walt (1966–69)	261	1298	5.0	27	8
Meredith, Don (1960–68)	242	1216	5.0	28	15
Hill, Calvin (1969)	204	942	4.6	55	8

PASSING

Player	Att.	Comp.	Pct.	Yds.	TD	Int.
Meredith, Don (1960–68)	2308	1170	50.7	17,199	135	111
LeBaron, Eddie (1960–63)	692	359	51.9	5,331	45	52
Morton, Craig (1966–69)	585	305	52.1	4,756	40	36
Rhome, Jerry (1965–68)	75	39	50.2	496	1	3
Staubach, Roger (1969)	47	23	48.9	421	1	2

RECEIVING

Player	No.	Yds.	Avg.	Long	TD
Clarke, Frank (1960–67)	281	5214	18.6	80	50
Hayes, Bob (1965–69)	252	4888	19.4	95	49
Howton, Billy (1960–63)	161	2368	14.7	69	17
Rentzel, Lance (1967–69)	155	2965	19.0	75	26
Perkins, Don (1960–68)	146	1310	8.9	39	3
Norman, Pettis (1963–69)	118	1602	13.6	49	14
Reeves, Dan (1965–69)	114	1528	13.4	60	17

SCORING

Player	TD	PAT	FG	Total
Hayes, Bob (1965–69)	53	—	—	318
Clarke, Frank (1960–67)	51	—	—	306
Perkins, Don (1960–68)	45	—	—	270
Villanueva, Danny (1965–67)	—	134	42	260
Reeves, Dan (1965–69)	40	—	—	240
Clark, Mike (1968–69)	—	97	37	208

PUNTING

Player	No.	Avg.	Long	Had Blocked
Sherer, Dave (1960)	57	42.5	67	1

Widby, Ron (1968–69)	122	42.2	84	0
Baker, Sam (1962–63)	128	40.5	72	0
Lothridge, Billy (1964)	62	40.3	75	1
Villanueva, Danny (1965–67)	192	40.3	58	1
Green, Allen (1961)	61	36.7	53	1

INTERCEPTIONS

Player	No.	Yds.	Avg.	Long	TD
Renfro, Mel (1964–68)	31	420	13.6	90	2
Green, Cornell (1963–69)	27	474	17.6	55	2
Bishop, Don (1960–63)	22	364	16.8	57	0
Gaechter, Mike (1962–69)	21	420	20.0	100	1
Howley, Chuck (1961–69)	16	248	15.5	58	2
Tubbs, Jerry (1960–66)	15	176	11.7	44	0
Jordan, Lee Roy (1963–69)	13	233	18.0	49	2

PUNT RETURNS

Player	No.	Yds.	Avg.	Long	TD
Renfro, Mel (1964–67)	95	765	8.0	69	1
Hayes, Bob (1965–69)	86	1026	11.9	90	3
Rentzel, Lance (1967–69)	24	152	6.3	27	0
Marsh, Amos (1961–62)	17	75	4.4	19	0
Gaechter, Mike (1962–64)	14	58	4.1	16	0

KICKOFF RETURNS

Player	No.	Yds.	Avg.	Long	TD
Renfro, Mel (1964–67)	85	2246	26.4	100	2
Marsh, Amos (1961–64)	65	1561	20.4	101	1
Garrison, Walt (1966–69)	41	813	19.8	36	0
Hayes, Bob (1965–69)	22	567	25.8	66	0

FIELD GOALS

Player	Att.	Made	Avg.	Long
Villanueva, Danny (1965–67)	81	42	.519	41
Clark, Mike (1968–69)	65	37	.569	50
Baker, Sam (1962–63)	47	23	.487	53
Van Raaphorst, Dick (1964)	29	14	.483	43
Cone, Fred (1960)	13	6	.462	45
Bielski, Dick (1961)	9	6	.667	42

7. Individual Single-Game Records

MOST YARDS GAINED RUSHING

Cowboys	150	Calvin Hill vs. Washington	Nov. 16, 1969
Opp.	232	Jimmy Brown, Cleveland	Sept. 22, 1963

MOST CARRIES

Cowboys	27	Calvin Hill vs. Washington	Nov. 16, 1969
	25	Dan Reeves vs. Washington	Oct. 8, 1967
		Don Perkins vs. Washington	Sept. 29, 1963
		Don Perkins vs. New York	Dec. 1, 1963
Opp.	27	Dick James, Washington	Dec. 17, 1961

LONGEST RUN FROM SCRIMMAGE

Cowboys	73	Amos Bullocks vs. Chicago	Nov. 18, 1962
Opp.	75	Ed Sutton, New York	Dec. 4, 1960

MOST PASSES ATTEMPTED

Cowboys	48	Don Meredith vs. San Francisco	Nov. 10, 1963
Opp.	46	Bill Wade, Chicago	Nov. 18, 1962
		Sonny Jurgensen, Washington	Nov. 13, 1966
		Tarkenton, (43) Wood (3), New York	Dec. 15, 1968

MOST PASSES COMPLETED

Cowboys	30	Don Meredith vs. San Francisco	Nov. 10, 1963
Opp.	466	Bill Wade, Chicago	Nov. 18, 1962
		Kent Nix, Pittsburgh	Oct. 22, 1967

MOST YARDS GAINED PASSING

Cowboys	460	Don Meredith vs. San Francisco	Nov. 10, 1963
Opp.	466	Bill Wade, Chicago	Nov. 18, 1962

MOST TOUCHDOWN PASSES

Cowboys	5	Eddie LeBaron vs. Pittsburgh	Oct. 21, 1962
		Don Meredith vs. Philadelphia	Oct. 9, 1966
		Don Meredith vs. New York	Sept. 18, 1966
		Don Meredith vs. Philadelphia	Sept. 29, 1968
		Craig Morton vs. Philadelphia	Oct. 19, 1969
Opp.	6	Y. A. Tittle, New York	Dec. 16, 1962

LONGEST COMPLETION

Cowboys	95	Don Meredith to Bob Hayes vs. Washington	Nov. 13, 1966

Opp.	86	Charlie Johnson to Sonny Randle, St. Louis	Oct. 28, 1962

(Dallas holds National Football League record for shortest touchdown pass, two inches, Eddie LeBaron to Dick Bielski, vs. Washington, October 9, 1960)

MOST PASSES HAD INTERCEPTED

Cowboys	5	Eddie LeBaron vs. Philadelphia	Sept. 30, 1960
		Eddie LeBaron vs. St. Louis	Nov. 5, 1961
Opp.	5	King Hill, Philadelphia	Sept. 29, 1968

MOST PASS RECEPTIONS

Cowboys	13	Lance Rentzel vs. Washington	Nov. 19, 1967
	11	Bill Howton vs. Philadelphia	Nov. 26, 1961
Opp.	12	J. R. Wilburn, Pittsburgh	Oct. 22, 1967

MOST YARDS LOST ATTEMPTING TO PASS

Cowboys	60	Don Meredith vs. Philadelphia	Dec. 6, 1964
Opp.	66	Ron Smith, Pittsburgh	Nov. 20, 1966

MOST YARDS ON PASS RECEPTIONS

Cowboys	246	Bob Hayes vs. Washington	Nov. 13, 1966
Opp.	195	Raymond Berry, Baltimore	Oct. 30, 1960

MOST TOUCHDOWNS ON PASS RECEPTIONS

Cowboys	3	Frank Clarke vs. Washington	Sept. 16, 1962
		Frank Clarke vs. Pittsburgh	Oct. 21, 1962
		Bob Hayes vs. Philadelphia	Oct. 9, 1966
		Dan Reeves vs. New York	Sept. 18, 1966
Opp.	3	Raymond Berry, Baltimore	Oct. 30, 1960
		Tommy McDonald, Philadelphia	Nov. 26, 1961
		Del Shofner, New York	Nov. 11, 1962
		Joe Walton, New York	Dec. 16, 1962

MOST POINTS SCORED

Cowboys	24	Dan Reeves vs. Atlanta	Nov. 5, 1967
	18	L. G. Dupre vs. New York	Dec. 4, 1960
		Frank Clarke vs. Washington	Sept. 16, 1962
		Frank Clarke vs. Pittsburgh	Oct. 21, 1962
		Dan Reeves vs. New York	Sept. 18, 1966
		Bob Hayes vs. Philadelphia	Oct. 9, 1966
		Bob Hayes vs. St. Louis	Nov. 23, 1967
Opp.	24	Dick James, Washington	Dec. 17, 1961

MOST TOUCHDOWNS

Cowboys	4	Dan Reeves vs. Atlanta	Nov. 5, 1967

	3	L. G. Dupre vs. New York	Dec. 4, 1960
		Frank Clarke vs. Washington	Sept. 16, 1962
		Frank Clarke vs. Pittsburgh	Oct. 21, 1962
		Don Perkins vs. New York	Dec. 1, 1963
		Dan Reeves vs. New York	Sept. 18, 1966
		Bob Hayes vs. Philadelphia	Oct. 9, 1966
		Bob Hayes vs. St. Louis	Nov. 23, 1967
		Lance Rentzel vs. Philadelphia	Oct. 19, 1969
Opp.	4	Dick James, Washington	Dec. 17, 1961

MOST EXTRA POINTS CONVERTED

Cowboys	8	Mike Clark vs. Detroit	Sept. 15, 1968
		Danny Villanueva vs. Philadelphia	Oct. 9, 1966
Opp.	7	Gerry Perry, St. Louis	Dec. 9, 1962

MOST EXTRA POINTS ATTEMPTED

Cowboys	8	Mike Clark vs. Detroit	Sept. 15, 1968
		Danny Villanueva vs. Philadelphia	Oct. 9, 1966
Opp.	7	Sam Baker, Cleveland	Oct. 16, 1960
		Gerry Perry, St. Louis	Dec. 9, 1962

MOST FIELD GOALS MADE

Cowboys	4	Danny Villanueva vs. Cleveland	Nov. 24, 1966
Opp.	4	Ed Khayat, Washington	Oct. 9, 1960
		Tommy Davis, San Francisco	Nov. 20, 1960
		Sam Baker, Philadelphia	Dec. 5, 1965

8. Cowboy All-Time Roster

Andrie, George, de, Marquette, 1962–69
Babb, Gene, lb-fb, Austin College, 1960–61
Baker, Sam, k, Oregon State, 1962–63
Barnes, Gary, oe, Clemson, 1963
Baynham, Craig, rb, Georgia Tech, 1967–69
Bercich, Bob, dhb, Michigan State, 1960–61
Bielski, Dick, oe, Maryland, 1960–61
Bishop, Don, dhb, City College of Los Angeles, 1960–65
Boeke, Jim, ot, Heidelberg, 1964–67
Borden, Nate, de, Indiana, 1960–61
Braatz, Tom, lb, Marquette, 1960
Bradfute, Byron, ot, Southern Mississippi, 1960–61
Brock, Clyde, dt, Utah State, 1962-63
Brown, Otto, dhb, Prairie View, 1969
Bullocks, Amos, rb, Southern Illinois, 1962–64
Burkett, Jackie, lb, Auburn, 1968–69
Butler, Bill, dhb, Chattanooga, 1960
Clark, Mike, k, Texas A.&M., 1968–69
Clark, Monte, ot, U.S.C., 1962
Clark, Phil, dhb, Northwestern, 1967–69
Clarke, Frank, oe, Colorado, 1960-67
Cole, Larry, de, Hawaii, 1968–69
Colvin, Jim, dt, Houston, 1964–66
Cone, Fred, k, Clemson, 1960
Connelly, Mike, c, Utah State, 1960–67
Conrad, Bobby Joe, oe, Texas A.&M., 1969
Cronin, Gene, de, College of Pacific, 1960
Cvercko, Andy, g, Northwestern, 1961–62
Daniels, Dick, dhb, University of Pacific (Oregon), 1966–68
Davis, Donnie, oe, Southern University, 1962
Davis, Sonny, lb, Baylor, 1961
Deters, Harold, k, North Carolina State, 1967
Dial, Buddy, oe, Rice, 1964–66
Dickson, Paul, ot, Baylor, 1960
Diehl, John, dt, Virginia, 1965
Ditka, Mike, oe, Pittsburgh, 1969
Doelling, Fred, dhb, Pennsylvania, 1960
Donohue, Leon, g, San Jose State, 1965–67
Doran, Jim, oe, Iowa State, 1960–61
Douglas, Merrill, fb, Utah, 1961

Dowdle, Mike, fb-lb, Texas, 1960–62
Dugan, Fred, oe, Dayton, 1960
Dunn, Perry Lee, rb, Mississippi, 1964–65
Dupre, L. G., rb, Baylor, 1960–61
East, Ron, dt, Montana State, 1967–69
Edwards, Dave, lb, Auburn, 1963–69
Falls, Mike, g, Minnesota, 1960–61
Fisher, Ray, ot, Eastern Illinois, 1960
Flowers, Richmond, dhb, Tennessee, 1969
Folkins, Lee, oe, Washington, 1962–64
Franckhauser, Tom, dhb, Purdue, 1960–61
Frank, Bill, ot, Colorado, 1964
Frost, Ken, dt, Tennessee, 1961–62
Fry, Bob, ot, Kentucky, 1960–64
Gaechter, Mike, dhb, Oregon, 1962–69
Garrison, Walt, fb, Oklahoma State, 1966–69
Gent, Pete, oe, Michigan State, 1964–68
Gibbs, Guy, qb, T.C.U., 1963
Gonzaga, John, de, no college, 1960
Granger, Charlie, ot, Southern University, 1961
Green, Allen, Mississippi, 1961
Green, Cornell, dhb, Utah State, 1962–69
Gregory, Glynn, oe-dhb, S.M.U., 1961–62
Grottkau, Bob, g, Oregon, 1961
Guy, Buzz, g, Duke, 1960
Hagen, Halvor, de, Weber State, 1969
Hansen, Wayne, lb, Texas Western, 1960
Harris, Jim, dhb, Oklahoma, 1961
Hayes, Bob, oe, Florida A.&M., 1965–69
Hayes, Wendell, rb, Humboldt State, 1963
Hays, Harold, lb, Southern Mississippi, 1963–67
Healy, Don, dt, Maryland, 1960–61
Heinrich, Don, qb, Washington, 1960
Herchman, Bill, dt, Texas Tech, 1960–61
Hill, Calvin, rb, Yale, 1969
Homan, Dennis, fl, Alabama, 1968–69
Houser, John, c-g, Redlands, 1960–61
Howley, Chuck, lb, West Virginia, 1961–69
Howton, Bill, oe, Rice, 1960–63
Hoyem, Lynn, c-g, Long Beach State, 1962–63
Humphrey, Buddy, qb, Baylor, 1961
Husmann, Ed, dt, Nebraska, 1960
Isbell, Joe Bob, g, Houston, 1962–65

Johnson, Mike, dhb, Kansas, 1966–69
Johnson, Mitch, g, U.C.L.A., 1965
Jordan, Lee Roy, lb, Alabama, 1963–69
Kowalczyk, Walt, fb, Michigan State, 1960
Kupp, Jake, g, Washington, 1964–65
LeBaron, Eddie, qb, College of Pacific, 1960–63
Lewis, D. D., lb, Mississippi State, 1968
Lewis, Woodley, oe, Oregon, 1960
Lilly, Robert, de-dt, T.C.U., 1961–69
Lisclo, Tony, ot, Tulsa, 1963–64, 1966–69
Livingston, Warren, dhb, Arizona, 1961–66
Lockett, J. W., fb, Central State (Oklahoma), 1961–62
Logan, Obert, dhb, Trinity (Texas), 1965–66
Long, Bob, lb, U.C.L.A., 1962
Lothridge, Billy, p-qb, Georgia Tech, 1964
Moegel, Dick, dhb, Rice, 1961
Manders, Dave, c, Michigan State, 1964–66, 1968–69
Marsh, Amos, fb, Oregon State, 1961–64
Mathews, Ray, oe, Clemson, 1960
McCreary, Bob, ot, Wake Forest, 1961
McDaniels, David, fl, Mississippi Valley, 1968
McDonald, Tommy, oe, Oklahoma, 1964
McIlhenny, Don, fb, S.M.U., 1960–61
Memmelaar, Dale, g, Wyoming, 1962–63
Meredith, Don, qb, S.M.U., 1960–68
Meyers, John, dt, Washington, 1962–63
Mooty, Jim, dhb, Arkansas, 1960
Morton, Craig, qb, California, 1965–69
Murchison, Ola Lee, oe, University of Pacific (California), 1961
Neely, Ralph, ot, Oklahoma, 1965–69
Niland, John, g, Iowa, 1966–69
Nolan, Dick, dhb, Maryland, 1962
Norman, Pettis, oe, J. C. Smith Coll., 1962–69
Norton, Jerry, dhb, S.M.U., 1962
Nutting, Ed, ot, Georgia Tech, 1963
Nye, Blaine, g, Stanford, 1968–69
Overton, Jerry, dhb, Utah, 1963
Patera, Jack, lb, Oregon, 1960–61
Perkins, Don, fb, New Mexico, 1961–68
Poimboeuf, Lance, k, Southwestern Louisiana, 1963
Porterfield, Garry, de, Tulsa, 1965
Pugh, Jethro, dt, Elizabeth City State, 1965–69
Putnam, Duane, g, College of Pacific, 1960

Randle, Sonny, oe, Virginia, 1968
Reese, Guy, dt, S.M.U., 1962–63
Reeves, Dan, rb, South Carolina, 1965–69
Renfro, Mel, dhb, Oregon, 1964–69
Rentzel, Lance, fl, Oklahoma, 1967–69
Rhome, Jerry, qb, Tulsa, 1965–68
Ridgway, Colin, k, Lamar Tech, 1965
Ridlon, Jim, dhb, Syracuse, 1963–64
Roach, John, qb, S.M.U., 1964
Sandeman, Bill, dt, University of Pacific (California), 1966
Schoenke, Ray, ot, S.M.U., 1963-64
Sherer, Dave, punter, S.M.U., 1960
Shy, Les, rb, Long Beach State, 1966–69
Simmons, Dave, lb, Georgia Tech, 1968
Smith, J. D., rb, North Carolina A.&T., 1965–66
Smith, Jim Ray, g-ot, Baylor, 1963–64
Staubach, Roger, qb, Navy, 1969
Stephens, Larry, de, Texas, 1963–67
Stiger, Jim, rb, Washington, 1963–65
Stincic, Tom, lb, Michigan, 1969
Stokes, Sims, fl, Northern Arizona, 1967
Stynchula, Andy, de, Penn State, 1968
Talbert, Don, ot-de, Texas, 1962, 1965
Townes, Willie, de, Tulsa, 1966–68
Tubbs, Jerry, lb, Oklahoma, 1960–67
Van Raaphorst, Dick, k, Ohio State, 1964
Villanueva, Danny, k, New Mexico State, 1965-67
Walker, Malcolm, c, Rice, 1966–69
Wayt, Russell, lb, Rice, 1965
Welch, Claxton, rb, Oregon, 1969
Whitfield, A. D., rb, North Texas State, 1965
Whittingham, Fred, lb, California Polytechnic Inst., 1969
Widby, Ron, p, Tennessee, 1968–69
Wilbur, John, g, Stanford, 1966–69
Wisener, Gary, dhb, Baylor, 1960
Wright, Rayfield, te-ot, Fort Valley State, 1967–69
Youmans, Maury, de, Syracuse, 1964–65

9. Cowboy All-Time Draft

1961

1. (a) Choice traded along with sixth choice to Washington for **Eddie LeBaron,** qb, College of Pacific, 5-7, 160; (b) Choice from Cleveland for first round pick in 1962: **Bob Lilly,** t, Texas Christian University, 6-5, 242; **2. E. J. Holub,** lb, Texas Tech, 6-4, 218 (went to AFL); **3. Stew Barber,** g, Penn State, 6-3, 230 (went to AFL); **4. Sonny Davis,** e, Baylor, 6-2, 210; **5.** Choice traded to San Francisco for **Gene Babb,** fb, Austin College, 6-3, 220; **6.** Choice traded, along with first choice, to Washington for **LeBaron; 7. Art Gilmore,** hb, Oregon State, 6-0, 200; **8. Don Talbert,** t, Texas, 6-5, 220; **9. Glenn Gregory,** hb, SMU, 6-2, 195; **10.** Choice traded to Green Bay for **Fred Cone,** fb-k, Clemson, 5-11, 198; **11. Norris Stevenson,** hb, Missouri, 6-1, 205; **12. Lowndes Shingler,** qb, Clemson, 6-1, 205; **13. Don Goodman,** hb, Florida, 6-0, 200; **14. Bill Shaw,** t, Georgia Tech, 6-3, 222, (went to AFL); **15. Julius Varnado,** t, San Francisco State, 6-4, 220 (went to AFL); **16. Jerry Steffen,** hb, Colorado, 6-0, 190; **17. Everett Cloud,** hb, Maryland, 6-0, 190; **18. Randy Williams,** hb, Indiana, 6-3, 208; **19. Lynn Hoyem,** c, Long Beach State, 6-4, 225; **20. Jerry Morgan,** qb, Iowa State, 6-3, 195.

1962

1. Choice traded to Cleveland for first round pick in 1961 when Cowboys picked **Bob Lilly; 2. Sonny Gibbs*,** qb, TCU, 6-7, 225; 3. (a) Choice to Chicago for **Don Meredith,** qb, SMU, 6-3, 200; (b) Choice from Cleveland for **Duane Putnam,** g, College of Pacific, 6-0, 221: **Bobby Plummer,** g, TCU, 6-2, 235; **4.** Choice to San Francisco for **Bill Herchman,** dt, Texas Tech, 6-1, 249; **5.** Choice to Los Angeles for **Jimmy Harris,** db, Oklahoma, 6-1, 184; **6.** (a) **Donnie Davis,** e, Southern University, 6-2, 235; (b) Choice and **Allen Green** from New York for **Fred Dugan: George Andrie,** e, Marquette, 6-7, 247; **7.** Choice to Los Angeles for **John Houser,** g. Redlands U., 6-4, 245; **8. Ken Tureaud,** b, Michigan, 6-1, 198; **9.** Choice to Baltimore for **Don Perkins,** rb, New Mexico, 5-10, 200; **10. John M. Longmeyer,** g, Southern Illinois, 6-3, 230; **11. Larry Hudas,** e, Michigan State, 6-4, 208; **12.** Choice to Green Bay for **Steve Meilinger,** e, Kentucky, 6-2, 230; **13. Robert Moses,** e, Texas, 6-3, 211; **14. Harold Hays*,** g, Southern Mississippi, 6-3, 218; **15. Guy Reese,** t, SMU, 6-5, 238; **16. Robert Johnston,** t, Rice, 6-4, 215; **17. Ray Jacobs,** t, Howard Payne, 6-3, 265 (went to AFL); **18. Dave Cloutier*,** b, Maine, 6-0, 195 (went to AFL); **19. Paul Holmes,** t, Georgia, 6-5, 220; **20. Amos Bullocks,** b, Southern Illinois, 6-1, 197.

1963

1. Lee Roy Jordan, lb, Alabama, 6-2, 210; **2.** Choice traded, along with ninth choice, to Chicago for **Chuck Howley,** lb, West Virginia, 6-2, 225; **3. Jim Price,** lb, Auburn, 6-3, 225; **4. Whaley Hall*,** g, Mississippi, 6-3, 230; **5.** Choice traded to New York for **Dick Nolan,** db, Maryland, 6-1, 185; **6.** Choice traded to Green Bay for **John Sutro,** 6-4, 245; **7. Marv Clothier,** g, Kansas, 6-4, 220; **8.** Choice traded to Green Bay for **Lee Folkins,** e, Washington, 6-5, 220; **9.** Choice traded to Chicago; **10. Rod Scheyer,** t, Washington, 6-2, 220;

*drafted as a future

11. Ray Schoenke, c, SMU, 6-3, 225; **12. Bill Perkins,** b, Iowa, 6-2, 218; **13. Paul Wicker*,** t, Fresno State, 6-5, 248; **14. Lou Cioci,** lb, Boston College, 6-2, 225; **15. Jerry Overton,** b, Utah, 6-2, 192; **16. Dennis Golden,** t. Holy Cross, 6-4, 235; **17. Ernest Parks*,** g, McMurry, 6-4, 230 (went to AFL); **18. Bill Frank,** t, Colorado, 6-4, 250; **19. Jim Stiger,** b, Washington, 5-11, 195; **20. Tommy Lucas,** e, Texas, 6-3, 218.

1964

1. Choice traded to Pittsburgh for **Buddy Dial,** fl, Rice, 6-1, 195; **2. Mel Renfro,** b, Oregon, 6-0, 195; **3.** Choice traded to Los Angeles for **Bob Long and John Meyers; 4. Perry Lee Dunn,** b, Mississippi, 6-2, 205; **5.** Choice traded to Green Bay for **Gary Barnes,** Clemson, 6-4, 210; **6.** (a) **Billy Lothridge,** qb, Georgia Tech, 6-1, 188; (b) Choice from Cleveland for **Andy Cvercko: Jim Curry,** e, Cincinnati, 6-4, 215; (c) Choice from Green Bay for **Jerry Norton: Jimmy Evans,** e, Texas Western, 6-1, 194; **7. Bob Hayes*,** wr, Florida A & M, 5-11, 189; **8. Al Geverink,** b, UCLA, 6-2, 190; **9. Jake Kupp,** e, Washington, 6-3, 215; **10. Roger Staubach*,** qb, Navy, 6-2, 190; **11. Bobby Crenshaw,** g, Baylor, 6-2, 230 (went to AFL); **12. Johnny Norman,** e, Northwestern Louisiana, 6-1, 185; **13. Jerry Rhome,** qb, Tulsa, 6-0, 185; **14. Jim Worden,** lb, Wittenberg, 6-1, 230; **15. Bill Van Burkleo,** b, Tulsa, 5-11, 185; **16. Paul Cercel,** c, Pittsburgh, 6-2, 222; **17. Harry Abell,** e, Missouri, 6-3, 212 (went to AFL); **18.** No selection (player chosen not eligible); **19. H. D. Murphy,** b, Oregon, 6-0, 190; **20. John Hughes,** lb, SMU, 6-2, 220.

1965

1. Craig Morton, qb, California, 6-4, 215; **2. Malcolm Walker,** lb, Rice, 6-4, 245; **3.** Choice traded to Green Bay (who traded it to New York) for **John Roach,** qb, SMU, 6-3, 205; **4.** (a) **Jim Sidle,** b, Auburn, 6-2, 215; (b) Choice from Detroit for **Sonny Gibbs: Bob Svihus,** t, USC, 6-4, 240 (went to AFL); **5. Roger Pettee,** lb, Florida, 6-4, 230; **6. Sonny Utz,** rb, VPI, 5-11, 215; **7. Brig Owens,** b, Cincinnati, 5-11, 183; **8. Russell Wayt,** lb, Rice, 6-4, 235; **9. Jim Zanios,** fb, Texas Tech, 6-0, 215; **10. Gaylon McCollough,** c, Alabama, 6-3, 215; **11. Jethro Pugh,** t, Elizabeth City State, 6-6, 255; **12. Ernie Kellerman,** qb, Miami (Ohio), 6-0, 175; **13. Jack Schraub,** e, California, 6-6, 210; **14. Gary Porterfield,** e, Tulsa, 6-3, 235; **15. Gene Foster,** b, Arizona State, 6-0, 195 (went to AFL); **16. Doug McDougal,** e, Oregon State, 6-4, 228; **17. Mitch Johnson,** t, UCLA, 6-4, 245; **18. Martin Amsler,** t, Evansville, 6-5, 250; **19. Marv Rettenmund,** hb, Ball State, 5-10, 195 (did not play); **20. Ron Barlow*,** t, Kansas State, 6-2, 230.

1966

1. John Niland, g, Iowa, 6-3, 245; **2. Willie Townes*,** de, Tulsa, 6-5, 265; **3.** Choice to San Francisco for **Leon Donohue,** g, San Jose State, 6-4, 252; **4.** Choice to Baltimore for **Ralph Neely,** t, Oklahoma, 6-6, 252; **5.** (a) Choice to San Francisco for **J. D. Smith,** rb, North Carolina A & T, 6-1, 206; (b) Choice from Baltimore thru Detroit for **Amos Marsh: Walt Garrison,** rb, Oklahoma State, 6-0, 209; **6. Bob Dunlevy,** e, West Virginia, 6-4, 195; **7. Art Robinson,** e, Florida A & M, 6-0, 208; **8. Don Kunit,** rb, Penn State, 6-2, 200; **9. Darrell Elam,** fl, West Virginia Tech, 6-2, 189; **10. Mason Mitchell,** rb, Washington, 6-1, 170; **11. Austin Denney*,** e, Tennessee, 6-2, 225; **12.** (a)

Choice from Pittsburgh for **Lee Folkins: Les Shy,** rb, Long Beach State, 6-1, 200; (b) **Craig Baynham*,** rb, Georgia Tech, 6-1, 200; **13. Ronnie Lamb,** b, South Carolina, 6-2, 216; **14. Lewis Turner,** rb, Norfolk State, 6-2, 183; **15. Mark Gartung*,** dt, Oregon State, 6-4, 255; **16. Tom Piggee,** rb, San Francisco State, 5-11, 200; **17. George Allen,** t, West Texas State, 6-7, 245 (went to AFL); **18. Steve Orr,** dt, Washington, 6-4, 230; **19. Byron Johnson,** e, Central Washington State, 6-5, 255; **20. Lou Hudson,** fl, Minnesota, 6-5, 220 (pro basketball).

1967

1. Choice given along with second and two fifths, to Houston for **Ralph Neely,** t, Oklahoma, 6-6, 265; **2. (Neely); 3. Phil Clark,** db, Northwestern, 6-2, 207; **4. Curtis Marker,** g, Northern Michigan, 6-2, 253; **5.** (a) Choice and **Jim Steffen** from Washington for **Brig Owens, Mitch Johnson** and **Jake Kupp (Neely);** (b) Choice from Cleveland for **Joe Bob Isbell: (Neely);** (c) Choice to Green Bay for **Henry Gremminger; 6. Sims Stokes,** e, Northern Arizona, 6-1, 198; **7. Rayfield Wright,** t, Ft. Valley State, 6-7, 235; **8. Steve Laub,** qb, Illinois Wesleyan, 6-1, 190; **9. Byron Morgan,** db, Findlay (Ohio), 6-3, 212; **10. Eugene Bowen,** rb, Tennessee A & I, 5-8, 210; **11. Pat Riley,** e, Kentucky, 205 (pro basketball); **12. Harold Deters,** k, North Carolina State, 6-0, 200; **13. Al Kerkian,** de, Akron, 6-6, 235; **14. Tom Boyd,** g, Tarleton State, 6-3, 250; **15. Leavie Davis,** db, Edward Waters College (Florida), 6-4, 210; **16. Paul Brothers,** hb, Oregon State, 6-1, 195 (went to Canada); **17. George Adams,** lb, Morehead State (Kentucky), 6-2, 218.

1968

1. Dennis Homan, fl, Alabama, 6-1, 181; **2. David McDaniels,** e, Mississippi Valley, 6-4, 200; **3.** (a) Choice to Minnesota for **Lance Rentzel,** Oklahoma; (b) Choice from Chicago for **Austin Denney** and **Mac Percival: Ed Harmon,** lb, Louisville, 6-4, 246; **4.** (a) Choice to New Orleans for **Larry Stephens,** Texas; (b) Choice from New York for **Jim Colvin,** Houston: **John Douglas,** lb, Missouri, 6-2, 215; **5. Blaine Nye,** g, Stanford, 6-4, 255; **6. D. D. Lewis,** lb, Mississippi State, 6-1, 210; **7. Bob Taucher,** t, Nebraska, 6-4, 251; **8. Frank Brown,** de, Albany (Ga.) State, 6-3, 249; **9. Ken Kmiec,** db, Illinois, 6-2, 187; **10. Ben Olison,** fl, Kansas, 6-1, 170; **11. Ron Shotts,** rb, Oklahoma, 6-0, 206 (did not play); **12. Wilson Whitty,** lb, Boston University, 6-3, 224; **13. Carter Lord,** te, Harvard, 6-2, 214; **14. Ron Williams,** db, West Virginia, 6-2, 190 (pro basketball); **15. Tommy Lunceford,** p, Auburn, 6-2, 202; **16. Larry Cole,** de, Hawaii, 6-5, 250; **17. George Nordgren,** rb, Houston, 6-0, 200.

1969

1. Calvin Hill, rb, Yale, 6-3, 230; **2. Richmond Flowers,** wr, Tennessee, 6-0, 183; **3.** (a) **Tom Stincic,** lb, Michigan, 6-2, 226; (b) Choice from San Francisco for **Harold Hays: Halvor Hagen,** de, Weber State, 6-5, 250; **4.** Choice to New Orleans for **Dave Simmons; 5.** (a) Choice to Baltimore for **Andy Stynchula;** (b) Choice from Los Angeles for **Coy Bacon: Chuck Kyle,** lb, Purdue, 6-1, 220; **6. Rich Shaw,** fl, Arizona State, 6-4, 205; **7. Larry Bales,** wr, Emory & Henry, 5-11, 185; **8. Elmer Benhardt,** lb, Missouri, 6-2, 200; **9. Claxton Welch,** rb, Oregon, 5-11, 200; **10. Stuart Gottlieb,** g, Weber State, 6-5, 250; **11. Clarence Williams,** dt, Prairie View A & M, 6-5, 250; **12. Bob Belden,** qb,

Notre Dame, 6-2, 210; **13. Rene Matison,** wr, New Mexico, 6-0, 185; **14. Gerald Lutri,** t, Northern Michigan, 6-4, 256; **15. Bill Justus,** db, Tennessee, 6-1, 180; **16. Floyd Kerr,** db, Colorado State, 6-3, 195; **17. Bill Bailey,** dt, Lewis & Clark, 6-4, 260.

1970

1. Duane Thomas, rb, West Texas State, 6-1, 220; **2.** (a) Choice from Chicago for **Craig Baynham** and **Phil Clark: Bob Asher,** t, Vanderbilt, 6-5, 255; (b) **Margene Adkins,** wr, Henderson Co. JC., 5-10, 183; **3.** (a) Choice from Houston through Cleveland for **Jerry Rhome: Charlie Waters,** db, Clemson, 6-1, 193; (b) Choice from Cleveland for **Jerry Rhome: Steve Kiner,** lb, Tennessee, 6-1, 215; (c) **Denton Fox,** db, Texas Tech, 6-3, 205; **4. John Fitzgerald,** t, Boston College, 6-4, 265; **5.** Choice to St. Louis for **Bobby Joe Conrad; 6. Pat Toomay,** de, Vanderbilt, 6-4, 230; **7. Don Abbey,** lb, Penn State, 6-2, 252; **8. Jerry Dossey,** g, Arkansas, 6-4, 244; **9. Zenon Andrushyshyn,** k, UCLA, 6-2, 212; **10. Pete Athas,** db, Tennessee, 6-0, 186; **11. Ivan Southerland,** t, Clemson, 6-4, 246; **12. Joe Williams,** re, Wyoming, 6-0, 193; **13. Mark Washington,** db, Morgan State, 5-11, 182; **14. Julian Martin,** wr, North Carolina Central, 6-2, 190; **15. Ken DeLong,** te, Tennessee, 6-1, 223; **16. Seaburn Hill,** db, Arizona State, 6-2, 195; **17. Glen Patterson,** c, Nebraska, 6-3, 220.

10. Cowboy All-Time Rookie Free Agents

(Originally signed by Cowboys; One Year or More on Regular Squad)

1960

Byron Bradfute, ot, Mississippi Southern, 6-3, 246.
Fred Doelling, dhb, Pennsylvania, 5-10, 190.
Jim Mooty, dhb, Arkansas, 5-9, 174.
Gary Wisener, oe, Baylor, 6-2, 205.

1961

Ken Frost, dt, Tennessee, 6-4, 245.
Charlie Granger, ot, Southern University, 6-2, 240.
Warren Livingston, dhb, Arizona, 5-10, 180.
Amos Marsh, fb, Oregon State, 6-1, 210.

1962

Mike Gaechter, dhb, Oregon, 6-0, 196.
Cornell Green, dhb, Utah State, 6-4, 216.
Joe Bob Isbell, g, Houston, 6-1, 243.
Pettis Norman, oe, Johnson C. Smith College, 6-3, 209.

1963

Dave Edwards, lb, Auburn, 6-2, 213.
Wendell Hayes, fb, Humboldt State, 6-0, 203.
Lance Poimbeouf, k, Southwestern Louisiana, 6-3, 245.

1964

Pete Gent, oe, Michigan State, 6-4, 210.
Dave Manders, c, Michigan State, 6-2, 240.

1965

Obert Logan, dhb, Trinity (Texas), 5-10, 180.
Dan Reeves, rb, South Carolina, 6-1, 203.
Colin Ridgway, k, Lamar Tech, 6-5, 211.
Bill Sandeman, dt, University of Pacific (California), 6-6, 249.
A. D. Whitfield, rb, North Texas State, 5-10, 200.

1966

Dick Daniels, dhb, University of Pacific (Oregon), 5-9, 183.
Mike Johnson, dhb, Kansas, 5-11, 188.
John Wilbur, g, Stanford, 6-4, 251.

1967

Ron East, dt, Montana State, 6-4, 245.

1968

———

1969

Otto Brown, dhb, Prairie View, 6-1, 188.

NOTES ON SOURCES

1

The "sudden-death" playoff game of 1958 naturally received coverage in every important newspaper in the United States. As would be expected, the *New York Times* treated it in the most detail. There is careful analysis of it by Tex Maule in "The Best Football Game Ever Played," *Sports Illustrated* (hereafter cited as *S.I.*), January 5, 1959, and "Here's Why It Was the Greatest Football Game Ever Played," *S.I.*, January 19, 1959.

The history of the NFL from 1920 into the 1950's is found in Harold ("Spike") Claasen's *The History of Professional Football*; George Halas' "Quarterbacking a New Industry," *Nation's Business*, December, 1966; the National Football League clubs' *Press-Radio-Television Books* for 1960, 1961, and 1962; Bill Levy's *Return to Glory: The Story of the Cleveland Browns*; and Bill Wallace's *Nelson's Encyclopedia of Pro Football*. Frank X. Tolbert, in "Can He Revive Football's Sad Sacks?" *Saturday Evening Post*, September 27, 1952, wrote the best account of the development of the Dallas Texans of 1952.

The popularity of pro football has been explored in dozens of articles during the sixties. The most suggestive of these include Thomas B. Morgan's "The American War Game," *Esquire*, October, 1965; William Phillips' "A Season in the Stands," *Commentary*, July, 1969; Roone Arledge's "It's Sports, It's Money . . . It's TV," *S.I.*, April 25, 1966; "Battle of Pros—Violence Under Control," *Life*, October 14, 1966; "Pro Foot-

ball: The National Pastime," *Time*, September 16, 1966; and Stephen Mahoney's "Pro Football's Profit Explosion," *Fortune*, November, 1966. Interviews with members of the Cowboy organization also provided information on this subject, and the views of the players, including Ralph Neely, Dan Reeves, John Niland, and Lee Roy Jordan, and of Tex Schramm proved especially useful.

2

Clint Murchison, Jr., and Lamar Hunt explained their interest in pro football and their respective roles in the Dallas expansion controversy of 1959–60 in interviews with the authors. Interviews with Tex Schramm and Angus Wynne added information on the creation of NFL-AFL rivalry in Dallas. The decisions of the United States district court in 1962 and the circuit court of appeals in 1963 concerning the AFL's antitrust action were indispensable sources for the whole expansion controversy, and the *Dallas Morning News* and the *Dallas Times-Herald* provided chronological arrangement of the developing issues. Important published sources include Claasen's *The History of Professional Football*; Tex Maule's "The Shaky New League," *S.I.*, February 8, 1960; and "The Scuffling Pros," *Newsweek*, January 18, 1960.

The economics of a professional football club were explained primarily from interviews with Tom Hardin and Clarence Spangler of the Cowboy business organization and from the following articles: Stephen Mahoney's "Pro Football's Profit Explosion," *Fortune*, November, 1964; Tex Maule's "A Stout Wall for Johnny," *S.I.*, October 5, 1959; Earl Selby's "The Big Dollar in Pro Football," *Reader's Digest*, November, 1966; and Thomas J. Murray's "The Big Booming Business of Pro Football," *Dun's Review and Modern Industry*, September, 1964.

The concept of controlled competition is explained by Ma-

honey in "Pro Football's Profit Explosion." It was reinforced in interviews with Murchison, Hunt, and Schramm.

3

Interviews with Clint Murchison, Jr., Tex Schramm, Tom Landry, and Gil Brandt provided much essential information on the background and work of the leaders of the Cowboy organization as it was established in 1960. Several articles also proved helpful in this area. These included "High Finance, Texas on Wall Street" (about Clint Murchison, Jr.), *Time*, June 16, 1961; Edward Linn's "The Thinking Man's Cowboy, Coach Tom Landry of Dallas," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 17, 1966; Paul O'Neil's "The Giant Defense is A Triumph of Mind," *Life*, December 5, 1960; Robert Riger's "Pro Football's Bright New Breed," *Esquire*, November, 1962; and Tex Maule's "Make No Mistake About It" (about Gil Brandt), *S.I.*, January 29, 1968.

Information on the first Cowboy team was drawn largely from the Schramm, Landry, and Brandt interviews and from the Dallas and Fort Worth newspapers. Jerry Tubbs, now a Cowboy coach, told the authors how he came to the team in 1960. The Jimmy Harris case is explained in *Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc.*, v. *James B. Harris*, 348 *Southwestern Reporter* 2d 37, 1961. "Scouting Reports," *S.I.*, September 26, 1960, predicted some victories for the first team, while the Dallas newspapers told the sad story of the 1960 season very well.

4

The Cowboys-Texans' rivalry in Dallas was discussed by Murchison and Hunt in their interviews. Schramm and Landry also gave the authors information on this subject. Dallas and Fort Worth newspapers provided a sizable body of material

throughout the three-year struggle. Tex Maule, in "Saturation in Dallas," *S.I.*, October 10, 1960, and "Coming of Age in Dallas," *S.I.*, October 2, 1961, devoted himself specifically to the situation in Dallas, while the following articles provided important information on the larger AFL-NFL struggle: Tex Maule's "The Shaky New League," *S.I.*, January 25, 1960; Ray Terrell's "The New Pros Open Up," *S.I.*, September 12, 1960; "Those Losers Won't Quit," *Newsweek*, January 2, 1961; and Melvin Durslag's "Football's League of Headaches," *Saturday Evening Post*, November 4, 1961.

The Cowboys' financial records for 1960–62 were provided by business manager Tom Hardin; estimates of the Texans' losses came from the previously cited articles on the AFL and from the Dallas newspapers.

Tex Schramm provided the story of the Lilly-Holub situation during the 1961 college-player draft. Newspapers and NFL press books describe the annual drafts and the results of each season's play from 1960 through 1962.

The major sources for the problem of league-package television contracts are Judge Grim's decision in *U.S.* v. *National Football League*, 196 *Federal Supplement* 445, 1961, and the debates in *Congressional Record*, 87th Congress, 1st session, September 18–21, 1961. The findings of the AFL's antitrust suit are in *American Football League* v. *National Football League*, 205 *Federal Supplement* 60, 1962, and *American Football League* v. *National Football League*, 323 *Federal Reporter*, 2d 124, 1963. Tex Maule's "Judgment at Baltimore," *S.I.*, June 4, 1962, is a convenient summary of the decision.

5

The description of the Cowboys' scouting system is based above all on an interview and many subsequent conversations with Gil Brandt. Without Brandt's patient willingness to supply

information and allow the authors to use the Cowboys' scouting forms, this part of the chapter could not have been completed. Published sources on this subject include Maule's "Make No Mistake About It"; J. Sayre's "The Once and Future Pro Football," *Holiday*, October, 1968; and a special article by Bob St. John, "IBM Means: Is Brandt Machine," in the *Dallas Morning News*, January 28, 1969.

Important material on free agents came from Brandt, from Dan Reeves's interview, and from *Life with the Cowboys*, a publication of the organization. Sources on Tom Landry's coaching system include interviews with Landry and his coaches and players in addition to the following book and articles: Tex Maule's "A Shuttle Shakes Up The Pros," *S.I.*, November 5, 1962; Riger's "Pro Football's Bright New Breed"; Edwin Schrake's and Tex Maule's "The Young Pros," *S.I.*, September 13, 1965; Linn's "Thinking Man's Cowboy"; and Steve Perkins' *Next Year's Champions: The Story of The Dallas Cowboys*.

The most complete accounts of the Cowboys on-the-field seasons from 1963 through 1966 are found in the Dallas newspapers and the NFL's press books. These papers were supplemented by *S.I.*'s annual "Scouting Reports" and certain special articles, including Tex Maule's "When the Booing Stopped," *S.I.*, September 26, 1966; Maule's "Red Hot Cowboys on A Rampage," *S.I.*, December 5, 1966; "Bye Bye Boos, Dallas Cowboys," *Time*, December 2, 1966; and John R. McDermott's "The Smiles of Texas Are Upon Clint's Cowboys," *Life*, December 16, 1966.

6

The improving business fortunes of the Cowboys from 1963 through 1966 were explored in the club's financial records. Television contracts are described in William Leggett's "The 28-Million-Dollar Deal," *S.I.*, February 3, 1964; "NFL-CBS Pact

Nails Prime Time, Top Cash," *Business Week*, January 1, 1966; and "Bigger Than All of U.S.: Agreement Between CBS and the NFL," *Time*, January 7, 1966. Other sources of income are best explained in "Calling the NFL's Biggest Plays," *Business Week*, October 29, 1966, an article on Commissioner Pete Rozelle.

Robert Curran's *The $400,000 Quarterback; or, The League that Came in from the Cold*, although pro-AFL, is a useful account of the NFL-AFL rivalry. In addition to frequent comments in Dallas area newspapers, good summaries of the developing rivalry are found in Robert H. Boyle's "The Underdogs Have Made It," *S.I.*, November 12, 1962; Dan Jenkins' and Tex Maule's "The Two Pro Football Leagues Must Meet," *S.I.*, December 16, 1963; and Tex Maule's "A Year of Change, Problems and Prosperity," *S.I.*, September 7, 1964.

Two outstanding NFL-AFL disputes over star college players in the early years are summarized in *Los Angeles Rams Football Club* v. *Cannon*, 185 *Federal Supplement* 717, 1960, and *New York Football Giants, Inc.*, v. *Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., and Charles Flowers*, 291 *Federal Reporter* 2d 471, 1961. The facts and points of contention of the early stages of the Neely case are found in *Houston Oilers, Inc.* v. *Ralph Neely*, "Brief of Appellee" [Neely] before the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (provided by Angus Wynne of Wynne, Jaffe & Tinsley in Dallas), and *Houston Oilers, Inc.*, v. *Ralph Neely*, 361 *Federal Reporter* 2d 36, 1966.

Clint Murchison, Jr., Lamar Hunt, and Tex Schramm gave useful information and opinions on the ruinous AFL-NFL competition that developed by mid-1966. The spectacular battles for players in 1965 and 1966 elicited dozens of news articles including "New Way to Get Rich Quick—in Football," *U.S. News and World Report*, January 18, 1965; "The Dotted Linemen," *Newsweek*, January 18, 1965; "Draft Bait," *Newsweek*,

December 6, 1965; "Pro Football: The Money Series," *Time*, December 31, 1965; "Upstaging the AFL," *Newsweek*, January 10, 1966; "New Road to Riches—Story of The Boom in Pro Football," *U.S. News and World Report*, January 17, 1966; and Edwin Schrake's "Big Rookie Bonuses Start a Battle," *S.I.*, January 24, 1966, and "The Fabulous Brodie Caper," *S.I.*, August 29, 1966.

7

Tex Schramm was a principal figure in reaching the merger agreement, so his interview with the authors was especially valuable on that subject. Schramm's part of the story was reinforced by the article "Here's How It Happened," *S.I.*, June 20, 1966. Interviews with Cowboy coaches and players all sought a reaction to and comments on the merger. The following news magazine stories contained useful information on the reaction outside Dallas and the Cowboy organization: "A Merger That Ends An Expensive Rivalry," *U.S. News and World Report*, June 20, 1966; "Pro Football: Seven Times Four Equals One," *Time*, June 17, 1966; and "Quid Pro Quo," *Newsweek*, June 20, 1966. Articles in *Time* on March 24, 1967, and *Newsweek* on March 27, 1967, following the first postmerger draft pointed out how the end of competition cut prices for players. The necessity of exempting the merger from the antitrust laws and the subsequent legislation to do so are explained in the *Congressional Record*, 89th Congress, 2nd session, October 14–21, 1966.

Dallas newspapers followed the Ralph Neely case closely in 1966. The *Morning News* and *Times-Herald*, the interviews with Schramm and Neely, and especially the decision in *Houston Oilers, Inc.*, v. *Ralph Neely*, 361 *Federal Reporter* 2d 36, 1966, were the primary sources for this involved controversy. The story of the Cowboys' unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court is told in *Neely* v. *Houston Oilers, Inc.*, "Petition For A Writ of

Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit" (provided by Angus Wynne of Wynne, Jaffe & Tinsley in Dallas), and *Neely* v. *Houston Oilers, Inc.*, 385 *United States Reports* 840, 942, 1966.

8

Questionnaire replies from a selected group of Dallas business and civic leaders provided valuable material throughout this chapter. All the members of the Cowboy organization who were interviewed were asked for their views on the social and economic impact of the club. The *Morning News* and *Times-Herald* are important sources on the social and business activities of Cowboy players in the Dallas community. Information concerning race relations on the team and in Dallas came especially from the interviews with Schramm, Mel Renfro, and Dan Reeves; from interviewer Gerald Astor's "Black and White Cowboys," *Look*, January 7, 1969; and from Perkins' *Next Year's Champions*.

Important sources on the stadium controversy and Texas Stadium include interviews with Clint Murchison, Jr., Tex Schramm, and Robert Cullum (president of the Texas State Fair Commission); the Dallas newspapers; and material supplied by the Texas Stadium Corporation.

9

The story of the Cowboys' search for a championship since 1967 relies in part on the observations of the authors, who went along on that search as fans. Interviews with the club's personnel, NFL press books, and newspaper accounts served to refresh our memories of those seasons. The Kicking Karavan was explained in detail by Gil Brandt and Ermal Allen. Materials on Calvin Hill's brilliant rookie season were super-

abundant, and they were reinforced by an interview with Hill at the Cowboys' training camp.

Information on the issues of the players' strike and opinions on the questions involved were drawn from the interviews with Tex Schramm, Tom Landry, and the players as well as from the following useful articles: Tex Maule's "Long Hot Winter For Both Leagues," *S.I.*, September 18, 1967; "Unions Call the Signals: NFL and AFL Players Plan to Register with NLRB as Bonafide Unions," *Business Week*, January 13, 1968; Steve Perkins' "Labor v. Management, A Debate in Pads," *Sport Folio*, March, 1968; Edwin Schrake's "Pro Football Faces a Delay of Game," *S.I.*, May 27, 1968; "Stop Action in the NFL," *Newsweek*, July 22, 1968; and "Strange Strike in Football—A Threat to Millions of Fans," *U.S. News and World Report*, July 22, 1968. *Life With the Cowboys* contains information on player pension and benefit plans. Material on the financial success of the Cowboys in the period from 1967 through 1969 came from Tom Hardin, the Cowboys' business manager.

10

The realignment of the leagues to complete the merger received extensive coverage in Dallas newspapers during 1969 and early 1970, and Tex Schramm's interview also provided information on the problems involved. Two articles by Tex Maule—"They'd Rather Switch . . .", *S.I.*, May 26, 1969, and "For the Saints, Realignment is a Love-in," *S.I.*, December 15, 1969—also dealt with that subject.

"As Much Football as Traffic Will Bear," *Broadcasting*, July 28, 1969, is an indispensable source on the new television contracts for the early 1970's. The question of overexposure in the seventies is discussed in Tex Maule's "The Curse of the Endless Playoff," *S.I.*, April 7, 1969. Speculation on "what is wrong with

the Cowboys" and on their future is based on the Dallas newspapers, the prospectus for 1970 provided by the club, and the authors' own perceptions as inexpert, but avid, fans.



GLOSSARY

The *multiple offense* is the use of a variety of different offensive alignments. From each set an almost unlimited number of plays can be run. The purpose of the multiple offense is to confuse the defensive team through the multiplicity of offensive formations, to attack a particular weakness of an opponent, and to gain blocking angles for the offensive line.

Although several teams use the multiple offense, notably the Kansas City Chiefs, the average fan probably associates this concept with the Dallas Cowboys rather than with any other professional club. The Cowboys, for example, can run an almost unlimited number of plays from twenty-nine different sets. The Cowboys use an average of thirteen formations in each game.

The Cowboys begin each offensive play from the *"I" formation* ("Y" designates *split end*, and "W" designates *wing back* or flanker. The position of the *wing back* determines the *strong side* of the offensive formation).



The coaching staff tells the quarterback to run at least twenty-five per cent of all plays from the "I." If the Cowboys attack the enemy from this formation, the offensive players do not place themselves into the traditional *three-point* stance, but rather run the play from a semi-upright position.

If the Cowboy quarterback chooses not to run or pass from the "I," he then shifts the team into one of the three other basic formations: *Brown*, *Red*, or *Green*.

Brown



Red



Green



The Cowboys use only one other formation besides these basic four. In short-yardage situations, two yards and under for a first down or touchdown, they send in an extra *tight end* for added blocking in the offensive line.

"I" Short Yardage



Terms that may confuse the average fan are *flip* and *motion*. Consequently they can be used to demonstrate some of the shifts in the multiple offense.

Shift from *"I"* into *Red Flip* (W and Y always on same side of the field).



Shift from *"I"* into *Red Motion* to *strong side*.



Shift from *"I"* into *Motion* to *Weak Side*: *Red Divide.*



DEFENSE

The Cowboys usually play the standard 4–3 defense:



The *CB* designates *corner backs* or the defensive backs nearest the sidelines, who usually cover the side receiver, and *FS* is the *free safety* or *weak safety*, while *SS* designates *strong safety*.

Most fans believe that professional teams play either a *man-*

to-man defense (a defensive back responsible for covering a particular receiver) or a *zone defense* (a defensive back responsible for covering a particular geographic area of the football field). Contrary to that opinion, professional teams utilize not only a man-to-man or zone but the frequent combination of the two defenses in a given situation. Usually linebackers and defensive backs do not know which of the defenses will be most effective until an offensive team comes out into a formation. Then the defensive coverage will make allowance for the offensive alignment and, in many cases, indeed change into zone, man-to-man, or a combination of the two based on the route run by the receivers. In many man-to-man situations the *free safety* has no special assignment, and thus is free either to double-cover a likely receiver or to go for the football. When the Cowboys call a *blitz*, some defensive backs, usually *LB* or line backers, rush the passer along with the linemen.



The Cowboys use one other defensive formation—the *prevent defense*. In the prevent defense, used on long yardage situations, near the end of a half, or in a case where the opponent must have a touchdown to win, the Cowboys remove one defensive tackle and send in an extra defensive back.

Other Terms of Interest

Pressure Defense.—The defensive linemen rush the passer without any hesitation. The Rams are usually best known for this type of defense.

Contain Defense.—A defensive lineman hesitates first to stop the run and to be responsible for an assigned geographic area and *then* rushes the passer. The Cowboys usually play a contain defense.

"Aerobics Run."—This is not the popular exercise system. Rather, it is a requirement by Landry that linebackers, offensive and defensive backs, and receivers run one and three-quarters miles in twelve minutes and linemen run one and one-half miles in the same length of time.

Rookie Camp.—The camp designed for rookies beginning two weeks prior to the regular training camp. There rookies compete only against each other, and the Cowboy coaches believe that they are better able to judge a rookie's natural talent during this period rather than by allowing him to be overshadowed by a veteran's experience.

Two-A-Days.—During training camp, the system of morning and afternoon practices.

Landry Mile.—Now discontinued. It once was a requirement at training camp that each back run one mile in under six minutes and each lineman in under seven.

Isometric Exercises.—The concept of muscular contraction taking place against resistance which consequently increases one's strength without shortening the muscle fibers. Professional football teams use isometric exercises to increase a player's agility and strength without making him "muscle bound."

Exergenie Program.—The Cowboys use a machine known as the Exergenie for isometric exercises. This relatively inexpensive apparatus (around $30.00) is a series of ropes and adjustments that allows a player to pull against an immovable object and exercise and strengthen particular muscles quickly. When the player pulls, the apparatus allows the muscles to extend to full length when a given amount of pressure is exerted. The machine can be adjusted so that each time more pressure is necessary to complete the exercise.

Injured Reserve.—A list that contains the names of injured players. These players cannot be activated during the season.

Injured List.—Injured list should not be confused with injured reserve. One can be waived injured, that is, placed on an injured list. If a player is waived injured, the team cannot recall him until four league games or thirty days have elapsed.

Taxi Squad.—Each team may assign a certain number of players (seven in 1969) to this squad. These players do not count against the forty-man squad limit.

Waiver.—A term used to denote a list of players a professional team announces that it is releasing from its active squad. Any other team in the league may claim these players for the one-hundred-dollar waiver price, or the players may be waived through the entire league, that is, no one may claim their contract. The team that waives the players, if no other team claims them, can assign the unclaimed players to the taxi squad.

Move List.—Obviously some players waived are very valuable reserves or future prospects. Consequently, when the season begins each team has a specified number of moves (ten in 1969) to use in transferring players from the roster to the taxi squad and vice-versa, to bring up a player from the injured list, or to activate someone acquired by trade. Those sent through the move list do not have to be waived.

Free Agent.—If a college player is not chosen in the annual draft, he is a free agent. If a ballplayer is waived through the league and is released by a club, he becomes a free agent. He may then sell his services to the highest bidder.

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